Ruth Wedgwood is Edward B. Burling Professor of International Law and Diplomacy; and Director of the International Law and Organizations Program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University, Washington DC. She is also a  visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution and a member of the UN Human Rights Committee.

If you’re a betting person, here’s a safe bet: On August 9, the balloting in the east African state of Rwanda will give world-famous military leader Paul Kagame yet another seven-year term as president. The astonishing margin of victory will impress even the modern grand viziers of Central Asia. The outcome is quite easy to predict, when no other candidates are allowed to campaign.

Given this and much else besides, it’s time Washington began to create some distance from a man who has earned his reputation as a de facto despot who terrorizes critics and does not shrink from political violence.

Kagame revels in his fame as the strategist who led a Tutsi invasion force from Uganda in 1994, pushing back the Hutu army and Hutu militia, though not before they perpetrated a shocking genocidal slaughter of hundreds of thousands of the country’s Tutsi minority, as well as moderate Hutu. Washington, reeling from Somalia and fearing another Black Hawk Down, refused to intervene. Madeline Albright was directed to inform the U.N. Security Council that, no, we would not reconstitute the U.N. peacekeeping force in Rwanda, and, further, the United States would veto any resolution that authorized other countries to do so. It was the season of peacekeeping misadventures, and the Clinton White House decided, as one former National Security Council official recalls, that it could not afford to intervene both in Haiti and Rwanda. Presidential Decision Directive 25, drafted by Richard Clarke as a white paper for peacekeeping, morphed into an excuse to “just say no.”

For the last 15 years, Kagame has at every turn invoked these memories to shoehorn the West into a nearly reflexive support for his government. Even Bill Clinton came back to apologize. Kagame has become a fixture at the United Nations in New York, regaling delegations in the Indonesian Lounge, extolling his vision of benevolent autocracy, claiming to admire Singapore as his model for economic growth and insisting that he and only he can keep Rwanda’s torn society knitted together.

In truth, the Rwandan leader presides over nothing more than hollow democracy. He has attacked and exiled any and all viable political opponents. The local press, as well as international journalists, have been bludgeoned and harassed. The regime uses the Stalinist crime of “divisionism” as a pretext to silence and prosecute any critic who dares question its policies or the state sanctioned version of the 1994 conflict. Read the rest of this entry »

 Christian J. Tams is Professor of International Law at the Univeristy of Glasgow. His publications include Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

The International Court of Justice’s Kosovo opinion of 22 July had been much expected. It was one of the not so frequent instances which the world (as opposed to State parties, or a small group of international lawyers) was waiting for the world court to speak. Great expectations can lead to great disappointment. And judging from the first round of reactions and responses on this blog and in other fora, there is indeed a feeling of disappointment: of course among those who expected a different outcome, but also among those who would have hoped for a fuller discussion of the legal issues raised by the unilateral declaration of independence of 17 February 2008.

I share many of the points made in the posts by Dapo and Zoran in their posts on this blog, notably their surprise at the Court’s strained conclusion on the identity of the authors of the declaration of independence – a readjustment of the request that is rightly criticised by Vice-President Tomka in his declaration. Instead of reiterating my agreement with other criticisms, I will use this comment to make two broader points on the scope of the opinion. The first comes back to the “minimalist” focus of the opinion, and essentially is an attempt to shift some of the blame away from the Court. The second is a reflection on what seems to be the crucial substantive statement of the opinion – namely that general international law does not prohibit declarations of independence.

A narrow answer to a narrow question

First, the Court’s minimalism. Few fail to mention it, some even speak of a “non-opinion”. I agree: the Kosovo opinion is narrowly argued, and its advisory value limited. But unlike some others, I do not think the Court can really be blamed for that. Of course, some of the judges may have been relieved to offer a narrow/cautious/minimalist reasoning, yet this is not unusual: when faced with high profile disputes courts often decide to be technical, and the ICJ is no exception. The real point is another one, and while obvious, I do not think it is properly reflected in the discussion so far. It is this: Read the rest of this entry »

Our readers might wish to know that the the ICJ’s recent Order on the inadmissibility of Italy’s counter-claims in the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State case, that was buried under the deluge that was the Kosovo AO,  is available from today on the ICJ’s website, together with three separate opinions. The Order essentially deals with the temporal admissibility of claims under Article 1 of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, and is in a way a sequel to the Certain Property (Liechtenstein v. Germany) case rejected by the Court a few years ago.

Editor’s Note: This post continues our discussion of Klabbers, Peters & Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law. In this post Prof. Peters responds to earlier posts by Professors Dunoff and Trachtman , Steven Wheatley, Jean Cohen, and  Dan Bodansky.

It is an honour to receive comments by distinguished experts on constitutionalism and international law. And it is fun to engage in a substantial discussion on difficult issues.

1. Method: All commentators raised important methodological issues.

Description and (‘top down’) prescription

Dunoff and Trachtman reproach us of a ‘top down’ approach to constitutionalism. In the introductory chapter, it was made clear that the book is, as such, a normative exercise, on a middle level of abstractness, and hooking onto existing legal rules, principles, and institutions. To the extent that this meant to ‘extrapolate’ trends (of constitutionalization), the study included the claim that these trends actually exist (a claim which was openly formulated in the book).

Dunoff and Trachtman also reproach us of embracing an ‘overly heroic vision of the law’. This critique manifests a disciplinary rift in the approaches of the two books, ours and the one edited by our critics. (see here). Dunoff and Trachtman espouse a more empirical method, more informed by social science. In contrast, we as a trio have not attempted to apply sociological methods, neither in quantitative not in qualitative terms. Our arguments are, as declared in Chapter 1, normative ones.

International constitutional law and politics

Steven Wheatley points out that the ‘language and metaphors of constitutionalism suggests a realm of (“neutral” and “objective”) discourse that sits above … politics’, whereas in reality the ‘global constitutional settlement … is the product of political debate, discourse, and will’. Along that line, Dunoff and Trachtman suspect us of *’under-estimating the role of international politics’.

Dunoff and Trachtman are right in saying that the enactment of positive law is only a ‘starting point, rather than a culmination’. Nevertheless, any (political) action does need a starting point. Under the rule of law, positive law is indeed a conditio sine qua non of governmental action. I postulate that there is an international rule of law which requires international governance to be based on legal rules (i.e. on formal and general prescriptions) as opposed to governance by ad hoc decisions.

Moreover, law and politics should not be viewed as distinct realms, but rather as deeply intertwined. Law is both the product (and desired consequence) of political activity, and an organizer and limit of political action. In particular, constitutional law is a branch of law which is very close to politics. Read the rest of this entry »

The UK government has announced recently that it plans to introduce legislation which would somewhat restrict the application of universal jurisdiction in the UK. The proposed rules do not restrict the scope of universal jurisdiction in the UK but will affect the possibility of private persons obtaining an arrest warrant in relation to universal jurisdiction crimes. The statement released by the government is as follows:

“Our commitment to our international obligations and to ensuring that there is no impunity for those accused of crimes of universal jurisdiction is unwavering.

It is important, however, that universal jurisdiction cases should be proceeded with in this country only on the basis of solid evidence that is likely to lead to a successful prosecution – otherwise there is a risk of damaging our ability to help in conflict resolution or to pursue a coherent foreign policy.

The Government has concluded, after careful consideration, that it would be appropriate to require the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions before an arrest warrant can be issued to a private prosecutor in respect of an offence of universal jurisdiction.”

Is this part of the demise of universal jurisdiction? I think not. The change is only a very slight restriction on how universal jurisdiction legislation will be applied given that the consent of the UK Attorney General was always required for prosecutions under such legislation. Also, it is worth pointing out that just last year the UK extended UK jurisdiction with respect to crimes under the UK’s International Criminal Court Act. Read the rest of this entry »

Chapter 7  of The Constitutionalization of International Law discusses the pros and cons of the constitutionalist paradigm. Critics of global constitutionalism doubt the empirical reality of the phenomenon called constitutionalization, call into question the analytic value of constitutionalism as an academic approach, and fear that the discourse is in normative terms dangerous. The chapter counters these objections.

1. The term ‘constitution’ might be a misnomer when applied to the international sphere. Also, the danger of blowing up an academic paper tiger is very real. Global constitutionalism as an academic agenda should follow the middle path between merely self-dignifying the status quo on the one hand and hanging onto pipe dreams on the other. In order to gain acceptance in the political realm, global constitutionalists might highlight the current situation of global interdependence. With such a state of affairs, national and global public interests tend to converge more and more, national interests and universal idealism are not necessarily in opposition. Given this convergence of global and national, an ‘idealist’ global constitutionalism which promotes global interests, may even, at least in the long run, further national economic and political interests as well, although some states benefit more than others.

2. The constitutionalist reading of international law might raise dangerously seductive over-expectations. Read the rest of this entry »

 In Chapter 6 of The Constitutionalization of International Law which deals with ‘Dual Democracy’, Anne Peters engages (see post here) with the challenges presented by regulation by non-state actors and the reduction in the importance of sovereign consent in international law to the practice of domestic democracy. The two-track solution depends on the democratization of domestic political systems (democracy within the state) and the democratization of international organizations and other non-state actors, principally through the introduction of parliamentary assemblies and consultation mechanisms (democracy beyond the state).

 International parliamentary assemblies might provide a useful addition to the global institutional architecture, but they would not ensure the democratization of global governance. The establishment of a legislative assembly does not provide democratic legitimacy in the absence of a political community constructed by the exercise of political authority through law. The principal advantages of international assemblies lie in their ability to ensure the representation of the plurality of dominant political opinions within states and to compensate for the democratic deficit that results from the application of the principle of sovereign equality in international law-making (one-state; one vote, irrespective of population size). The most significant contribution would be in establishing an institutional mechanism to monitor the governance activities of global regulators and providing a locus for informed democratic debate on the appropriateness (or otherwise) of global law norms. Read the rest of this entry »

Zoran Oklopcic is Assistant Professor, Department of Law, Carleton University, Ottawa. Hs previous EJIL:Talk! post on Self-Determination and the Status of Kosovo can be found here.

As we digest the meaning and implications of the recent Advisory Opinion, Separate and Dissenting Opinions, I’d like to offer two preliminary remarks: the first deals with the (lack of) mention of the right to self-determination of peoples, and secondly regarding the identity of the author of the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo.

In its decision, the Court declined to ‘apply’ straightforwardly the norm of self-determination to judge the UDI ‘illegal’ or ‘legal’. Had it chosen to follow the suggestions of Spain, Argentina, Serbia, China and others, Kosovo’s UDI would have been judged illegal because ‘external’ self-determination doesn’t apply outside of the contexts of decolonization and military occupation. Conversely, if following Albania, Estonia, Poland, Germany, Ireland and others, Kosovo’s UDI would have been legal under the ‘remedial’ variant of self-determination.

The Court chose instead to follow the suggestions of the United States, Britain and several other countries, and not to engage in interpretation of the question of self-determination at all. In a situation where opinions on the applicability of self-determination sharply diverge, seeking the lowest common denominator, the lex specialis of UN Resolution 1244 to judge Kosovo’s UDI, could have appeared as a prudent strategy. Interestingly, the Court did not refer to the parallel prong of the US argument—“the unique combination of factors”—that sought to provide a moral component to the otherwise technical reasoning that anchored the legal argument in the interpretation of Res. 1244. Read the rest of this entry »

The International Court of Justice has held that the declaration of independence by Kosovo is not in violation of international law.  Despite what is likely to be said in the media, this opinion is rather narrow. The Court has not ruled that Kosovo is (or is not a State) nor has it ruled that it is lawful (or unlawful) for States to recognise the independence of Kosovo. All that the Court has said is that international law does not prohibit the people of Kosovo (or their representatives) from declaring independence. I suppose this is of some relevance to other people aspiring for independence as it indicates that international law does not prevent a minority from trying to achieve independence - by means of a verbal declaration. I doubt that this is in any way controversial but just to have the ICJ say this gives a political boost to those aspiring for independence. So in this sense, the opinion is a victory for Kosovo.  As Marko stated in his excellent preview (which is still worth reading as it captures really well the issues before the Court and the options that it had before it), one of the key issues before the Court was the “question question”: what was the scope of the question before the Court? According to the Court:

“The question is narrow and specific; it asks for the Court’s opinion on whether or not the declaration of independence is in accordance with international law. It does not ask about the legal consequences of that declaration. In particular, it does not ask whether or not Kosovo has achieved statehood. Nor does it ask about the validity or legal effects of the recognition of Kosovo by those States which have recognized it as an independent State. Accordingly, the Court does not consider that it is necessary to address such issues as whether or not the declaration has led to the creation of a State or the status of the acts of recognition in order to answer the question put by the General Assembly.” (para. 51)

Furthermore in answering the narrow question as to whether or not the declaration was in accordance with internationa law, the Court took the view that all it had to do was decide whether or not the declaration was prohibited by international law. In its view, it was not called upon to decide whether Kosovo had a right or entitlement to declare independence. This mean that issues to do with self-determination and whether there was a right of minorities to “remedial seccession” were not addressed by the Court . Read the rest of this entry »

Jean L. Cohen is Nell and Herbert Singer Professor of Political Theory and Contemporary Civilization at Columbia University.

I was asked to respond to the chapters of Anne Peters in the new volume, The Constitutionalisation of International Law. Peters’ work is comprehensive, diligent and impressive in its erudition and scope.  It gives a good overview of the arguments on all sides yet does not convince me.  I’ll summarize the general thesis and make some remarks along the way and in conclusion. 

Peters’ chapter on Dual Democracy must be situated in the cosmopolitan camp.  Her thesis is that global constitutionalism requires democracy and that democracy must be dual: i.e. it must operate on two tracks: one statist, the other individualist, the former relating to governance within states, the latter to governance ‘above’ states. While it is not clear to me why global constitutionalism requires democracy (Much could depend on the concepts of constitution and constitutionalism which are not examined in these chapters. But whatever conception one works with, surely it is not convincing to equate constitutionalism and democracy: rather their interrelation requires serious theoretical and perhaps historical reflection).  Obviously the real thrust of the chapter is about imagining a feasible utopia of democratic global governance.  There’s no need to repeat the arguments as to the non-democratic character of international law-making or of global governance institutions.  Clearly the issue of legitimacy arises due to the expanded scope and reach of international/global law and governance.  For Peters, legitimacy means democratic legitimacy.  She usefully canvasses all the usual suspects in the democratic camp and comes up with her own distinctive position.  The strength of her position is that it avoids the substitution-alism of many models – cosmopolitan democracy does not replace democracy within states, global civil society does not replace domestic or global government, mechanisms of direct democracy do not replace mechanisms of representation or accountability.  Nor does her approach simply rest on the domestic analogy: she trys not to simply ratchet up democratic arrangements and mechanisms developed in democratic states to the globe or to international organizations (IOs) or in today’s parlance, global governance institutions (GGIs).  To be sure, she works with a strong conception of democratic principles—political equality, participation, inclusion of all governed, responsiveness and accountability of the governing actors and the sanction power of citizens to throw out politicians normally through elections.  But the dualistic conception is contrived to mesh with the dualism of the world order—i.e. as one that is and will remain composed of both states and individuals.  Thus against substitutes like theories of deliberation, participatory democracy or competitive democracy (ascribed to Dryzek, Pateman, and Pettit respectively) that allegedly should replace formal electoral democracy, she rightly argues that these do not on their own merit the label, democratic unless they hook up with formal i.e. electoral democratic mechanisms.

 How then to resolve the democratic deficit of international law?  So what is dual democracy?  Again, the constitutionalisation of international law in this chapter entails democratization which must occur on two distinct tracks. Read the rest of this entry »