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Home Archive for category "International Humanitarian Law"

Joint Series on International Law and Armed Conflict: Monica Hakimi on Fair Trial Guarantees in Armed Conflict

Published on September 23, 2016        Author: 

The second post in our joint blog series arising from the 2016 Transatlantic Workshop on International, ‘Fair Trial Guarantees in Armed Conflict’- by Monica Hakimi (Michigan Law) is now available on Lawfare.

Here’s a taste:

hakimiThe fair trial protections that apply in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) have received much less attention in recent years than have the protections on targeting and security detention. No doubt, this is because the basic contours of a fair criminal trial are generally not in dispute. Still, they raise a number of interesting questions. Here, I describe the current legal landscape and identify some issues that warrant further study.

A. The Regulatory Framework

The relevant treaty law can be laid out succinctly. The four Geneva Conventions, the two Additional Protocols, and human rights law all require that criminal trials be fair. The specific language and requirements of each instrument vary, but the key parameters are similar. (The relevant provisions are GCI art. 49; GCII, art. 50; GCIII arts. 84, 86, 99, 102–08; GCIV arts. 5, 64, 66–75, 117; common art. 3; API art. 75; APII art. 6; and ICCPR art. 14.)  In short, a court must: (1) be independent, (2) be impartial, and (3) afford defendants basic guarantees. A court is independent if it has the ability to conduct its business without undue external interference. It is impartial if its decisions rest on the evidence before it, without any predisposition toward one side or the other.

Common Article 3 does not list specific guarantees for criminal defendants in NIACs; it simply requires that defendants be afforded “all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized people.” Other treaty provisions identify what these guarantees might be. The provisions that apply in international conflicts, Additional Protocol II (which governs a subset of NIACs), and human rights law all require: (a) a presumption of innocence, (b) prompt notification of the offenses, (c) charges based on individual responsibility and offenses prescribed in law, (d) means to present a defense, (e) presence at trial, (f) a right against self-incrimination, and (g) notification of remedies. Three other guarantees are listed in the treaty provisions for international conflicts and in human rights law—but not in the provisions that specifically govern NIACs: (h) trial without undue delay, (i) open proceedings, and (j) no double jeopardy.

Read the full post over on Lawfare.

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Joint Series on International Law and Armed Conflict: Fair Trial Guarantees in Armed Conflict 

Published on September 22, 2016        Author: 

As noted yesterday, EJIL:Talk! together with Lawfare and InterCross are running a joint series over the next few weeks on International Law and Armed Conflict. The first post in the series is by Nehal Bhuta on fair trial guarantees in armed conflict.

The protection of fair trial rights during international and non-international armed conflicts might reasonably be seen as an area where the convergence between international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHR) is considerable, and in which the co-application of the two bodies of international law results in “interpretive complementarity” in respect of specific guarantees contained in both legal regimes. It should be noted at the outset that a person detained for the purposes of criminal prosecution during an international or non-international armed conflict is within the jurisdiction of the prosecuting state for the purposes of international human rights law whether the person is within the territory of the detaining state or not. At the same time,  that state may also be a detaining power, an occupying power or a party to a conflict on its own territory (even if part of that territory may be outside its effective control).

In this short post, I wish to raise for discussion areas of tension and uncertainty in the relationship between IHL and IHR in fair trial guarantees during an armed conflict. I first address the question of whether IHL countenances different understandings or interpretations of specific fair trial guarantees protected in both IHL and IHR. I then turn to the related question of whether derogation provisions can and should be invoked in order to give effect to IHL-based interpretations of a fair trial right over an IHR-based construction of the right. Finally, I examine some dilemmas associated with countenancing the possibility of courts constituted by armed groups as conducting fair trials under IHL.

Fair Trial Guarantees under IHL and IHR

The fair trial guarantees contained in IHL are expressed in the following general formulations found in the Geneva Conventions (GC) and Additional Protocols (AP I and II):  Read the rest of this entry…

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Transatlantic Workshop on International Law and Armed Conflict: Introduction to a Joint Blog Series

Published on September 21, 2016        Author: 

In late July, a group of academic, military, and governmental experts from both sides of the Atlantic gathered at the University of Oxford for the fourth annual “Transatlantic Workshop on International Law and Armed Conflict”. The roundtable, held under the Chatham House Rule, and which this year included participants from Australia was held over two days and examined contemporary questions of international law relating to military operations.

This year’s event placed a particular emphasis not only on some substantive issues relating to the conduct of hostilities (such as targeting of “war sustaining” objects and the principle of proportionality), but on procedural obligations arising under the law of armed conflict. The procedural obligations discussed include the obligations of parties: to engage in review of the lawfulness of detentions in the armed conflict; to guarantee fair trials for those prosecuted for offences related to the conflict; and to investigate suspected violations of the law of armed conflict. Discussion of these procedural obligations focused on the content and scope of these obligations. The sessions also examined the extent to which these obligations apply to (and are capable of being fulfilled in) non-international armed conflicts and non-state armed groups. Inevitably, the sessions also considered the relationship between the procedural obligations imposed by international humanitarian law and those which may arise under international human rights law. To what extent should the latter inform the former?

Some of those who attended the workshop have agreed to participate in a series of blog posts focusing on specific topics that were addressed during the workshop. Three blogs, Intercross, EJIL:Talk!, and Lawfare, are coordinating the series, and will host the posts, outlined below. Each blog post represent’s the different authors’ perspectives, and not necessarily those of anyone else at the workshop, nor any of the institutions represented. The blogposts focus almost exclusively on procedural obligations in the law of armed conflict. In addition, there will be a post on the principle of proportionality under IHL. Although proportionality imposes a substantive obligation on parties not to cause damage or casualties which are excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage, arguably, the attempts to achieve conformity with this obligation tend to be effected through particular processes and procedures . Read the rest of this entry…

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English Court of Appeal Decides Al-Saadoon Case on the ECHR’s Application Extraterritorially and in Armed Conflict

Published on September 14, 2016        Author: 

Last week the Court of Appeal of England and Wales rendered a unanimous judgment in Al-Saadoon & Ors v Secretary of State for Defence [2016] EWCA Civ 811. For extended analysis, see David Hart QC’s post on the UK Human Rights Blog here. Like the judgment of the High Court by Mr Justice Leggatt below, this judgment, written by Lord Justice Lloyd Jones, is exceptionally rigorous and well-argued. In a nutshell, the CoA basically endorsed almost all of the Leggatt J’s reasoning below, with one specific exception: while Leggatt J considered that under the ECtHR’s Al-Skeini judgment the personal conception of Article 1 jurisdiction as authority and control over an individual exercised by a state agent necessarily captures the use of lethal force against that individual, Lloyd Jones LJ held that he did not think that the ECtHR intended the principles articulated in Al-Skeini to go that far, and that it should be for the ECtHR to extended them thusly if it wanted to do so. He nonetheless agreed with Leggatt J in the application of the relevant principles to the facts, with most of the claimants being covered by the ECHR on a different basis.

The key paras of Lloyd Jones LJ’s reasoning are below the fold. In any event, in my view both of the judges have it right: limiting the personal principle so that it does not cover uses of lethal force (e.g. by a drone) would indeed be arbitrary, but in Al-Skeini the Court did in fact try to preserve the result of Bankovic and vaguely create a limitation of precisely this kind (see more here). And I can fully see why an English judge would think that this conceptual mess is one for Strasbourg to sort out – note, in that regard, the impact that cases that do not concern armed conflict (e.g. on extraterritorial surveillance) will inevitably have on this jurisprudence. What will ultimately happen in this regard is unclear, and will depend on the wider political context and the readiness of Strasbourg to find and follow the moral logic of Article 1 ECHR – but it’s clear that this case is headed first to the UK Supreme Court and then on to Strasbourg.

Read the rest of this entry…

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Missing the Mark: Reprieve, ‘Kill Lists’ and Human Rights Advocacy

Published on September 6, 2016        Author: 

Deception, lies, murder, conspiracy. This is the stuff of crime novels. It is also the story spun in a report published earlier this year by Reprieve, a human rights charity active in the UK and the US. In its report, entitled ‘Britain’s Kill List’, Reprieve claims to reveal shocking proof that exposes the involvement of the British Government in a global assassination project:

On September 7th, 2015, Prime Minister David Cameron came to Parliament and announced a “new departure” for Britain, a policy of killing individuals the Security Services and the military do not like, people placed on a list of individuals who the UK (acting along with the US and others) have identified and systematically plan to kill. The mere admission that there is a Kill List certainly should, indeed, have been a “departure” for a country that prides itself on decency. Unfortunately, it was not a “new departure” at all, as we had been doing it secretly for more than a decade.

Reprieve alleges that the British Government has been complicit in preparing and executing a ‘kill list’ for years, that such a ‘kill list’ is incompatible with the rule of law and that the Prime Minister has deceived the public about Britain’s involvement in this ‘disturbing’ practice. These are serious allegations, which merit a response, even a belated one. All the more so, since on closer inspection they reveal an astonishing appetite for sensationalism and disregard for accuracy.

Who is deceiving Parliament and the public?

On 7 September 2015, former Prime Minister David Cameron announced to the House of Commons that the Royal Air Force carried out a drone strike on 21 August 2015 inside Syria against Reyaad Khan, a British national and member of ISIL. The strike killed Khan and two other members of ISIL. By declaring that the operation was a ‘new departure’ for Britain, Reprieve claims that the Prime Minister has deceived Parliament and the people (pp. 5 and 7), given that this was not the first occasion the UK has acted upon a ‘kill list’. Indeed, much of Reprieve’s report is preoccupied with demonstrating that the UK has contributed to a ‘kill list’ well before the Prime Minister made his announcement to Parliament. Read the rest of this entry…

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The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in the African Commission’s General Comment on the Right to Life

Published on June 7, 2016        Author: 

In November 2015, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) adopted General Comment (GC) no. 3 on the right to life. The GC deals with a variety of issues surrounding the right to life, inter alia the death penalty, use of force in law enforcement and armed conflict, investigations and accountability, and extraterritoriality. The GC also considers the relationship between the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and international humanitarian law (IHL):

“32. In armed conflict, what constitutes an ‘arbitrary’ deprivation of life during the conduct of hostilities is to be determined by reference to international humanitarian law. This law does not prohibit the use of force in hostilities against lawful targets (for example combatants or civilians directly participating in hostilities) if necessary from a military perspective, provided that, in all circumstances, the rules of distinction, proportionality and precaution in attack are observed. Any violation of international humanitarian law resulting in death, including war crimes, will be an arbitrary deprivation of life.”

This statement is interesting in respect of three elements: the concept of ‘arbitrariness’ with regard to acts of deprivation of life in armed conflict; the interpretive principle employed to connect the ACHPR and IHL; and the legal consequences arising from IHL violations when human rights law also applies. Before taking a closer look at all these points, it should be clarified that the conclusions drawn concern the IHL and human rights obligations of States, and do not necessarily extend to those of non-State actors.

Arbitrary Deprivations of Life in Armed Conflict

In the first place, the African Commission asserted that to determine whether a deprivation of life is arbitrary in armed conflict – and therefore in violation of Article 4 ACHPR – it is necessary to make reference to IHL. Such a stance echoes the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) dictum in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion (para 25). The relevant rules the African Commission identified are those concerning the use of force against individuals and the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack, which apply in both international and non-international armed conflicts (Articles 48, 51, 57 AP I; 13 AP II; CIHL Study). That the protection of the right to life in connection to hostilities requires taking IHL rules into account has long been affirmed by human rights treaty bodies, particularly the Inter-American Commission and Court (inter alia IAComHR Abella, para 161; IACtHR Santo Domingo Massacre, paras 211‒236; also HRCtee Draft GC 36, para 63). Thus, the African Commission’s GC 3 consolidated an established interpretive trend, according to which IHL provides the yardstick to evaluate when use of force in the conduct of hostilities amounts to arbitrary deprivation of life in violation of relevant human rights norms.

The Principle of Systemic Integration

The second point worthy of note is that the African Commission refrained from invoking lex specialis to read the interplay between IHL and human rights law. Lex specialis, both an interpretive principle and a conflict-solution technique, indicates that:

“if a matter is being regulated by a general standard as well as a more specific rule, then the latter should take precedence over the former” (ILC Fragmentation Report, para 56).

 The ICJ employed it to contend that either an IHL specific norm (Nuclear Weapons, para 25) or IHL as a legal regime (Wall, para 106) is lex specialis with regard to human rights law. The lex specialis principle has been at times employed by the Inter-American Commission (inter alia Coard, para 42; Gregoria Herminia, para 20), whereas none of the other international bodies have resorted to it. Notably, the ICJ did not invoke it in a successive case where it dealt with the interplay between the two bodies of law (Armed Activities, para 216).

Commentators have extensively analysed, debated and criticised the use of lex specialis in relation to the interaction between IHL and human rights law (inter alia Prud’homme; Hampson, 558‒562; Milanović, Ch 5). Interestingly, some scholars highlighted that in Nuclear Weapons the ICJ did not actually employ lex specialis, but rather another principle of interpretation: systemic integration (d’Aspremont and Tranchez, 238‒241; similarly Gowlland-Debbas, 361). This principle, which is found in Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, provides that in the interpretation of a treaty:

 “[t]here shall be taken into account […] any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”.

 I find this viewpoint particularly convincing. When the ICJ stated that:

 “[t]he test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life […] falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict” (Nuclear Weapons, para 25),

 it actually made use of systemic integration under the guise of lex specialis (d’Aspremont and Tranchez, 238). Indeed, it interpreted a human rights provision taking into account IHL rules, which is an application of the principle of systemic integration.

International bodies have constantly employed this principle to connect IHL and human rights law rules. They have done so implicitly (HRCtee GC 31, para 11), or by expressly invoking Article 31(3)(c) VCLT (IAComHR Molina, para 121; ECtHR Hassan, para 102), or on the basis of equivalent provisions included in their constitutive instruments, such as Article 29 ACHR (IACtHR Ituango Massacres, para 179) or Articles 60‒61 ACHPR (AComHPR DRC v Burundi et al, para 70). In GC 3, the African Commission followed the same path:

 “During the conduct of hostilities, the right to life needs to be interpreted with reference to the rules of international humanitarian law.” (para 13).

 It thereby confirmed that systemic integration, not lex specialis, is the appropriate interpretive principle to operationalise the relationship between norms of IHL and human rights law.

Concurrent Violations of IHL and Human Rights Law

The last point concerns the closing sentence of the above-quoted passage, in which the African Commission affirmed that an attack causing death in violation of IHL rules amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of life. This is a remarkable statement. For the first time, a human rights treaty body made it explicit that, when human rights law norms are placed in the background to favour the application of IHL norms, a breach of the latter entails a violation of the former. A similar reasoning may be found in the Human Rights Committee’s Draft GC 36 (para 63), not yet adopted, whereas it could only be inferred from previous case law (IACtHR Santo Domingo Massacre, paras 230, 237; ECtHR Hassan, para 105, with reference to the right to personal liberty). This constitutes the logical conclusion of the interpretive choice according to which the arbitrariness of a deprivation of life in armed conflict is to be determined with reference to IHL. Of course, the presupposition is that an act is simultaneously in breach of IHL and human rights law. The use of dum-dum bullets, for example, violates IHL but not necessarily human rights law.

In my opinion, it is possible to extract a more general principle concerning the relationship between rules of IHL and human rights law. In instances of norms competition, when a prohibitive human rights law norm is placed in the background in favour of a permissive IHL norm, a violation of the prevailing IHL norm entails a corresponding violation of the background human rights law norm. The result is that the latter re-emerges, bringing along relevant normative consequences. I will just consider here the implications this has for the right to a remedy.

Remedies in Armed Conflict

Individual reparations claims for alleged IHL violations often fail when directly brought in a State’s domestic courts (e.g. Varvarin case). This owes to the uncertainty surrounding the right to reparation under IHL. Articles 3 HC IV, 91 AP I, and corresponding customary rules provide that a State must pay compensation for the breaches of IHL it is responsible for. Several scholars contend that these norms grant victims a right to reparation directly enforceable at domestic level (Kalshoven, 835‒836; Zegveld, 512). State practice and case law is inconsistent in that regard, yet most domestic courts tend to deny such an entitlement to individuals (for an account, CIHL Study, 544‒545;  Henn, 617‒623). However, when a breach of IHL also results in a violation of human rights law, victims may seek redress on the basis of the latter.

All major human rights treaties include a provision concerning the right to an effective remedy (e.g. Articles 7(1)(a) ACHPR; 2(3) ICCPR), which translates to a State obligation to provide individuals with both procedural and substantive domestic remedies (AComHPR GC 3, para. 7). Victims may seek redress for human rights violations first in domestic courts and, if that fails and where possible, with the relevant human rights treaty body. The acknowledgment that a breach of the IHL targeting rules resulting in death amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of life opens the way to individuals for obtaining redress for IHL violations via the right to a remedy under human rights law. This may expand even further. The Inter-American Court indeed held that an attack which fails to comply with IHL rules and endangers the civilian population may amount to a breach of the rights to life and personal integrity (Article 4‒5 ACHR), even if nobody is killed or injured (Santo Domingo Massacre, paras 236‒237; similarly HRCtee Draft GC 36, para 63).

Outlook

The impact of the African Commission’s GC is possibly manifold. On the international plane, it may encourage other treaty bodies to make similarly general statements, so to consolidate the interpretation that, in the conduct of hostilities, the right to life is not violated as long as relevant IHL rules are complied with. A similar construal may extend to the right to liberty and security detention of civilians in armed conflict (in this vein ECtHR Hassan, paras 105‒106). At the national level, this perspective may persuade judges to consider whether alleged IHL breaches also amount to human rights violations, which would allow victims to bring claims directly in domestic courts. Overall, the African Commission’s GC may constitute a significant contribution to strengthen the enforcement of victims’ right to reparation for both IHL and human rights violations in armed conflict.

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New Drone Report by UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights

Published on May 10, 2016        Author: 

Following up on yesterday’s post on the Eye in the Sky, today the UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights published an important new report on the UK’s resort to drone strikes. Most interestingly, the report contains a number of clarifications of the UK’s policy on drone strikes, on the basis of the evidence obtained by the Committee, especially in situations outside active armed conflict. One of the report’s conclusions is that the UK does, in fact, reserve the right to use drones outside armed conflict, and that such strikes would be governed by human rights law rather than the law of war, but that in limited circumstances such strikes could be lawful. The report also calls on the UK Government to respond with further clarifications. As a general matter the report is written clearly and the legal analysis is reasonably nuanced and rigorous.

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Eye in the Sky

Published on May 9, 2016        Author: 

Last week I had the pleasure of seeing the new movie starring Helen Mirren and the late great Alan Rickman, Eye in the Sky. I was simply floored. Not only is Eye in the Sky an example of film-making at its best, with intelligent pacing and stellar acting throughout, it is also one of the most sophisticated treatments that I have seen of the legal, policy and moral dilemmas that people who make targeting decisions are faced with. It even has words like necessity and proportionality in it, and generally used correctly at that! I could totally envisage a vigorous classroom discussion of the various issues raised after every ten minutes of the movie. I just couldn’t recommend it more for anyone even remotely interested in the legal and moral aspects of targeted killings by drones.  *MINOR SPOILERS FOLLOW*

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A Comment on Croatia’s Concerns over Serbia’s So-Called “Mini-Hague”

Published on April 22, 2016        Author: 

As recently reported, Croatia has blocked the opening of Chapters 23 and 24 of the accession negotiations between Serbia and the European Union (EU). One of the reasons given relates to Serbia’s law establishing the jurisdiction of Serbian prosecutors and courts over war crimes committed anywhere on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Justifying their actions, Croatian officials have said that Serbia must follow “European standards”, with some Croatian officials and media reports referring to Serbia’s extension of jurisdiction as the creation of a “mini-Hague” (a media report in Serbo-Croatian is available here). Croatia has asserted that such jurisdiction is incompatible with international law and that it actually constitutes a “hybrid”, rather than universal, jurisdiction (available here in Serbo-Croatian). From the perspective of States whose national legislation provides for universal jurisdiction over international crimes, the issues arising here are quite interesting.

The involvement of the European Commission and its request that the Croatian government cease its opposition has added further complexity to the matter. In a ‘non-paper’, the European Commission has expressed its opinion that the arguments advanced by Croatia are not justified. Commenting on the document, a Croatian official has described it as an old document meant for internal use, and one that the Croatian public should not be bothered with.

Jurisdiction over Croatian Nationals

Croatia’s criticism seems to be aimed at the statutory provisions themselves. In particular, Croatia takes issue with Article 3 of the Serbian Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of State Organs in War Crimes Proceedings, which provides:

The government authorities of the Republic of Serbia set out under this Law shall have jurisdiction in proceedings for criminal offences specified in Article 2 hereof, committed on the territory of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, regardless of the citizenship of the perpetrator or victim. (An older English version of the law is available here; the quoted provision remains unchanged.)

Croatia thus appears concerned with the possibility of Serbia exercising its jurisdiction over Croatian nationals. No accusations of discriminatory or systematic prosecutions by Serbian prosecutors against Croatian nationals have been advanced by Croatia.  To date, universal jurisdiction has not been extensively used to prosecute foreign nationals for war crimes allegedly perpetrated in the Yugoslav conflict; reported cases include both an acquittal and a rejection of a request for extradition (for the reason of an allegedly politically motivated process) of two Bosnians. In 2015, a Croatian national sentenced in Serbia for war crimes was transferred to serve his sentence in Croatia.

Compliance with “European Standards” and International Law

The Croatian government is targeting a particular statutory provision, which in its opinion, marks Serbia’s intention to act as a “regional policeman”. Read the rest of this entry…

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The United States is at War with Syria (according to the ICRC’s New Geneva Convention Commentary)

Published on April 8, 2016        Author: 

The United States is currently engaged in an armed conflict with an organized armed group operating from the territory of two foreign states. Is this armed conflict an international armed conflict (IAC), a non-international armed conflict (NIAC), both, or neither? The question matters because the answer determines which international legal rules apply to the conflict and regulate its conduct.

In his recent speech to the American Society of International Law, U.S. State Department Legal Adviser Brian Egan noted that “some of our foreign partners have asked us how we classify the conflict with ISIL and thus what set of rules applies. Because we are engaged in an armed conflict against a non-State actor, our war against ISIL is a non-international armed conflict, or NIAC.”

So far, so good. Few would deny that the United States is in a NIAC with ISIL. However, Egan continues: “Therefore, the applicable international legal regime governing our military operations is the law of armed conflict covering NIACs.”

Not so fast. In its recently released Commentary on the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the International Committee of the Red Cross writes that “an international armed conflict arises between the territorial State and the intervening State when force is used on the former’s territory without its consent.” If the territorial state consents to the use of force on its territory—including force directed at an organized armed group—then there is no international armed conflict between the two states. Since Iraq has consented to the United States using force against ISIL on its territory, there is no international armed conflict between the United States and Iraq. It follows that only the law of armed conflict covering NIACs governs U.S. military operations in Iraq.

Again, so far, so good. But what about U.S. military operations in Syria? According to the ICRC, if the territorial state does not consent to the use of force on its territory—even force directed exclusively at an organized armed group—then an international armed conflict arises between the two states. Importantly, “[t]his does not exclude the existence of a parallel non-international armed conflict between the intervening State and the armed group.”

It seems to follow that, according to the ICRC’s approach, the United States is both in a NIAC with ISIL and in an IAC with Syria. Accordingly, both the law of armed conflict covering NIACs and the law of armed conflict covering IACs govern U.S. military operations in Syria. Read the rest of this entry…

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