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Home Editorials EJIL Editorial Vol 21:1- Lautsi: Crucifix in the Classroom Redux

EJIL Editorial Vol 21:1- Lautsi: Crucifix in the Classroom Redux

Published on June 1, 2010        Author: 

There are few legal issues which still manage to evoke civic passion in the wider population. Increasingly, and sometimes for the wrong reasons, the place of religion in our public spaces has become one of them. In the age of the internet and Google we can safely assume that all readers of this Journal will have either read the Lautsi decision of the European Court of Human Rights or have read about it, thus obviating the need for the usual preliminaries. As is known, a Chamber of the Court held that the displaying in Italian public schools of the crucifix was a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Independently of one’s view of the substantive result, the decision of the Second Chamber of the ECtHR is an embarrassment. There are few long-term issues on the European agenda that are more urgent, more complex and more delicate than the way we deal with the challenging problems of State and Church, religious minorities, the questions of collective identities of Europe and within Europe, and the parameters of uniformity and diversity of our states and within our states. All these issues are encapsulated in Lautsi. All are disposed of, Oracle like, in 11 impatient and apodictic paragraphs. Compare this to the 90 pages of the Supreme Court of the UK in the recent JFS Case, to give but one example.[1]

The European Court of Human Rights is not an Oracle. It is a dialogical partner with the Member States Parties to the Convention, and the legitimacy and persuasiveness of its decisions resides both in their quality and communicative power. The ECtHR is simultaneously reflective and constitutive of the European constitutional practices and norms. When there is a diverse constitutional practice among the Convention States – and there certainly is in this area – the Court needs to listen, not only preach, and to be seen to be listening. In this decision not only does it not engage with the rich jurisprudence, doctrine and practice to be found in many of the Member States, while blithely citing mostly its own decisions, it does not even address some of the issues raised by the defendant state.

The Decision of the Chamber is undergirded by the following breathtaking understanding of the Convention system in matters of Church and State: ‘[t]he duty of neutrality and impartiality of the state is incompatible with any judgment on its part of the legitimacy of religious beliefs or ways of expressing them’ (Recital 47(e)).

The mind simply boggles. What, for example, of a Britain, with its established Church, in which the Monarch is not only the Head of State but the Head of the Church of England, in which schoolchildren might be invited to sing the national anthem (God (oy vey) Save the Queen). Is that very constitutional structure of an Established Church not some kind of judgment that in some way at least Anglicanism is not illegitimate?  Would the UK ever be able to comply with this norm? Is the Court intimating that Britain is to become a France on this issue? May Irish schools no longer teach the Irish Constitution to schoolchildren because the Constitution endorses expressis verbis in its Preamble the Holy Trinity? Must Denmark, like Sweden, abandon Lutheranism as the official Danish Church or hide this fact from its children? One could cite endless other examples. Can one have an established church, or an endorsed church, or a supported church, or a privileged church (one of the many modalities of the non-laique group of states who are, pace the Chamber, still part of Europe), as one does in so many European states, which does not, at a minimum, impinge on the issue of legitimacy of religious beliefs as the Court seems to say no state may?

What is so interesting about the European constitutional doctrinal landscape is that whilst insisting on Freedom of Religion and Freedom from Religion, it allows a rich diversity in the constitutional iconography of the state and different forms of entanglement of religion in its public life: from fully established churches to endorsed churches to cooperative arrangements as well as, of course, to states in which laïcité is part of the definition of the state, as in France.

It is not possible to establish a hermetic border between the symbology of the state which may be religiously imbued and the positive asset of its constitutional law which must respect freedom from religion any more than it is impossible to prevent some spillover from, say, the French laique self-understanding into the classroom. When one prohibits all religious dress in school, rather than allowing all religious dress, is one not making some kind of statement on religious belief?

How one draws the line between the identitarian aspects of the state which might have religious elements and the need for an education which is free and not religiously coercive is an important and delicate issue. But you cannot even begin to draw that line if you do not acknowledge that in Europe there is such a line to be drawn. These issues were raised in the pleadings, but find no echo at all in the decision.

This is not merely a formal critique of the Chamber’s failure to understand the doctrinal and conceptual field in which this decision is situated. The European landscape which accepts as legitimate a UK and a France, a Malta or Greece or Ireland as well as an Italy, is a unique and uniquely promising model of tolerance and pluralism. You would not guess such from the decision of the Court. The rhetoric of this decision, its underlying sensibility, its omission to acknowledge these distinctions, would be understandable if it were penned by the French Constitutional Council or, for that matter, the US Supreme Court. But not from the ECtHR.

What, then, of the actual holding? In some way the Government of Italy raised the white flag of surrender even before the Court issued its decision by relying exclusively on the argument that the school crucifix was little more than a cultural symbol that transcended or marginalized its original or outwardly religious significance. Still, their argument was not specious. The cross in the ‘Red Cross’ we see on ambulances or in the battlefield are accepted as a symbol of human value that has long lost its identification  with the Christian tradition. And the same is true for the cross which is to be found in many national flags. But context does matter and I think that the Court was right to reject this argument in the context of the classroom. This is especially so when, as is so often the case, the cross in the classroom is not the ‘logo-ized’ simple cross but a veritable crucifix with the body of Christ. But even had Italy won on this argument, it would, in my eyes, have been a pyrrhic victory. In the cultural, social and political circumstance of Europe today one does not want to win on such ground – because it implies that if a symbol still maintains its religious significance, it has no place in the public square. That cannot be a correct reflection of the European constitutional sensibility.

The Court was right to emphasize that the Convention provisions in question should be interpreted in the light of the objective of educating towards a democracy which instils the values of pluralism and tolerance. It is also right to emphasize that in our understanding of Religious Freedom one must emphasize both the positive (Freedom of Religion) and the negative (Freedom from Religion). We may, too, accept its ruling that in the classroom the Crucifix may have a plurality of meanings, but its predominant one is religious. And we may even accept its premise that what the public authority puts on the walls of its schools has an educational impact, at a minimum by validating or invalidating certain world views.

Does all this lead ineluctably to the conclusion that the Crucifix, as a religious symbol, has no place in the school? It is here that things require very careful and close attention and where we meet the most disappointing aspect of this decision: its failure seriously to grapple – except in ‘knee jerk’ fashion – with the new circumstance of Europe in which these issues suddenly seem pressing.

In a multicultural society, where the principal cleavages are among different religions or different religious denominations, a display in the public school attended by, say, Christians, Jews and Muslims, of the crucifix could be seen as educationally coercive. The remedy in this scenario might be either to remove the crucifix, validating no religion, or to add, as appropriate, say the crescent and the Star of David, validating all equally. One might think that the second option is better since, if handled appropriately, it would offer more hope of teaching a positive lesson of mutual respect and tolerance – especially when one is faced with a majority religion that is not in need of validation and others that are subject to suspicion or scorn. The effect of a naked wall, and a wall which displays all symbols, though formally equal in its neutrality, is educationally very different.

But the Europe of today is not such a multicultural society. In many of our states, the cleavage between, say, religious Catholics, Jews and Muslims, is far smaller than between the ‘faithful’ (whether Jews or Christians or Muslims) and the ‘secular’. Laïcité  is not an empty category which signifies absence of faith. It is often, as in this case, a rich world view, a position of conscience. It is not an indifference to religion. The secularist would find the crucifix as offensive as might the Jew or Muslim. Having on the wall a crucifix, a crescent and a Star of David would be to someone for whom a secular world view was not just a description of absence of religious faith, but a ‘faith’ in its own right, triply offensive.

So what of a naked wall? Easy solution?

Consider the following parable of Marco and Leonardo, two friends just about to start a new school An exciting moment. They live in a place like Abano Terme, the locale where Ms Lautsi lived. Leonardo visits Marco for the first time at his home. He enters and notices a crucifix on the wall at the entrance. ‘What is that?’, he asks. ‘A crucifix – why, you don’t have one? Every house should have one.’ Leonardo returns to his home agitated. His mother patiently explains: ‘They are believing Catholics. We respect them and their beliefs.’ (Or, we don’t believe in such stuff, but we respect their right to believe etc.) ‘Can we have one on our wall?’ ‘No’ would surely be the answer of a firm and decided mother like Ms. Lautsi. And rightly so. It is a secular world view that she wants to impart to her children. Now imagine a visit by Marco to Leonardo’s house. ‘Wow!’, he exclaims, ‘no crucifix? An empty wall?’ He returns agitated to his house. ‘Well’, explains his mother, ‘they are a wonderful family, good and kind and charitable. But they do not share our belief in the Saviour. We respect them.’ ‘So can we remove our crucifix?’ ‘Of course not. We respect them, but for us it is unthinkable to have a house without a crucifix.’ The next day both kids go to school. Imagine the school with a crucifix. Leonardo returns home agitated: ‘The school is like Marco’s house. Are you sure, Mamma, that it is okay not to have a crucifix?’ That is the essence of Ms. Lausti’s complaint. But imagine, too, that on the first day the walls are naked. Marco returns home agitated. ‘The school is like Leonardo’s house,’ he cries. ‘You see, I told you we don’t need it.’ And even more alarming would be the situation if the crucifixes, always there, suddenly were removed.

In a society where one of the principal cleavages is not among the religious but between the religious and the secular, absence of religion is not a neutral option.  Some countries, like the Netherlands and the UK, understand better the dilemma. The state there is more serious in trying to be neutral or agnostic in the educational area. It funds secular schools and, on an equal footing, religious schools. It is a system that has clear advantages in allowing parents to give the kind of education they choose for their children with equal funding by the state – though, of course, respecting a certain core of civic content. It ensures freedom of religion, in that critical area of education, and allows freedom from religion on an equal footing. It is an option which, apparently, is not available under the Italian Constitution. In any event, I think that there is something noble and educationally challenging in having all kids in the same public school and learning to respect each other in the rich diversity which characterizes our societies. But in the conditions of our societies, the naked public square, the naked wall in the school, is decidedly not a neutral position, which seems to be at the root of the reasoning of the Court. It is no more neutral than having a crucifix on the wall. It is a disingenuous secular canard, the opposite of pluralism, which has to be dispelled once and for all if we are serious about teaching our children, religious and secular, Christian, Muslim and Jew, to live as a harmonious society in mutual respect. Further, to say that the cross is predominantly religious does not mean that it is only that and that Italian history and identity started with, say the French Revolution. Is one to revoke from the public space one’s symbols as if ‘contaminated’ by their religious content? Change the British National Anthem? Amend the first phrase of the German Constitution? On the other hand, the Italian government cannot credibly simply insist on the status quo ante under the unconvincing legal stratagem that the crucifix is nothing more than, or predominantly, a cultural icon. That is nonsense and even committed Christians should rebel against such a reductionist notion of the Christian principal religious icon.

What then should the Court do? It has every right and duty to impose an obligation on states to ensure that their public schools are not a place which is religiously coercive. (Militant atheism is also religiously coercive.) But there is no ‘One Size Fits All’ manner in which this can be achieved. It depends on demographics, tradition, and creative educational solutions.

In every context in which this becomes an issue, public authorities, educational experts, representatives of the different social forces must engage in a conversation of the best means to ensure a school precinct and classroom that will positively show respect for different religions, and not hide them away, as well as equal respect for the secular Weltanschauung. It may require the removal of all crucifixes, of some crucifixes, of none at all. It may require the addition of other religious symbols. It may require a school precinct which reflects the pluralism of society – some rooms with, some rooms without, etc. I am sure that those whose field is education can come up with creative, differentiated solutions – not only lawyers are creative.

By this reasoning, Ms. Lautsi is perhaps entitled to her damages because the Italian government failed to demonstrate that the use of religious symbology in its classroom was part of a credible programme of education for tolerance and mutual respect. It is that which should be the guideline and constitutional imperative of contemporary Europe.


[1] Length does not ensure necessarily a good decision as that very decision of the Supreme Court proves. But reasoning, even if misguided, is preferable to oracular commands. For a critique of the JFS decision see http://www.jewishreviewofbooks.com/publications/detail/discrimination-and-identity-in-london-the-jewish-free-school-case.

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5 Responses

  1. Natasha

    Thank you Professor Weiler for this very interesting post. I wonder, do you think the Lautsi case and the JFS case are manifestations of a broader shift away from institutional freedom of religion and towards a more individualised conception of religious freedom? And what do you think are the implications of this trend? Is there room for a more robust conception of freedom of religion in the ECHR, given the wording of Article 9, or is this an issue that should rather be dealt with through the margin of appreciation?

  2. Ronan McCrea

    Thank you Professor Weiler for a most interesting piece. I agree with much of what you have written. However, I feel that the story of Marco and Leonardo is not quite appropriate. It attributes to the silence of the state a positive atheism. Secularism and atheism are very different things. The latter is a view on the merits of the religion, the former a framework of dealing with the fact of religious diversity in state contexts. The story would perhaps be more appropriate if Leonardo’s family had a picture of Voltaire, Richard Dawkins or some other anti-religious figure on their wall symbolising their rejection of religion. The two boys attending a school with an empty wall would then perceive that the state neither endorsed nor rejected the spiritual position of either of their parents.
    Congratulations again on a stimulating piece.
    Best wishes,

    Ronan McCrea

  3. Gabor

    The crucifix have different meaning for various groups in Europe. Gypsies, Jews and Muslims (e.g. Albanians) were murdered under the cross. Those children might have nightmares seeing those again on school walls.

    Weiler is right, Europe of today is not a multicultural society – because they murdered non-Christians.

  4. […] are not among different religions but rather between religious and non-religious (see also his post in EJIL: Talk!). Although the Lautsi case raises a whole array of complex issues concerning the limits of […]

  5. Jacob Hedman

    in response to Ronan’s comment; but then in your suggested scenario when then the boy’s return to school and see the blank walls, what is it in their text books that the school is showing, is it Voltaire, Darwin, religious tolerance, Christianity, Islam, Judaism? I mean is it minority rule or majority rule? This issue is of immense importance here in USA I feel. I really appreciate this dialog on this matter in a reasonable tone and feel what professor Weiler discussed is something that I wish more of the professors and educators, citizens and politicians would revisit more throughly in the like manner.

    Here Christians can not have these religious freedoms in all public schools and yet what is taught as fact is Darwinism but not creationism, they have it in the books, in the curriculum, they don’t need it on the walls. It moved from freedom OF religion and majority rules to freedom FROM religion minority rules in the public sector here.

    Which is not equality, it is giving validity and more bearing to one view point than the other. For one’s view should be equal here in the US and thus the sum total of the mass should be respected and understood, however not that it alienates anyones freedoms. Yet having it that the minority rule superseeds the majority does not honor the rights of the individual in the majority either.

    If your religion is of a minority in our current culture, then you are protected from being kept from honoring your religious convictions. Which is good but when it does not work that way for the peoples whos religious freedoms fall on the side of the majority your are not given this liberty because it some how now turns to become oppressive to the minority. Only that the case really is that the majority is whom being repressed at this point. And this is not true and equal. This is out of balance and false.

    I only write this from an Americans view in response to a nice surprise that I can read this blog and see what others are facing as well. I pray for peace about these issues of tolerance and true justice and for us to have creative loving solutions with patient and thoughtful debate to cultivate the most loving and logical outcomes to these and other social differences.