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The Interests of Justice- where does that come from? Part II

Published on August 14, 2019        Author: 

Editor’s Note: This is part II of a two-part post. Read part I here.

After tracing the drafting history of article 53 of the Statute in part I of this post, part II is dedicated to the consequences that may be drawn from the relevant drafting history for the application of the “interests of justice” criterion.

The  “Interests of Justice”: a Criterion for a Limited Use

While the preparatory works of the Statute reveal that the drafters intended to provide for an “interests of justice” criterion, it is clear that they also intended to restrict its use, especially at the stage of the initiation of the investigation. This seems logical, as such a criterion was originally proposed only with regard to the initiation of prosecutions.

This conclusion arises from a comparison of the draft Statute as it stood on 18 June 1998 with the text of article 53 adopted during the last week of the Rome Conference. Such a comparison shows radical changes during the negotiations in Rome: (i) a negative formulation was finally adopted, whereas a positive determination was required from the Prosecutor at the beginning of the Rome Conference; (ii) the text of article 53(1)(c) was amended to start with the necessity to first consider factors militating in favour of an investigation (“the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims”); and (iii) a high threshold was inserted in relation to the “interests of justice” criterion (“substantial reasons”) in comparison to the relatively low threshold (“reasonable basis”) for the two other criteria provided for in article 53(1)(a) and (b). In addition to those changes, the drafters also adopted a specific mechanism of judicial review under article 53(3)(b) of the Statute with regard to the “interests of justice” criterion, which the Pre-Trial Chamber may initiate proprio motu.

Although the vagueness of the “interests of justice” criterion is regrettable, the absence of a specific definition in the Statute was “compensated” by the procedural compromise described in the preceding paragraph, which aimed to limit the use of interests of justice criterion and prevent its abuse. As mentioned already in the part I of this post, it was this procedural compromise that alleviated, to a certain extent, the concerns expressed by several delegations during the negotiations with regard to the existence of this criterion, and finally allowed its adoption in Rome. Read the rest of this entry…

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The Interests of Justice- where does that come from? Part I

Published on August 13, 2019        Author: 

There has been much debate about the decision issued by Pre-Trial Chamber II rejecting the request by the Office of the Prosecutor to open an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan because such an investigation would not serve “the interests of justice”.

Despite the recent surge in academic interest in this criterion, which appears in article 53 of the Rome Statute (the “Statute”) of the International Criminal Court (the “ICC” or “Court”), not much has been written about its origins (for an exception, see here). Yet, the drafting history of the “interests of justice” criterion is highly instructive for its application. Accordingly, this post is divided in two parts: the first part will trace the drafting history of the “interests of justice” criterion; the second part will provide an interpretation of this criterion as informed by its drafting history.

It is worth recalling that the negotiations on the Rome Statute started on the basis of a project which was developed and finally adopted in 1994 by the International Law Commission (“ILC”). This project was discussed first in the context of an ad hoc Committee established by the United Nations General Assembly, which convened in April and August 1995. Then, a Preparatory Committee was established by the same Assembly, which convened twice in 1996, three times in 1997 and once in 1998. It is the final report of that Committee in April 1998 which was the basis for the negotiations during the Rome Conference, which took place from 15 June until 17 July 1998. Those formal sessions were completed by intersessional meetings during which useful progress was made.

The Draft Statute of the International Law Commission

There was no mention of the criterion of “interests of justice” in the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court adopted by the ILC (“ILC Draft Statute”) in July 1994. Article 26 (‘Investigation of alleged crimes’) of the Draft Statute did not require the Prosecutor to consider specific criteria in deciding whether to initiate an investigation. This provision simply stated that the “Prosecutor shall initiate an investigation unless the Prosecutor concludes that there is no possible basis for a prosecution under this Statute and decides not to initiate an investigation”, in which case the Prosecutor had to inform the Presidency accordingly Read the rest of this entry…

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Governance and the UN Global Compact on Migration: Just another Soft Law Cooperation Framework or a New Legal Regime governing International Migration?

Published on March 4, 2019        Author:  and

Editor’s note: This post is part of the ESIL Interest Group on Migration and Refugee Law symposium on The UN Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees: The Twin Peaks?

Does the UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) fulfill the criteria of a legal regime for international migration or is it just another soft law cooperation framework amidst many? If the GCM is merely a cooperation framework, then what is its contribution to international migration law (IML)? Is it limited to institutional questions, including the quality of follow-up, monitoring and review? What does it mean to ascribe the GCM a “governance capacity”? Does “governance”, as a counter concept to government, feature at the same time as an antidote to anarchy, so that the GCM could be fashioned as the complement to the “missing regime” of IML?

To resolve the ambiguity over the GCM’s governance ambition means for one to reply to the question posed by Aleinikoff in 2007, i.e. to what extent the GCM provides for the long-sought after “architecture” to govern the “substance” of IML. To respond to the challenge secondly means to uncover to what extent the GCM has overcome the “anarchy” underlying the fragmented state of IML, also called the “piecemeal approach” (Opeskin et al. 2012). This approach allowed States in the Global North to keep national sovereignty over territory and borders untouched by design, but also for few exceptions of multilateral cooperation on service providers in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and regional schemes on free movement of persons. However, the “management” of population flows from sending countries has led to uncertain outcomes for the protection of migrants’ rights, while rendering their entitlements an often-neglected legal category in international law.

In this post, we will provide a first appraisal of whether the GCM has governance potential – a capacity which may move it beyond the mere “international cooperation framework”, designed by GCM drafters. Read the rest of this entry…

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“We are tidying up”: The Global Compact on Migration and its Interaction with International Human Rights Law

Published on March 1, 2019        Author: 

Editor’s note: This post is part of the ESIL Interest Group on Migration and Refugee Law symposium on The UN Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees: The Twin Peaks?

“We are not talking about anything new […] Rather we are tidying up” – said El Salvador’s Representative before the vote at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on the adoption of the Global Compact on Migration (GCM), also known as the Marrakech Compact (GA/12113). Other similar declarations joined the chorus of States in three clear directions: 1) the Compact is not legally binding; 2) the Compact does not create any new international obligations in the form of new customary rules; and 3) the Compact reaffirms States’ sovereignty.

Be that as it may, one cannot but agree with Maria Gavouneli that the GCM, at this stage, will not have a huge impact on the existing legal framework applicable to the mass movements of individuals. However, it is possible to move the critique one step forward looking at some contents of the GCM that might have some normative effects on the sources of international law governing the management of migration.

The GCM and its Legal Nature

As Anne Peters put it on this blog, the GCM is part of the borderless category of international soft law instruments, as States’ will clearly excludes the legal bindingness of its objectives and actions. However, it is no mystery that soft law instruments might have, under certain conditions, normative effects. Read the rest of this entry…

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Introduction to the Symposium on ‘the UN Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees: The Twin Peaks?’

Published on February 27, 2019        Author: , , and

Editor’s note: EJIL:Talk! is happy to announce that starting today, the blog will host a symposium on The UN Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees: The Twin Peaks?. In their contribution to this series, five members of the ESIL Interest Group on Migration and Refugee Law will engage with overarching and cross-cutting topics in the context of the recently adopted Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and Global Compact on Refugees.

We thank the authors for their contributions, and for the interesting discussions this symposium is sure to generate!

In this blog symposium, the ESIL Interest Group on Migration and Refugee Law focuses on the recently adopted two United Nations (UN) instruments aiming at reinforcing the (legal) structures of global governance on migration and asylum: the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) as well as the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR). Human migration has been a constant in the history of the world and a defining reality of our time. International migration has been coined as a global “megatrend” by the International Organization for Migration. In this context came the Global Compacts, which are the outcomes of a two-year negotiation process in different formats and settings. After several rounds of inclusive preparatory talks within the UN in New York, the Marrakech Intergovernmental Conference, held on 10-11 December 2018, formally adopted the Global Compact on Migration, which was later endorsed by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on 19 December 2018 (with 152 States voting for it). The Global Compact on Refugees has been prepared in a less transparent way by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), then was presented to the UN General Assembly in September 2018, and was subsequently also endorsed by the UNGA in December last year (181 countries voted in favour of it). Read the rest of this entry…

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ICJ Delivers Chagos Advisory Opinion, UK Loses Badly

Published on February 25, 2019        Author: 

Earlier this afternoon the ICJ delivered its Chagos advisory opinion. Briefly, the Court found that the separation of the Chagos archipelago from the British colony of Mauritius was contrary to the right to self-determination and that accordingly the decolonization of Mauritius was not completed in conformity with international law. As a consequence, the Court found that the UK’s continuing administration of the archipelago, which includes the largest US naval base in the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia, is a continuing internationally wrongful act, which the UK was under an obligation to cease as soon as possible. The Court was almost unanimous – its decision not to exercise discretion and decline giving an opinion was made by 12 votes to 1, while its findings on the merits were made by 13 votes to 1 (Judge Donoghue dissenting). The AO and the various separate opinions is available here.

Here are some key takeaways.

Read the rest of this entry…

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So, Has This Ever Happened Before?

Published on September 19, 2017        Author: 

For the past week or so I’ve been enjoying the start of my sabbatical in New York, as a visiting professor at Columbia this semester. And for the past couple of days I’ve been enjoying – well, experiencing – the chaotic collapse of parts of the city during the UN General Assembly. And today I could enjoy – well, behold – the spectacle of the President of the United States threatening another UN member state with nuclear destruction at the podium of the General Assembly:

http://www.trbimg.com/img-59c133a3/turbine/la-na-trump-un-pictures-20170919/650/650x366

Photo credit LA Times: http://www.latimes.com/world/la-un-general-assembly-live-updates-world-awaits-president-trumps-first-assembly-20170918-htmlstory.html

If this is not twisted enough, now North Korea’s reckless pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles threatens the entire world with unthinkable loss of human life.

It is an outrage that some nations would not only trade with such a regime, but would arm, supply, and financially support a country that imperils the world with nuclear conflict. No nation on earth has an interest in seeing this band of criminals arm itself with nuclear weapons and missiles.

The United States has great strength and patience, but if it is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea. Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime. The United States is ready, willing and able, but hopefully this will not be necessary. That’s what the United Nations is all about; that’s what the United Nations is for. Let’s see how they do.

Note the nature of the threat – if the US is forced to defend itself or its allies, it will totally destroy North Korea (not – react to the extent necessary and proportionate; presumably even a preemptive self-defense theory would be on the table). Note also how the United Nations is a ‘they’ rather than a ‘we.’  Question for the readers: has this ever happened before? Shoes have been banged at that podium, of course, and sulfur has been smelt. Yet even at the height of the Cold War, has a head of state of a nuclear-weapons state used this kind of directly threatening language? Or is this simply old-fashioned nuclear deterrence inartfully expressed?

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ICJ Advisory Opinion Request on the Chagos Islands

Published on June 24, 2017        Author: 

Yesterday the UN General Assembly voted, by 94 to 15 with 65 states abstaining, to issue a request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the Chagos Islands. Readers will be familiar with the many legal disputes that have arisen from this leftover UK colonial possession in the Indian Ocean, ranging from the human tragedy of the Chagossians expelled en masse from the islands to make room for what is now a US military base of enormous size and importance, to the role that the Diego Garcia base played in the war on terror, to the applicability of human rights law to these issues, the designation of real or pretextual maritime protection areas, and the actual sovereignty dispute with Mauritius. Here’s a useful news item from the Guardian, and here is GA resolution itself, A/RES/71/292.  This is the operative part, i.e. the request that the Court will have to address:

(a)     “Was the process of decolonization of Mauritius lawfully completed when Mauritius was granted independence in 1968, following the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius and having regard to international law, including obligations reflected in General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 2066 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 2232 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 and 2357 (XXII) of 19 December 1967?”;

(b)     “What are the consequences under international law, including obligations reflected in the above-mentioned resolutions, arising from the continued administration by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the Chagos Archipelago, including with respect to the inability of Mauritius to implement a programme for the resettlement on the Chagos Archipelago of its nationals, in particular those of Chagossian origin?”.

The precise drafting of these questions can be enormously consequential, as shown most recently and most clearly with the Kosovo advisory opinion – I would refer interested readers in that regard to the volume edited by Michael Wood and myself on The Law and Politics of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion (OUP, 2015), particularly chapters 3, 6 and 7 which deal with various aspects of the ‘question question.’ At first glance, the drafting of the Chagos request is not only interesting, but also quite intelligent, especially regarding the (a) part.

Why? Well, one almost ritualistic aspect of these advisory opinions are the objections made to the jurisdiction of the Court and the propriety of its exercise by states who opposed the issuance of the AO request in the first place. These objections almost never work, but the good fight is nonetheless always fought. And there are cases, like the Kosovo one, in which a particular objection (there regarding the relationship between the UNSC and the UNGA) could find significantly more purchase than could otherwise be expected. In the Chagos case in particular, one could expect the UK to make the objection that the AO request is trying to circumvent the consent requirement for contentious ICJ jurisdiction, and is in effect litigating a bilateral dispute (see e.g. the Wall AO, para. 43-50). And in fact there clearly is a set of bilateral disputes on Chagos between Mauritius and the UK.

Note, however, the clever drafting of part (a) of the request: it doesn’t directly speak of whether Mauritius has sovereignty over the Islands, but asks whether the process of decolonization of Mauritius was lawfully completed because of the separation of the Chagos Islands from its territory. It also makes links to numerous GA resolutions, in order to reinforce the view that this is a multilateral issue, raising broader questions of principle which the GA has been dealing with for decades.

When it comes to part (b) of the request, what’s particularly notable is that it doesn’t simply ask what the consequences would be if the Court found that the UK acted unlawfully in part (a). Rather, the consequences are those arising from the UK’s continued administration of the Chagos Islands. This would allow the Court to deal with various questions that not directly related to sovereignty or any faults with the decolonization process, like the plight of the Chagossians. On the other hand, the drafting of part (b) is also such that it could allow the Court to ‘properly interpret’ it in such a way as to avoid some of the more controversial issues, as it in fact did in the Kosovo AO. We shall, of course, have to wait and see what happens – but watch this space.

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SOGI Mandate Passes Third Committee Hurdle

On 21 November 2016, the Third Committee of the General Assembly (GA) voted to uphold the United Nations mandate of the Independent Expert on sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) in a very closely fought vote. The decision represents a major stepping stone for the promotion of LGBTI rights, and provides much-needed reassurance regarding the ability of the Human Rights Council (HRC) – and the broader UN machinery – to adequately combat international human rights challenges.

Two main points of contention emerged during discussions leading up to, and during the day of the vote: 1) whether there is a legal basis for the mandate (the substantive argument); and 2) whether the GA has the power to override decisions made by the HRC (the procedural argument). It was the latter argument that generated the most discussion, and will therefore be the main focus of this post.

This post will begin with an analysis of what exactly happened on the day of the vote, and will be followed by an exploration of the two main arguments. The post will end with a discussion on what this vote could mean both in the short-term and long-term.

The day’s proceedings

When formally introducing the resolution to the Third Committee, the African Group had announced an oral amendment to OP2, stating that consideration of resolution 32/2 should be suspended until the 72nd session of the GA, a detail missing from the initial draft which had left it open to the criticism that the mandate was being suspended indefinitely. As noted by the representative for Brazil an optimistic reading of this amendment would have been misleading: specifying that this item will be revisited in one year’s time does not alter the far-reaching negative impact of the move. Furthermore, there are no reasonable grounds to think that the position taken by the African Group would change by next autumn. Read the rest of this entry…

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How to Bridge the Gap? Corporate and Government Surveillance Examined at the UN

Published on December 7, 2016        Author: 

On 21 November, the UN General Assembly Third Committee adopted the draft resolution on the right to privacy in the digital age. This came at the same time the UK passed a law (the Investigatory Powers Act) which codified what are arguably the most extreme surveillance powers in the history of any western democracy.

This is the third time the UN General Assembly has adopted a resolution on the topic, and as it did in 2014, the UN has called on all states to review their surveillance legislation, policies, and practices “with a view to upholding the right to privacy by ensuring the full and effective implementation of all their obligations under international human rights law”.

This comes at a time in which governments around the world are adopting laws that give wider surveillance powers to state security agencies, beyond what is permitted under existing human rights law. Just to name a few, Privacy International had documented this trend in a range of countries, including in China, Colombia, France, Kenya, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

So, which part of effective implementation of human rights law do governments need explained? Read the rest of this entry…

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