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The Viability of Corruption Defenses in Investment Arbitration When the State Does Not Prosecute

Published on April 15, 2015        Author: 

Corruption has become a focal point in international investment arbitration, as investors and respondent States both have alleged corruption as the basis for claims and defenses in a number of recent investment arbitrations. Decisions in cases such as World Duty Free v. Kenya and Metal-Tech v. Uzbekistan confirm that corruption is contrary to international public policy and the laws of nearly all nations. Accordingly, if an investment tribunal finds that the investor obtained its investment through corruption, the tribunal will conclude that it lacks jurisdiction over the dispute or that the investor’s claims are inadmissible.

Certain commentators have suggested, however, that respondent States should be required to prosecute the allegedly corrupt parties in order to raise defenses based on corruption. A threshold question thus is whether a State should be deemed to have acquiesced in the alleged corruption and thus be estopped from asserting any related defenses, if it failed to prosecute the allegedly responsible individuals.

As early as 2000, the tribunal in Wena Hotels v. Egypt remarked that it was “reluctant to immunize Egypt from liability in this arbitration,” because the government of Egypt had been aware of the consulting agreement that allegedly was used to conceal corrupt payments, and had “decided (for whatever reasons) not to prosecute” the consultant (para. 116). More recently, in the set-aside proceeding of Congo v. Commisimpex, the Paris Court of Appeal held that Congo’s mere allegations of a general climate of corruption within the government administration, without indicating the persons likely to be involved in the corruption or prosecuting the alleged beneficiaries of the corruption, were an insufficient basis to set aside the award against Congo. Notwithstanding the comments in these decisions regarding the State’s failure to prosecute, the State’s failure to prosecute was not dispositive in either case, because neither the Wena tribunal nor the Paris Court of Appeal was presented with persuasive evidence of corruption. As the Wena tribunal explained, Egypt bore “the burden of proving such an affirmative defense” of corruption, and had “failed to present any evidence that would refute Wena’s evidence that the [consulting agreement] was a legitimate agreement. . . .” (para. 117). Read the rest of this entry…

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The Mauritius Convention on Transparency: A Model for Investment Law Reform?

Published on April 8, 2015        Author: 

In the midst of heated debates on investor-State dispute settlement in Europe, on 10 December 2014 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration. Prepared by UNCITRAL in the context of its recent revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the Convention, also known as the ‘Mauritius Convention on Transparency’, was opened for signature on 17 March 2015 in Port Louis, Mauritius. Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Mauritius, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States signed the Convention at this occasion (see UN Press Release). In my Editorial in the latest issue of the Journal of World Investment and Trade (which this blog reproduces), I interpret this Convention as a piece of constitutional reform of the international investment regime and ask to which extent it can serve as a model for international investment law reform more generally.

A Piece of Constitutional Reform of the International Investment Regime

The Mauritius Convention will extend the application of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, which so far have a very limited scope of application (only to UNCITRAL investor-State arbitrations that are based on treaties concluded on or after 1 April 2014), potentially to the entire treaty-based international investment regime as it stood on 1 April 2014. Notably, it would make the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules applicable to all treaty-based investor-State arbitrations under ‘old’ treaties, independently of the applicable arbitration rules. Whether the arbitration in question is governed by the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the ICSID Convention, the Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, the Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce – you name it – the Mauritius Convention would provide for transparency of submissions to arbitral tribunals, arbitration hearings, and decisions by arbitral tribunals, and give more room for third-party participation under a uniform set of rules. It could thus apply to some 3000+ investment treaty relations if both the respondent State and the investor’s home State are contracting parties or, alternatively, if the investor-claimant accepts the unilateral offer to apply the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules made by the respondent in signing the Convention (see Article 2 of the Mauritius Convention).

Provided it is signed and ratified by a sufficiently large number of States and regional economic integration organizations, such as the EU or ASEAN, the Mauritius Convention will bring about a paradigm shift in investor-State dispute settlement. Although possibilities for reservations, including subsequent ones, are broad (Articles 3 and 4 of the Mauritius Convention), and although ongoing arbitrations are excluded from its scope of application (Article 5 of the Mauritius Convention), the Convention will establish transparency as a general principle of international investment law.

This constitutes another step in the incremental adaptation of international investment law to the demands of a more democratic and accountable international public law system of private-public adjudication. The wide-spread application of transparency under the Convention would not only enhance the accountability of the underlying investor-State relations, but also enable better public control of the arbitral process. This turns the Mauritius Convention into an instrument with constitutional implications for the international investment regime. Read the rest of this entry…

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Breaking the Washington Consensus?  The Rise of ‘Alternative’ Development Banks

Published on March 18, 2015        Author: 

The United Kingdom scuttled much of its trans-Atlantic partnership with the United States this week, when it became the first G7 country to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) over US objections.  European countries France, Germany, and Italy followed suit, with Australia and South Korea now re-evaluating their positions to consider joining the USD $50 billion capitalized AIIB. Japan is holding firm on its alliance with the United States in refusing to join the AIIB.  United States National Security Council spokesperson Patrick Ventrell declared that “any new multilateral institution should incorporate the high standards of the World Bank and the regional development banks…we have concerns about whether the AIIB will meet these high standards, particularly related to governance, and environmental and social safeguards.” As I write from my temporary office here at the Centre for Asian Legal Studies (CALS) at the National University of Singapore Faculty of Law, commentaries proliferate on this debacle and the alleged waning geopolitical influence of the United States, most recently from Kishore Mahbubani, Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, who declares all these events “a sign of American decline”.  It is not the first indictment on America’s lessening hegemonic grip in the face of China as a rising power. Joseph Weiler’s magisterial Keynote at the 2014 ESIL conference showed how the conflation of politics, cultural cleavages, economics, and moral authority essentially presaged the end of Pax Americana.   More detail to these themes also resonate from a recent 2014 edited book by political science and international relations scholars Vinod Aggarwal and Sara Newland, showing how both the United States and the European Union have deployed various strategies of engagement, cooperation, and confrontation with the rise of China.

Whichever brush we use to describe the decision of key US allies such as the UK and Europe to join the AIIB (e.g. defection from US alliances, or strategic policies towards engagement with China as a rising power), the more interesting international legal phenomenon here is the impact of the rise of the AIIB (and other rival new development banks in the future) on the decades of dominance of the Washington Consensus in international development finance law.  Will the rise of ‘alternative’ development banks such as the AIIB break the stranglehold of the Washington Consensus on international development lending? And if so, what will the AIIB replace it with?  Would the AIIB and new ‘alternative’ development banks necessarily spell sea changes in ensuring compliance with international environmental and social norms and treaty standards throughout international development projects in developing countries?  While the AIIB has been hailed as a needed balance to American dominance in international development lending, China has also been quite opaque thus far on the actual contours of the AIIB’s governance and the terms of its international development lending policies.  And it is precisely this nebulousness that the US appears to interpret as a slide towards the lowest denominator in social inclusion, and the protection of environmental and social safeguards in international development lending.  Never mind that the World Bank is doing its own soul-searching and internal review on this score as well by calling for a long overdue review of its environmental and social safeguards policies, with World Bank President Jim Yong Kim recently warning of the surge of forced resettlement from Bank projects.

The rise of new ‘alternative’ development banks such as the AIIB and the contemplated BRICS bank creates an opening not just to dilute the powerful (almost monopolistic) reach of the United States on international development finance policies, but also to engage all international finance powerhouses – established or emerging – in reforms over global standard-setting in the international development finance ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ law. For over sixty years since the post-war global reconstruction period and in tandem with the evolution of the modern UN Charter era, Washington Consensus policies have dominated reform prescriptions for developing country borrowers.  These policies focus on ten points as the core focus of lending by international financial institutions that heavily depend on US capital (the trio of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the US Treasury): Read the rest of this entry…

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Anti-Fragmentation Strategies: the Curious Case of the EU and World Trade Law

Published on February 20, 2015        Author: 

The investor-State dispute settlement provisions of the EU’s proposed new free trade agreements with the US (the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – TTIP), Canada (the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement – CETA) and Singapore (the EU – Singapore Free Trade Agreement) are receiving considerable coverage in the popular media as well as within academic circles (note the recent EJIL: Talk! posts here and here). However, these agreements include not only investor-State dispute settlement but also inter-State dispute settlement provisions which should be equally interesting to international lawyers. On the one hand these provisions provide incentives to resolve trade disputes involving big trading players bilaterally, outside the WTO’s multilateral system, while on the other hand their provisions also reflect an attempt to address problems of fragmentation within the international legal system.

As with many areas of international law, world trade law has historically been concerned with the dangers of fragmentation. While the WTO may be viewed as a ‘fragment’ of the international legal system, within the WTO there is particular worry over the role of new free trade agreements. Why, when you have a multilateral institution with a comparatively clear set of obligations and relatively effective dispute system, would you conclude free trade agreements which contain substantively similar (though often wider ranging) obligations? The fear here is of what Jagdish Bhagwati called the ‘spaghetti bowl’ – a mass of regional or bilateral agreements concluded without consideration for each other or their implications for trade, potentially increasing costs, regulation and distorting conditions of competition for traders.

The concern is not only economic (i.e. that free trade agreements will undermine the non-discriminatory backbone of the current trade settlement), it is also legal: the ‘spaghetti bowl’ can distort the coherence of a legal system and its attendant expectation of certainty as much as it can distort the conditions of competition in trade. Nonetheless, institutional deadlock at the WTO has led to a number of free trade agreements being concluded globally. Until now, cases which have involved overlapping free trade agreement and WTO obligations have been resolved on the system in question’s own terms: for example, the Argentina v Brazil, Pork Subsidies MERCOSUR tribunal using more detailed WTO provisions to interpret a Decision (para. 57) or the Appellate Body in Mexico – Soft Drinks acknowledging NAFTA obligations but not seeing any basis for adjudicating upon them directly (paras. 54-56). Read the rest of this entry…

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European Hypocrisy: TTIP and ISDS

Published on January 21, 2015        Author: 

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For some, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) in and of itself has become in many European (and American) circles, the enemy: another manifestation of unchecked globalization, the march of Capital trumping social, environmental and other  rights, an unhealthy embrace of the Americans from whose clutches we have painfully managed to extricate ourselves, et cetera. Yes, there is some sarcasm or irony in the above, but visit the blogs and you will see where it comes from. My sarcasm should not be taken as a dismissal of all or any of these concerns. TTIP is far from Snow White. The concerns are not entirely fanciful. It is the final objective I oppose: a no-holds-barred attack on TTIP with the objective of tanking the whole agreement. If this is your view, do not waste your time here and skip to another item.

A wholesale defeat of TTIP, if achieved, will, I believe, be a big time Pyrrhic victory ̶ a hugely missed opportunity for the polities and the peoples of these polities.

I support the TTIP for two obvious and banal reasons. First, there is every reason to believe that on aggregate it will contribute significantly to an increase in welfare in both polities, enhance growth, contribute to stability and constitute another tool, in an embarrassingly empty toolkit, to combat future transatlantic-generated economic shocks. A large and often unspoken asset of TTIP rests not with the content of the various substantive disciplines but in establishing a culture of joint conversation, regulation and management. It will counter the litigious and confrontational culture of the WTO, where the EU and the USA find themselves typically as rivals and antagonists. Constructivist theory actually has something to say here as do the insights of Global Administrative Law scholarship. Read the rest of this entry…

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Towards a Constitutional Law Framework for Investment Law Reform

Published on January 5, 2015        Author: 

Reforming international investment law and investor-state arbitration is a widespread concern. This is nowhere more manifest than in the heated debates (in Germany and elsewhere) about the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Should there be investor-state arbitration between economies with well-functioning legal systems? Do we need an appellate mechanism to control arbitral tribunals? Who should serve as arbitrator and what ethical standards govern? And how should the substantive standards of investment protection be formulated in order to safeguard policy space for host states? These are some of the questions debated. At the same time, reforming international investment law is not only on the agendas of contracting parties, it also plays an important role for international organizations, such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), or the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

The Need for a Normative Framework for Investment Law Reform

The reform proposals that result from these various initiatives reflect the political pressure international investment law is facing; they also put pressure on states to remedy the discontents with the current system (see my earlier post on EJIL: Talk!). At the same time, the large number of reform proposals currently floated risk fragmenting investment law even further. This can be counterproductive if the aim is to arrive at an investment law regime that is both balanced and predictable. Furthermore, reform proposals themselves reflect underlying political and ideological preferences that may not be globally shared. What is needed therefore is a debate about these preferences and their impact on investment law reform. In other words: we need a broader debate about the normative framework for investment law reform.

As I argue in my Editorial of the latest Special Issue of the Journal of World Investment and Trade (entitled ‘Towards Better BITs? – Making International Investment Law Responsive to Sustainable Development Objectives’), this framework should not be seen only as a matter of (potentially short-lived and changing) economic policies that differ from one country to another. Instead, we should develop a framework for investment law reform on the basis of more fundamental principles, in particular if we are looking for ‘systemic reform’ that makes international investment law acceptable to all states. This requires – as Karl Sauvant and Federico Ortino rightly point out in a recent study – consensus-building processes about underlying assumptions and objectives for investment law reform. Read the rest of this entry…

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Social Capital and the Limits of Network Analysis

Published on September 29, 2014        Author: 

I want to start by thanking each of the commentators for their kind, forgiving and thought-provoking comments on my article, and by recognizing that the work of DaphaMichael and Tom set the foundations and served as the inspiration for this work. I will organize my responses into three different clusters:  methodology, extensions and other, more general comments.

Methodology

I will first address Tom’s comments on the record of appointment as a proxy for displayed preferences. Can we ignore the fact that an appointment does not necessarily indicate that the arbitrator was the appointer’s first choice? I like to think of this question as a job offer to a candidate who decides not to accept an offer. The truth may be that certain candidates are in high demand and that many companies are offering jobs to the same well-qualified candidates.  Hence it is possible that parties who nominate arbitrators and may be trying to enlarge the diversity of the pool of arbitrators in ICSID may be somewhat restricted by the broader market of arbitration professionals.  This is true especially where, as Michael points out (and as confirmed by arbitrators during my interviews), the compensation provided by ICSID is lower than that of other arbitration opportunities and venues.   This is a limitation of the assumptions that can be made from the ICSID appointments. We are left with only the record of appointments as a second-best proxy.

A second point raised by Tom as to why the mid-2000s witnessed the first appointments of today’s power-brokers is also relevant. We must take into consideration that these years saw a boom of investor-state cases and, hence, more appointments. It is also true that this is when we started seeing more awards discussed publically.  Although I did not report these statistics in this paper, measures that reflect the connectivity of the network start stabilizing and changing in less intense ways during this period.  Thus I’m not surprised that the network acquired self-organizing qualities during this time.  One plausible hypothesis for future exploration is how the development of transparency rules may have helped cement public knowledge of decisions and with that, some of the insights that come with understanding the decision-making philosophy of arbitrators.

On the methodology of determining the average compensation per arbitration of US$200,000, I admit that the number is not incredibly precise. However, it is the best approximation I could divine. I followed a complex, yet not foolproof strategy to arrive at what I consider a very rough average. First, I computed the amount in 2010 dollars from roughly 70 awards that provided information on compensation in my sample of ICSID and ICSID Additional Facility awards. I divided this amount by the months of duration of each case and averaged the result. Using the dollars per month estimate, I calculated the possible amount paid to an arbitrator on settled or dismissed cases based on an average duration of the case. I confirmed that this rough estimate was in the right ballpark with one scholar who has done extensive empirical work with ICSID data as well as through my interviews with arbitrators. It is not an exact appraisal, but what is relevant for the purpose of the article is whether ICSID’s rate completely changes the incentives to accept an appointment and hence whether the distribution of ICSID appointments is completely different from that of other institutions. We cannot know the answer to this question for certain, but with a grain of salt, my educated guess (taking into account what I gleaned from working at ICSID) is that it does not. Most appointments are accepted and most rejections occur when a conflict exists. In my experience it was only in very few cases that, for other reasons (such as being too busy) an arbitrator decided not to accept an appointment. Read the rest of this entry…

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ICSID Arbitrators: The Ultimate Social Network?

Published on September 25, 2014        Author: 

waibelMichael Waibel is a University Lecturer at the University of Cambridge.

Sergio Puig’s article offers a refreshingly new, thought-provoking analysis of the links between investment arbitrators. Who the parties appoint as arbitrators matters for how the investment treaty regime operates. Criticism of the appointment process in investment arbitration is widespread, yet rigorous empirical work on this important aspect of the investment treaty regime remains rare. Relying on the theoretical frame of social network analysis, Sergio sheds light on the interactions among ICSID arbitrators. His analysis suggests that a core group of 25 arbitrators enjoys disproportionate influence on the development of the investment treaty regime. To understand what animates the regime, it may suffice to analyse the preferences and political philosophy of these 25 ‘power-brokers’.

The Core-Periphery Divide and Underrepresentation

The core of the arbitration network is composed of 25 arbitrators. Members of this elite group are on average connected to 11.75 other arbitrators. The core’s cultural and legal homogeneity is striking: 14 Europeans, 4 Latin Americans, 3 Canadians, 1 New Zealander and only 1 US arbitrator. Similarly, among the top ten countries of origin of ICSID arbitrators overall, five are Euro-Atlantic states (US, France, UK, Canada and Switzerland) and five Latin American. By contrast, African and Asian arbitrators have rarely been appointed to ICSID tribunals, despite significant inward- and outward flows of foreign investment to and from Asia in particular. In such data-intensive work, minor errors are bound to creep in. For instance, in Figure 4, Vaughan Lowe appears as a US, rather than a UK national, and the 26th arbitrator in the core between Jonny Veeder and Jan Paulsson remains nameless.

The formal bond of nationality may be only a crude measure of arbitrator behaviour. As Sergio rightly highlights (p. 405), many arbitrators with nationalities of developing countries have received at least part of their legal education in developed countries (chiefly the UK, the US and France). Indeed, if one focuses on arbitrators who have spent most or all of their adult lives in a developing country and have not worked or received part of their educated in developed countries, the voice of developing countries in even less represented among ICSID arbitrators than the formal link of nationality would suggest.

Other demographics are also underrepresented among ICSID arbitrators, most notably women. 93 percent of all ICSID appointments were male arbitrators (p. 404). Given that Brigitte Stern has accumulated the highest number of appointments of any ICSID arbitrator, the share of female arbitrators is even lower at 5 percent (p. 405). Two female super arbitrators apart, women are at the periphery of the arbitration network. This gender imbalance mirrors the general characteristics of the entire arbitration network (p. 411).

Yanhui Wu and I have recently assembled data on a control group composed of more than 700 potential ICSID arbitrators, i.e. individuals with similar characteristics and qualifications to those who have already been appointed to at least one ICSID tribunal. Our control group includes current and former ICJ and WTO Appellate Body (AB) Members who, unlike some of their judicial colleagues, have yet to be appointed to an ICSID tribunal, and partners at leading arbitration practices in the same position. Ten former AB members and 18 current and former ICJ judges since 1990 have never been appointed. The following table compares some characteristics of the treatment and control groups. Read the rest of this entry…

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Social Capital and Arbitral Decision Making

Published on September 24, 2014        Author: 

DDaphnaaphna Kapeliuk is a Senior Lecturer at Radzyner Law School, IDC Herzliya. Her research interest focuses on international arbitration in general and on arbitral behavior in particular and on private international law.

In his brilliant article “Social Capital in the Arbitration Market”, Sergio Puig seeks to map the social arrangements that result from interactions among ICSID arbitrators, as part of the social dynamics of international arbitration. Using data of all appointments of ICSID arbitrators made between 1972 and 2014 and applying a social network analysis methodology, Sergio sets out to understand the role of social capital in investment arbitration by relying upon proxy measures for social connectivity.

The sophisticated maps of the interactions among ICSID arbitrators represent a picture of the social landscape of the arbitration market. These maps are of great importance, especially since ICSID tribunals are composed of three arbitrators, and the dynamics between the arbitrators within the panels are important to understand the outcome of disputes. Sergio’s article joins prior scholarship that has claimed that ICSID arbitrations are handled by a closed group of arbitrators, sometimes referred to as “grand old men”, or “blue chip men”, who are being repeatedly appointed to decide large scale investment disputes. He argues that the network analysis of ICSID arbitrators “provides important evidence of a dense network”, in which a limited number of prestigious arbitrators increase in prestige, while the others remain in the periphery.

Sergio’s major contribution to understanding the interconnections among these arbitrators is presented in figures 4 and 6. Figure 4 focuses on the inside and outside of core ties and common cases of the 25 most central arbitrators, and figure 6 represents a sociogram of appointments of arbitrators (as presiding arbitrators) by other arbitrators to the same panels. These figures clearly show the strong ties between the central arbitrators within arbitration panels.
While the main objective of the article is to map the social dynamics of ICSID arbitrators, Sergio argues that the network analysis provides evidence that the dense network of arbitrators “reinforces prevailing norms and behavior and insulates its most important members from outside influence”. Although the social landscape presented in the article supports the claim that the core of the prominent ICSID arbitrators is small, that the article does not analyze how this network might reinforce prevailing norms and behavior. It does not define or analyze these terms. The remainder of this comment offers one possible mechanism for how the social structure might lead to the postulated outcome.
There is no doubt that the entry barriers to the investment arbitration market are extremely high. An arbitrator who wishes to be admitted to the core of the prestigious network, and thus repeatedly appointed, must establish a reputation that justifies a “membership” in the “club”. It is through his connections, behavior and decision making that he can establish such reputation. Sergio’s article focuses on the interconnections among arbitrators, but not on their behavior or decision making. Read the rest of this entry…

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Comments on Sergio Puig’s ‘Social Capital in the Arbitration Market’

Published on September 23, 2014        Author: 

Tom SchultzThomas Schultz is a Reader in Commercial Law in the Dickson Poon School of Law at King’s College London and a Swiss National Science Foundation Research Professor in the International Law Department at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva. He is also the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of International Dispute Settlement (Oxford University Press).

Professor Puig’s article ‘Social Capital in the Arbitration Market’ is a quite wonderful contribution to a number of things: our understanding of the dynamics of investment arbitration, the literature on arbitrator appointments, the methodological diversification of studies in international law, and certainly a few more. And it brings us rather convincing evidence, in a field where claims and representations (not to speak of copious discussions of what other people happen to have said) are more readily found than data and studies to substantiate claims. It is, in other words, intellectually edifying. The experimental design is well done, the plan well executed and the findings credible. In this, it is intellectually responsive to developments in the social sciences and the humanities. We don’t even need a mood-elevating metaphor to set great store by this sort of works, and this work in particular. (Incidentally, the study is also a formidable ‘who’s who in investment arbitration’, which undoubtedly will make for welcome entertainment in certain circles.)

A few small methodological points would probably deserve more discussion. (I said ‘would deserve’, not ‘would have deserved’: the article is long enough as it is and this is a law journal after all.) For instance, the author says that ‘The network analysis advanced in this article relies upon displayed preferences by the appointing entity (litigation parties, arbitrators, and the institution) to provide a larger picture of the network’s aggregate topology.’ But how do we know the preferences of the appointing entity? Right, by looking at appointments. But do effective appointments really tell us what the preferences are? What if individuals, who are the preferred choices of the appointing entity, refuse an appointment, and the appointing entity has to turn to their second or third choice? Never happens. Well… Actually, could such situations be statistically relevant?

Another methodological point: Figure 8 is puzzling. Not puzzling as in ‘probably wrong’. Puzzling as in ‘how come’? Here’s the author’s accompanying notes: “Figure 8 shows how, despite the fact that most ICSID cases were registered in the last 10 years, most ‘power-brokers’ or those arbitrators at the top of the profession entered the network in or prior to 2004.” In other words, the mid-2000s is the moment when you see the network effects. Why? Why did the network stabilise at that point in time? The network seems to have acquired self-organisational elements at that point in time, but, again, why then? Any hypothesis? Just happenstance? Just puzzling.

Beyond methodological considerations, we may also wonder–and perhaps the author wants to elaborate on this–why, in fact, it is a bad thing that a small number of arbitrators decide a great number of cases. Read the rest of this entry…

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