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Home Archive for category "International Economic Law"

The Polisario case: Do EU fundamental rights matter for EU trade policies?

Published on February 3, 2017        Author: 

On 10 December 2015, the General Court of the European Union (GC) rendered a judgment in the Council v. Front Polisario case that was revolutionary in many regards: not only did a national liberalization movement successfully challenge an EU trade agreement, the Court also considered the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) applicable to non-EU citizens on a non EU-territory and in the context of trade policies (see previously, Geraldo Vidigal in EJILTalk).

A month ago and a year later, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) quashed the decision of the GC and denied legal standing for the Front Polisario. However, the door for a role of EU fundamental rights as a benchmark for EU trade policies is not yet closed. To the contrary, the ECJ’s conclusions brought to the fore an ugly truth that shows that the extraterritorial effects of EU trade policies are in urgent need of closer scrutiny.

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Economic Nationalism in a New Age for International Economic Law: Recalling Warnings of Ludwig von Mises and the Austrian School

Published on January 30, 2017        Author: 

International economic law developments barely one month into 2017 have been nothing short of tectonic this side of the Atlantic. From US President Trump’s first executive action to withdraw the United States from the unratified Trans-Pacific Partnership; his subsequent announcement (later called mainly an option) to impose a 20% border tax on Mexican imports into the United States to finance a wall between the two countries; a declared initiative to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that was signed under the administration of Republican President George Bush; unprecedented changes to the United States National Security Council removing the nation’s top military, intelligence, and security advisers to only permit regular attendance for White House chief strategist Steve Bannon and more limited attendance of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of National Intelligence; threats of punitive tariffs against China and accusations of illegal currency manipulation; to last Friday’s latest executive order announcing a travel ban against individuals from seven predominantly Muslim states (approximately 218 million persons) and the 4-month suspension of any refugee entry, as a possible first step to a broader ban – it is becoming all too clear that barely ten days into the new presidency, the United States will not be above reversing, abandoning, disregarding, or defecting from any of the established rules and institutions of international economic law, through extraordinary actions and reversals that have scarcely any or no inter-agency vetting and consultation, and significantly, with the new president declining to divest himself from all business interests or to introduce transparency and consultation measures even as these political-security-economic policy reversals continue to be formulated with relative opacity. The Dow Jones industrial averages and NASDAQ composite index both dropped with the sudden rush to sell off US equities, and American private companies have taken to hiring crisis management and communication firms for the new age of undisclosed and sudden economic policy reversals, reviewing operations and mergers against possible charges of being “Anti-American”.

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What Will a Trump Administration Mean for International Agreements with the United States?

Published on December 13, 2016        Author: 

On 20 January 2017, Donald Trump will become the 45th President of the United States. During the campaign, he spoke often about terminating landmark international agreements concluded by the Obama administration, including the Paris Agreement on climate change, the Iran nuclear deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the normalization of relations with Cuba. Predicting what might actually happen in a Trump administration is difficult, because his statements as a private citizen, candidate and president-elect have been inconsistent. Should he wish to follow through on the campaign rhetoric to take immediate action on these issues, what can the president actually do unilaterally? Decisions to terminate these agreements raise questions under both international and domestic law. The United States is bound under international law when it becomes a party to an international agreement, and also has some limited obligations upon signature. Under US constitutional law, the presidency is at its most independent and powerful in dealing with foreign relations. While that power is not unlimited, soon-to-be President Trump could arguably fulfil all of those campaign promises without violating domestic or international law.

Paris Agreement on Climate Change

On 3 September 2016, the United States ratified the Paris Agreement on climate change which entered into force on 4 November 2016. The agreement was concluded under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) which was ratified by the United States in 1992 and entered into force in 1994. The Paris Agreement establishes no binding financial commitments or emissions targets. The states party are bound only to formulate and publish national plans for reducing greenhouse gas emissions to hold the increase in the global average temperature to “well below” 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to reduce the increase to 1.5°C. The United States is the second largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world, and its participation in the Paris Agreement was critical to bringing other states, particularly China, on board. Read the rest of this entry…

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Remaking Globalization for the Local: The Real Search for Equality and Diversity in International Law

Published on November 9, 2016        Author: 

From Western liberal democracies in the United States and the European Union, to historically democratic developing countries such as the Philippines, ignored, disenfranchised, and disempowered local communities emphatically made themselves heard in elections and referenda around the world.  For better or for worse, the international economic order will be remade, somehow.  It would be specious and condescending to merely say that this is the rise of “populism” without truly understanding the concerns of local communities who have driven electorates all over the world to reject any form of the “establishment” – whether they be traditional politicians and parties, State apparatuses, international organizations, mainstream media, or multinational corporations.

The supranationalist structures of modern international law’s prominent institutions – the United Nations (UN), the Washington Consensus behemoths such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the European Union (EU), among others – are premised on deepening inter-State cooperation while still ensuring full respect for the basic UN Charter of the “principle of sovereign equality” of all States. However, the actual power and felt impact of these global institutions on the daily modern lives of individuals, groups, and local communities reveals serious fissures that expose an obvious imbalance between the terms of international cooperation and States’ sovereign equality – from the micromanagement of Greek agencies by EU fiscal managers and inspectors during the worst nadir of the EU’s financial crisis; the enforced austerity and structural adjustment programs of World Bank technocrats harnessing the leverage of the Bank’s conditionality lending to developing countries; the loss of jobs and social dislocations caused to communities throughout manufacturing states in the United States of America when multinational corporations move operations offshore to China or Mexico; as well as the drastically increased competition for resources and the rise in challenges to religious, social, ideological and group identity posed by cleavages within multicultural societies emerging from formerly hermetic communities now overrun by refugees and other immigrants fleeing political persecution, climate change-related natural disasters, and other humanitarian crises.

Restive “Westphalian” political elites push back against the seeming tyranny of the international system and its global institutions, in order to increasingly assert the sovereign prerogative of states and their supposed ‘independence’ from any form of international governance that ultimately erodes any of these elites’ real bases of power. The recent rise of populist, anti-establishment, anti-trade, and anti-internationalist leaders throughout established democracies – from France’s Marine Le Pen, the United States’ Donald Trump and (to a certain extent) Bernie Sanders, the United Kingdom’s Nigel Farage, the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte, Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, among others – is no coincidence. ‘Silent’, faceless, and individually powerless, electoral majorities are clearly voting for leaders who project themselves as best able to roll back the worst excesses of inequality, insecurity, and uncertainty faced by households from an (actual or imagined) unrestrained international order. The rise of an unstable, deep populism throughout liberal democracies around the world does not only express what IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde calls “a groundswell of discontent” against globalization, but rather, a return to a much harder ‘Westphalian’ version of State sovereignty insulated from the common interests and shared concerns of this century’s community of nations forged and united in the aftermath of the First and Second World Wars.

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Quasi-Judicial Dialogue for the Coherent Development of International Law

Multilateral Development Banks have established international accountability mechanisms over the last 25 years in order to offer private individuals or groups a process through which they can demand the redress of grievances caused by the banks’ projects. Accountability mechanisms are often composed of experts appointed by each bank’s Board of Directors. The mechanisms generally have a compliance review function, with or without a problem-solving function. With their different mandates, these quasi-judicial bodies have, just like judicial bodies, proliferated in a process that can be deemed “quasi-anarchic“. This post explores a recent project in Kenya presented simultaneously before two accountability mechanisms, and argues that accountability mechanisms’ “quasi-judicial dialogue” can constitute a source of inspiration for the coherent development of international law.

Two Accountability Mechanisms, Two Mandates

As judicial and quasi-judicial bodies participate in the development of international law, there is a risk of incoherence in their decisions with consequences such as unpredictability, inequalities or forum-shopping, which would endanger the international legal system (see Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?). Incoherence may become even more acute for Multilateral Development Banks’ accountability mechanisms as they confront very similar factual scenarios, especially in the case of co-financing where parties affected by an investment may seize more than one accountability mechanism, just like in the Kenya Electricity Expansion Project presented before the World Bank and the European Investment Bank’s accountability mechanisms.

Indeed, there are four important differences between the mandates of the World Bank Inspection Panel (hereinafter the Panel) and the European Investment Bank’s Complaints Mechanism. In all four aspects, the World Bank’s policy is more restrictive than the European Investment Bank’s (hereinafter EIB). Read the rest of this entry…

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Detecting Prohibited Subsidies and Determining Continued Compliance: WTO Panel Rules (Again) for the US in the Airbus Dispute with EU

Published on September 26, 2016        Author: 

On 22 September 2016, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) scored another victory in its long-running dispute with the European Union (EU) over subsidies provided by certain EU Member States to large civil aircraft manufacturer Airbus. The USTR sought to prove that 36 challenged EU measures remained inconsistent with its duty to comply with the rulings and recommendations issued by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) after adopting the original 30 June 2010 Panel Report in this case.  Specifically, the US challenged four types of subsidies allegedly made by the EU and/or certain EU Member States to Airbus for continuing inconsistency with the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement: 1) launch aid or member State financing; 2) equity infusions for the corporate restructuring of Aerospatiale and Deutsche Airbus; 3) infrastructure related measures of German and Spanish authorities; and 4) research and technological development funding provided by the EU and certain member States.

The 22 September 2016 WTO Panel Report European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft [hereafter, “2016 Panel Report”] found, among others, that: 1) French, German, Spanish, and UK launch aid or member State financing for the Airbus A350XWB constituted actionable specific subsidies (2016 Panel Report, para. 7.1.c.ii.); 2) the EU and certain member States have failed to comply with their obligation to withdraw the subsidies for other Airbus aircraft (2016 Panel Report, para. 7.1.c.ix.); 3) the EU continues to be in violation of Articles 5(c) and 6.3(a)(b) and (c) of the SCM Agreement by failing to comply with previous recommendations and rulings of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in the original 30 June 2010 Panel Report (2016 Panel Report, para 7.2); 4) to the extent that the challenged EU measures remain inconsistent with the SCM Agreement, they have nullified or impaired benefits accruing to the US under that Agreement (2016 Panel Report, para. 7.3); and 5) the EU and certain member States failed to bring 34 of its 36 challenged measures into conformity with their obligations under the SCM Agreement (2016 Panel Report, para. 7.4).

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Unpacking the Complexities of Backlash and Identifying its Unintended Consequences

Published on August 25, 2016        Author: 

References to “backlash” are becoming increasingly ubiquitous in international law scholarship (see for example this recent EJIL article and accompanying EJIL:Talk! Discussion). Few have, however, sought to define or unpack the complexities of backlash. In this post, we draw upon our chapter in a forthcoming book titled The Judicialization of International Law – A Mixed Blessing? (Oxford University Press, 2017). We seek to develop a notion of “backlash”, identify what underlies it, and illuminate its potential unintended consequences. While we focus upon investment treaty arbitration as a case study, we endeavor to illuminate the complexities of evaluating opposition to international regimes. These issues hold particular relevance to investor-State arbitration given current State negotiations of major bi‑ and multi‑ lateral treaties with investor-State protections. They are also likely to gain in relevance with many investment treaties shortly coming up for renewal or termination.

Defining Backlash

The notion of backlash has seldom been defined, instead being used as an umbrella term to capture a range of forms of critique and contestation. These include State decisions to review, not renew, terminate, or withdraw from existing treaties; refusals to negotiate or sign investment treaties; and changes in the approaches of States to the negotiation of new treaties. There are also forms of “backlash” arising from civil society, non-governmental organizations, and academia in the form of protests, comments in public consultation processes, increased reporting, and academic discussion. Such acts, along with others, are increasingly cited as evidence of “a rising backlash” against the regime of investor-State arbitration generally.

The term “backlash” indicates the presence of something more than scrutiny, critique or even crisis. Read the rest of this entry…

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Philip Morris v Uruguay: an affirmation of ‘Police Powers’ and ‘Regulatory Power in the Public Interest’ in International Investment Law

Published on July 28, 2016        Author: 

In recent years there has been criticism that international investment treaties and investor-State arbitration conducted under those treaties increasingly, and unacceptably, have encroached upon the legitimate uses of States’ regulatory power. These concerns have not only been expressed in scholarship, but have also been at the forefront of State negotiations in recent multilateral and bilateral trade and investment agreements (see, for example, the recent discussion by Anthea Roberts and Richard Braddock here on the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement). The concerns have led to policy proposals from States and international organisations for greater safeguards for States to be able to enact measures in the public interest without attracting liability under investment treaties.

Investor-State arbitration tribunals appear to be alive to these concerns. On 8 July 2016, a tribunal (constituted by Professor Piero Bernardini, Mr Gary Born and Judge James Crawford) convened pursuant to the Switzerland-Uruguay Bilateral Investment Treaty (‘BIT’) delivered an award which, by majority, upheld the legality of two tobacco-control measures enacted by the Uruguayan government for the purpose of protecting public health. The award contains an extensive analysis of the interaction between States’ regulatory powers to enact laws in the public interest and States’ obligations to protect and promote foreign investment within their territory. This post will focus on two aspects of the award that considered this interaction: the claim pursuant to Article 5 of the BIT (expropriation) and the claim pursuant to Article 3(2) (fair and equitable treatment or FET).

The challenged measures

The claim, brought by the Philip Morris group of tobacco companies against Uruguay, challenged two legislative measures. First, the claimants challenged a law that mandated a ‘single presentation requirement’ on cigarette packaging, such that different packaging or variants of cigarettes were prohibited.

Secondly, the claimants challenged a law that mandated an increase in the size of health warnings on cigarette packaging from 50 to 80% of the lower part of each of the main sides of a cigarette package (‘the 80/80 requirement’). As the the amicus brief submitted by the WHO and Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (‘FCTC’) Secretariat noted, large graphic and text health warnings are increasingly common on tobacco packaging globally and a number of States have enacted (or are considering enacting) laws with the aim of preventing misleading tobacco packaging, as is required of States parties to the FCTC (including Uruguay). Read the rest of this entry…

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