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Home Archive for category "Treaty Law"

The Mauritius Convention on Transparency: A Model for Investment Law Reform?

Published on April 8, 2015        Author: 

In the midst of heated debates on investor-State dispute settlement in Europe, on 10 December 2014 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration. Prepared by UNCITRAL in the context of its recent revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the Convention, also known as the ‘Mauritius Convention on Transparency’, was opened for signature on 17 March 2015 in Port Louis, Mauritius. Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Mauritius, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States signed the Convention at this occasion (see UN Press Release). In my Editorial in the latest issue of the Journal of World Investment and Trade (which this blog reproduces), I interpret this Convention as a piece of constitutional reform of the international investment regime and ask to which extent it can serve as a model for international investment law reform more generally.

A Piece of Constitutional Reform of the International Investment Regime

The Mauritius Convention will extend the application of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, which so far have a very limited scope of application (only to UNCITRAL investor-State arbitrations that are based on treaties concluded on or after 1 April 2014), potentially to the entire treaty-based international investment regime as it stood on 1 April 2014. Notably, it would make the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules applicable to all treaty-based investor-State arbitrations under ‘old’ treaties, independently of the applicable arbitration rules. Whether the arbitration in question is governed by the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the ICSID Convention, the Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, the Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce – you name it – the Mauritius Convention would provide for transparency of submissions to arbitral tribunals, arbitration hearings, and decisions by arbitral tribunals, and give more room for third-party participation under a uniform set of rules. It could thus apply to some 3000+ investment treaty relations if both the respondent State and the investor’s home State are contracting parties or, alternatively, if the investor-claimant accepts the unilateral offer to apply the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules made by the respondent in signing the Convention (see Article 2 of the Mauritius Convention).

Provided it is signed and ratified by a sufficiently large number of States and regional economic integration organizations, such as the EU or ASEAN, the Mauritius Convention will bring about a paradigm shift in investor-State dispute settlement. Although possibilities for reservations, including subsequent ones, are broad (Articles 3 and 4 of the Mauritius Convention), and although ongoing arbitrations are excluded from its scope of application (Article 5 of the Mauritius Convention), the Convention will establish transparency as a general principle of international investment law.

This constitutes another step in the incremental adaptation of international investment law to the demands of a more democratic and accountable international public law system of private-public adjudication. The wide-spread application of transparency under the Convention would not only enhance the accountability of the underlying investor-State relations, but also enable better public control of the arbitral process. This turns the Mauritius Convention into an instrument with constitutional implications for the international investment regime. Read the rest of this entry…

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Double Duty at the ICC

Published on January 12, 2015        Author: 

After days of speculation, the clouds have begun to clear over Palestine’s strategy at the ICC. Ever since the Security Council rejected a draft resolution on December 30, 2014 designed to upgrade Palestine’s status to full Member State of the UN and imposing a 12-month deadline on a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the media overwhelmingly reported that Palestine signed the Rome Statute. Yet there was no word on the ICC website and no official information confirming these reports.

The uncertainty grew as the holidays came to an end. Finally, on January 5th, the ICC issued a press release. Contrary to all expectations, however, it appeared that Palestine had submitted a declaration under Article 12(3) of the Statute on December 31st. When using this procedure, states confer jurisdiction to the Court on a one-time, ad hoc, basis. By using this procedure, states do not become party to the Rome Statute, the founding document of the International Criminal Court.

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A Response to the Discussants on the Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties

Published on December 18, 2014        Author: 

I begin by saying that I am extremely grateful to the contributors to this book symposium for kindly having taken the time to read my book The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties, and to commit to writing their very stimulating views of it. Given the richness of the comments provided by my colleagues, it would I think be impertinent for me to do more, at this stage, than to try to set out the reflections that their comments have prompted with me.

In writing my book, one of the things I tried to do was to stress the striking interpretative potential with which the Vienna Convention rules are pregnant. It is worth remembering that when counsel for the United Kingdom in what Lord Hoffmann in Matthews [2003] UKHL 4 at [28] referred to as ‘the great case of Golder’ tried to reign in the European Court of Human Rights, they did so by exhorting the Court that it was bound by the rules set out in Articles 31–33 of the Vienna Convention. It is safe to say that the strategy backfired.

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Running in Circles: A Comment on Bjorge’s Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties

Published on December 18, 2014        Author: 

It was a pleasure to read Eirik Bjorge’s The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties. The book is well written and exceptionally well researched. Eirik demonstrates nothing less than an encyclopedic knowledge of the relevant case law and scholarship, and has seemingly read every single bit of text that the International Law Commission and its rapporteurs have produced on the question of interpretation. Eirik’s book is beyond question the most comprehensive examination to date of the issue of evolutionary treaty interpretation, and it fills an important gap in the literature.

While the virtues of the book are many, I cannot help but feel that, had Eirik chosen a different methodological path, the book could have been significantly more illuminating with regard to the nature of the phenomenon of evolutionary interpretation. This is not because I take issue with the main thrust of Eirik’s argument, namely that evolutionary interpretation is perfectly compatible with the rules of interpretation set out in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Yes, it is – at least partly because the Vienna ‘rules’ are so broad and flexible that one can do (almost) whatever one wants with them.

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Running in Circles: A Comment on Bjorge’s Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties

Published on December 18, 2014        Author: 

It was a pleasure to read Eirik Bjorge’s The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties. The book is well written and exceptionally well researched. Eirik demonstrates nothing less than an encyclopedic knowledge of the relevant case law and scholarship, and has seemingly read every single bit of text that the International Law Commission and its rapporteurs have produced on the question of interpretation. Eirik’s book is beyond question the most comprehensive examination to date of the issue of evolutionary treaty interpretation, and it fills an important gap in the literature.

While the virtues of the book are many, I cannot help but feel that, had Eirik chosen a different methodological path, the book could have been significantly more illuminating with regard to the nature of the phenomenon of evolutionary interpretation. This is not because I take issue with the main thrust of Eirik’s argument, namely that evolutionary interpretation is perfectly compatible with the rules of interpretation set out in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Yes, it is – at least partly because the Vienna ‘rules’ are so broad and flexible that one can do (almost) whatever one wants with them.

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Is Evolutionary Interpretation Only A Matter of Finding the Parties’ Intentions?

Published on December 17, 2014        Author: 

The main thesis in Eirik Bjorge’s The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties is that evolutionary interpretation depends on the intention of the parties to a treaty and results from applying Articles 31 to 33 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’).

Few would probably dispute that treaty interpretation always involves the intention of the parties. However, the debate – to which this monograph unquestionably is a valuable contribution – continues on where that intention is to be found. Is the controlling element the text of a treaty, its object and purpose (in whatever manner that might be established), its origins or some other feature? It would appear that there continue to be many perspectives on what the concept of the intention of the parties means and where it can (or should) be found.

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A Note on Bjorge’s The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties

Published on December 16, 2014        Author: 

A treaty. An international court or tribunal. Two states. The search for meaning. Submissions are made by the parties as to the ‘correct’ or ‘best’ interpretation of the treaty. Recourse is had to the canons of interpretation in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Terms like ‘good faith’, ‘ordinary meaning’, ‘object and purpose’ are repeated like incantations. So too, almost as often, terms like ‘subsequent agreement’, ‘subsequent practice’ and ‘evolutionary interpretation’ reverberate. One sometimes wonders what has happened to the actual text of the treaty to be interpreted, blanketed as it now is in interpretative theory.

In this careful and lawyerly study, Eirik Bjorge cuts through all this, drawing our attention back to basics. First and above all one has to look at the text of the treaty. The text, in its authentic language(s), is the primary expression of the common intention of the parties. This common intention is to be determined objectively by applying the canons of interpretation established in the Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention. Bjorge points out that the evolutionary interpretation of treaties is nothing more than that: an expression of the traditional canons of treaty construction. It is a method suited for all treaties, not just one class. It is a method for all international tribunals, not just one. But how much interpretation can the text stand? It is this question that encapsulates the quest for meaning.

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A Note on Bjorge’s The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties

Published on December 16, 2014        Author: 

A treaty. An international court or tribunal. Two states. The search for meaning. Submissions are made by the parties as to the ‘correct’ or ‘best’ interpretation of the treaty. Recourse is had to the canons of interpretation in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Terms like ‘good faith’, ‘ordinary meaning’, ‘object and purpose’ are repeated like incantations. So too, almost as often, terms like ‘subsequent agreement’, ‘subsequent practice’ and ‘evolutionary interpretation’ reverberate. One sometimes wonders what has happened to the actual text of the treaty to be interpreted, blanketed as it now is in interpretative theory.

In this careful and lawyerly study, Eirik Bjorge cuts through all this, drawing our attention back to basics. First and above all one has to look at the text of the treaty. The text, in its authentic language(s), is the primary expression of the common intention of the parties. This common intention is to be determined objectively by applying the canons of interpretation established in the Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention. Bjorge points out that the evolutionary interpretation of treaties is nothing more than that: an expression of the traditional canons of treaty construction. It is a method suited for all treaties, not just one class. It is a method for all international tribunals, not just one. But how much interpretation can the text stand? It is this question that encapsulates the quest for meaning.

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Discussing the Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties

Published on December 16, 2014        Author: 

Treaty interpretation: the role of party intention and good faith

I very much appreciated reading Eirik’s book. It is certainly a valuable contribution to the literature on treaty interpretation. Using the limited space available in a blog post, I will pick up on an idea introduced by Eirik in Chapter 3 – that there might be something of an interplay between evolutionary interpretation, party intention, and good faith. To use Eirik’s own words, “[e]volutionary interpretation may … be required by good faith”. Myself, I would describe the interplay as follows:

Articles 31-33 confer upon interpreters a discretion. For example, they leave to interpreters to decide whether in the interpretation of a treaty, the ordinary meaning of its terms should be defined based on language conventions that existed at the time of the conclusion of the treaty or conventions that exist at whatever time the treaty is interpreted. This discretion is not absolute, while treaties are always to be interpreted in good faith. To interpret a treaty in good faith is tantamount to interpreting it for a purpose, the purpose being to establish the common intention of its parties. Thus, the principle of good faith sets a limit to any discretion exercised by an interpreter under Articles 31-33. For example, although the choice between the historical and current-day ordinary meaning cannot be justified by direct reference to any rule of international law, in making this choice, the interpreter shall continue his/her search for the intention of the treaty parties.

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Introducing The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties

Published on December 15, 2014        Author: 

image windows Den Haag 0061 (NL)(1)Although the issue may have become obscured at some point after the drafting of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it is increasingly acknowledged in international law that the goal of treaty interpretation is, as the International Law Commission’s first Special Rapporteur on the law of treaties JL Brierly put it, ‘to give effect to the intention of the parties as fully and fairly as possible’ (The Law of Nations (OUP, 1928) 168; A Clapham, Brierly’s Law of Nations (7th edn, OUP, 2013) 349).

The question of the intention of the parties in treaty interpretation might be thought to take on a particular interest in connection with the evolutionary interpretation of treaties. Though there is no standard definition of the term ‘evolutionary interpretation’, the upshot is that the meaning of treaty terms may be liable to change over time, without the specific intervention of the parties to amend or modify the treaty terms.

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