There are, I think, at least three different “variants” of what is commonly termed “global constitutionalism” – and the GAL project interacts in a complex manner with all three, at no point refusing the conceptual possibility (although many doubt, in some variants, the empirical plausibility).

Firstly, there is a domestic variant – global rules as a source for domestic constitutional law. On this, the GAL project has little if anything to say: except to note that this type of global influencing of national actors and laws is much more pronounced in the administrative field.

Secondly, there is an extra-national variant – the “constitutionalisation” of various international bodies. Analyses along these lines are usually limited to the EU, the WTO and occasionally the UN. There is nothing in the concept of GAL that would deny this possibility; indeed, the EU and the WTO both have plausible claims to some (if different) form of constitutionalisation. GAL here can act as complementary: its focus on all bodies that exercise public power allows it to encapsulate those (the vast majority) global regulators in terms of which constitutional discourse simply appears inappropriate (transnational networks of regulators, formally private bodies with a public governance function, etc.). GAL, however, is in no way premised upon a rejection fo either the possibility or indeed the existence of such extranational constitutions.

Lastly, there is the “universal” variant of global constitutionalism, in which the plurality extranational constitutions can be seen as either manifestations of, or models for, the emergence of a truly global constitutional polity, heirarchically superior to all others. Although many – myself included – doubt whether this is either empirically justifiable or normatively desirable, again, GAL is not opposed in principle to this; instead, administrative law would complement constitutional law at the global level as it does domestically. However, given the evident contemporary fragmentation of both values and normative orders, and the apparent lack of political will to change this, it is worthwhile recalling that GAL can exist, and operate effectively, with such fragmentation – and, importantly, can continue to do so, in a relatively stable manner, even if the putative move to a unitary global polity does not – ever – materialise.

To summarise: global constitutionalism needs GAL; GAL, on the other hand, can operate with or without its constitutional counterpart.

(I have posted on this in more detail on NYU’s GAL blog, at http://globaladminlaw.blogspot.com/2008/12/new-ejiltalk-blog-gal-gets-early.html. I don’t know the policies on linking to other blogs – mods, please delete if not allowed).