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Home Human Rights Archive for category "Extraterritorial Application"

A Trio of Blockbuster Judgments from the UK Supreme Court

Published on January 17, 2017        Author: 

This morning the UK Supreme Court delivered three important judgments dealing with various claims alleging wrongful acts by the UK when fighting international terrorism (UK Supreme Court page; Guardian news report). In Belhaj and Rahmatullah No. 1 the Court unanimously dismissed the Government’s appeal, and found that the claim against the UK for its alleged complicity in torture and mistreatment of the claimants was not barred by rules of state immunity and the foreign act of state doctrine (press release; judgment). In Rahmatullah No. 1 and Mohammed the Court unanimously allowed the Government’s appeals, holding that, insofar as the respondents’ tort claims are based on acts of an inherently governmental nature in the conduct of foreign military operations by the Crown, these were Crown acts of state for which the Government cannot be liable in tort (press release; judgment). Finally, and perhaps of greatest interest to most of our readers, in Al-Waheed and Serdar Mohammed the Court, by 7 votes to 2 in a set of very complex judgments, held that British forces had power to take
and detain prisoners for periods exceeding 96 hours if this was necessary for imperative reasons of security, but that its procedures for doing so did not comply with ECHR article 5(4) because they did not afford prisoners an effective right to challenge their detention (press release; judgment). We will be covering these judgments in more detail soon.

I have only had the time to read Serdar Mohammed, which I am yet fully to digest, but here are some initial thoughts (we have of course extensively covered this case on the blog before). The two key judgments are those of Lord Sumption for the majority and Lord Reed for the minority; I must say that by and large I incline towards the latter. I am also troubled by some of the ipse dixit, rather casual references in the judgments of the majority justices to the lex specialis principle; the supposedly restrictive original intentions of the drafters of the ECHR with regard to its application extraterritorially and in armed conflict, which are in reality completely unknowable; similarly casual constructions of coherent narratives of a very messy field that confirm one’s own predispositions (e.g. that in Al-Skeini the Strasbourg Court unprecedentedly expanded the reach of the Convention to extraterritorial armed conflicts, when one could just as easily say that in Bankovic the Court unprecedentedly restricted the Convention’s reach); or the supposed unavailability of extraterritorial derogations, on which see more here.  That said, the judgments are thoughtful and rigorous even when one might disagree with them, which brings me to the Court’s main findings.

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Practitioners’ Guide to Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict

Published on January 15, 2017        Author: 

The questions whether, when and how international human rights law applies to the activities of armed forces during armed conflict have been the subject of much discussion and litigation in the past couple of decades. It is now clear “that the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict . . .” (International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Wall in Palestine (2004), para. 106).

However, what has been less clear is when those protections apply, especially when the state concerned is acting outside its territory, and how human rights law is to be applied in armed conflict. With regard to the latter question, one of the key issues is the relationship between human rights law, as it applies in conflict, and international humanitarian law as the law specifically designed for application in conflict. In the literature, and even in the case law, most attention has focussed on the when question (the question of applicability of human rights law) rather than the how question (the method and mode of application of human rights law). However, given that it is undoubtedly the case that there are circumstances when human rights law applies in armed conflict, even extraterritorially, the focus on the former set of questions, has led to an unfortunate lack of guidance as to how to apply (and to think about the application) of human rights law in situations of conflict.

Towards the end of last year, Oxford University Press published the Practitioners’ Guide to Human Rights in Law Armed Conflict (Murray, Akande, Garraway, Hampson, Lubell & Wilmhurst), a book that arises out of a project carried out by Chatham House under the leadership of Elizabeth Wilmhurst. The aim of this book is to provide guidance not only on when human rights law applies in situations of conflict, but, more importantly, on how it is to be applied.  As the Introduction to the book sets out, “The book is concerned primarily with giving guidance to the armed forces for the conduct and preparation of military operations.” (p. 2) However, it should be of assistance to all those who have to think about the application of human rights law in conflict – government officials, lawyers appearing before courts, members of non-governmental organizations and judges.

The book is divided into two parts. The first part (Chapters 1-4) provides an overview of human rights law, when it applies extraterritorially (ch. 3) and its relationship to the law of armed conflict (ch. 4). The second part (Chapters 5-17) provides detailed guidance on how human rights law applies to a range of issues that arise in armed conflict, eg the conduct of hostilities and targeting (ch. 5); weapons (ch. 7); prisoners of war and internment (ch. 8); occupation (ch. 10); and cyber operations (ch. 15). Read the rest of this entry…

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The Kunduz Affair and the German State Liability Regime – The Federal Court of Justice’s Turn to Anachronism

Published on December 5, 2016        Author: 

On 6 October 2016 the Federal Court of Justice (henceforth “Court”) decided on an appeal against the Higher Regional Court of Cologne’s dismissal of two actions for compensation brought against the Federal Republic of Germany (III ZR 140/15, only available in German): Abdul Hannan sought compensation for the death of two of his sons in the amount of 40.000 Euro, Qureisha Rauf, a mother of seven, sought alimentation for the death of her husband and father of her children in the amount of 50.000 Euro. The death of their relatives was the result of a fatal airstrike ordered by Colonel Klein who was in charge of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kunduz in the northern part of Afghanistan. The PRT was institutionally embedded in the framework of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Whilst Klein was operationally subordinated to the ISAF commander and in the end the NATO Commander-in-Chief he remained within the chain of command of the German Federal Army ultimately being subject to orders of the German Ministry of Defense. The ordered strike was directed against two fuel tanks previously stolen by Taliban from PRT’s premises which were stuck in a sandbank close by. Fearing that these tanks would be used for an attack against the PRT camp Klein commanded their destruction after receiving the information of a military informant that no civilians were present at the relevant location which infrared pictures delivered by US-American fighter aircrafts seemed to support. In retrospect these assumption proved wrong: The attack led to the death of 100 to 150 people, mostly civilians who gathered around the fuel tanks out of curiosity, others were apparently forced by the Taliban to assist with the recovery of the tanks (with regard to the criminal investigation against Klein see here).

A Legal Bombshell

The lower courts were unable to find that Germany incurred liability based on Art. 34 Basic Law in conjunction with § 839 German Civil Code since the claimants failed to establish that Klein violated ius in bello norms – Art. 51, 57 of the First Additional Protocol and Art. 13 of the Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions were particualrly in question. The Court, however, went beyond that by asserting that the state liability regime does not apply with regard to actions of the German army in the context of armed conflicts per se. The Court’s finding can be considered a legal bombshell since this question has been left open within previous judgments (see the Court’s “Varvarin” judgment of 2nd November 2006, III ZR 190/05). Until now both the Court itself as well as the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) applied an “even if” argumentative strategy in similar cases: Not explicitly deciding whether actions within armed conflicts fell into the scope of the liability regime, they limited themselves to finding that even if they did, compensatory claims would remain unsuccessful since other conditions – especially a breach of a duty on part of German state officials – were not met (see FCC, “Varvarin” decision of 3th August 2013 – 2 BvR 2660/06, 2 BvR 487/07 – available in English).

Viewed against the background of German constitutional law as well as obligations stemming from international law – especially the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) – this decision suffers from methodological and substantive deficiencies and is hardly tenable. Read the rest of this entry…

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Joint Series on International Law and Armed Conflict: Rachel VanLandingham on the Procedural Regulation of Detention in Armed Conflict

Published on October 6, 2016        Author: 

The fourth post in our joint blog series arising from the 2016 Transatlantic Workshop on International,’The Procedural Regulation of Detention in Armed Conflict’- by Rachel E. VanLandingham (Southwestern Law School, Los Angeles) is now available on Lawfare.

Here’s a snippet:

vanDuring our conference, I was asked to generate discussion regarding the procedural regulation of detention during armed conflict, particularly during non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). Though lawyers love process, there is a tendency for both soldiers’ and civilians’ eyes to glaze over when they hear the words “procedures,” as they invoke memories of mind-numbing bureaucratic process endured at one’s department of motor vehicles. Yet procedures are vitally important, as they transform values into reality; they are how fairness marries with pragmatism to produce just results. In wartime detention, they ensure exigent detention is reasonable, and work to satisfy fundamental notions of fairness; furthermore, giving process that is due helps reinforce the legitimacy and hence strategic efficacy of military operations. Establishing and following procedures is just as vital an endeavor in ensuring that individuals detained during armed conflict pragmatically should be detained and lawfully can be detained, as it is in ensuring militaries intentionally target military objectives and not civilians.

While detention is internationally recognized as “a necessary, lawful and legitimate”component of military operations, there remain serious legal gaps regarding how detention should be conducted in the most common type of war, those between states and non-state armed groups. While the Geneva Conventions provide robust, detailed rules regarding how and when to detain both civilians and combatants during international armed conflict (IAC), there is no equivalent for NIACs. It is in states’ best interest to remedy this gap, both to avoid repeating past gross abuses and pragmatically, because such procedures are directly linked to operational success.

The issues most relevant to procedural regulation of NIAC detention fall roughly into three categories: the legal authority to detain; standards of (reasons for) detention; and notification plus review mechanisms.

Read the rest over on Lawfare.

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UK to Derogate from the ECHR in Armed Conflict

Published on October 5, 2016        Author: 

At the Conservative party conference this week, the UK Prime Minister and her defence secretary announced that the UK will derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights in times of armed conflict. I have written before that such derogations – if appropriately used – can be a valuable tool in regulating the relationship between human rights law and international humanitarian law, by providing much needed clarity and flexibility. I hence have no problem with the principle of the idea – indeed, I have argued in particular that the dicta of some of the judges of UK’s highest courts to the effect that the ECHR cannot be derogated from extraterritorially are not to be followed. I do have a problem, however, with how this derogation idea is now being sold to the British public and for what purpose. In that regard, my comments in this post are caveated by the unfortunate fact that the specifics of the derogation plan are yet to be published – we know that there will be a ‘presumed’ derogation, but not from which rights and under what exact circumstances.

Let me first deal with the political salesmanship. To start with, there’s the usual (and forgivable) pandering – Theresa May thus opens her pitch by saying that “Our Armed Forces are the best in the world” and that her government “will ensure that our troops are recognised for the incredible job they do. Those who serve on the frontline will have our support when they come home.” Oh, please. By what metric exactly are the British armed forces “the best in the world”? By their tactical combat effectiveness? By their actual achievement of specific strategic goals (in which they’ve been constantly hampered by the underfunding, underequipping and wishful thinking on the part of their political masters)? By their compliance with the law of armed conflict? The Chilcot inquiry’s findings with respect to the armed forces’ performance in Basra do not exactly support the “best in the world/incredible job” label.

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Al-Saadoon and the Duty to Investigate

Published on September 16, 2016        Author: 

On September 9, a UK Court of Appeal handed down its judgment in Al-Saadoon & Ors v. Secretary of State for Defence [2016] EWCA Civ 811]. Much of that case revolved around when and how the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) applies to the conduct of a State beyond its own borders (i.e., extraterritorially) in situations of armed conflict where that State is in some way linked to a use of force that results in death.

This post focuses on a separate issue in the judgment: the duty to criminally investigate violations of non-refoulement (under Article 3, ECHR) and arbitrary deprivation of liberty (Article 5, ECHR). The non-refoulement issue arose after two individuals who U.K. military forces captured in Iraq claimed they were transferred to U.S. custody and in whose hands they were subsequently ill-treated. The Article 5 issue arose after U.K. military forces operating in Iraq detained several individuals who claimed to have had their Article 5 rights violated whilst in U.K. custody. The question that Lord Justice Lloyd Jones had to resolve was whether, under the ECHR, the U.K. had a duty to conduct criminal investigations into these alleged violations.

Lloyd Jones LJ, agreeing with Mr. Justice Leggatt’s prior High Court judgment, said that no such obligation to investigate exists for all Art 3 non-refoulement and all Article 5 violations. Read the rest of this entry…

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English Court of Appeal Decides Al-Saadoon Case on the ECHR’s Application Extraterritorially and in Armed Conflict

Published on September 14, 2016        Author: 

Last week the Court of Appeal of England and Wales rendered a unanimous judgment in Al-Saadoon & Ors v Secretary of State for Defence [2016] EWCA Civ 811. For extended analysis, see David Hart QC’s post on the UK Human Rights Blog here. Like the judgment of the High Court by Mr Justice Leggatt below, this judgment, written by Lord Justice Lloyd Jones, is exceptionally rigorous and well-argued. In a nutshell, the CoA basically endorsed almost all of the Leggatt J’s reasoning below, with one specific exception: while Leggatt J considered that under the ECtHR’s Al-Skeini judgment the personal conception of Article 1 jurisdiction as authority and control over an individual exercised by a state agent necessarily captures the use of lethal force against that individual, Lloyd Jones LJ held that he did not think that the ECtHR intended the principles articulated in Al-Skeini to go that far, and that it should be for the ECtHR to extended them thusly if it wanted to do so. He nonetheless agreed with Leggatt J in the application of the relevant principles to the facts, with most of the claimants being covered by the ECHR on a different basis.

The key paras of Lloyd Jones LJ’s reasoning are below the fold. In any event, in my view both of the judges have it right: limiting the personal principle so that it does not cover uses of lethal force (e.g. by a drone) would indeed be arbitrary, but in Al-Skeini the Court did in fact try to preserve the result of Bankovic and vaguely create a limitation of precisely this kind (see more here). And I can fully see why an English judge would think that this conceptual mess is one for Strasbourg to sort out – note, in that regard, the impact that cases that do not concern armed conflict (e.g. on extraterritorial surveillance) will inevitably have on this jurisprudence. What will ultimately happen in this regard is unclear, and will depend on the wider political context and the readiness of Strasbourg to find and follow the moral logic of Article 1 ECHR – but it’s clear that this case is headed first to the UK Supreme Court and then on to Strasbourg.

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ECHR Jurisdiction and Mass Surveillance: Scrutinising the UK Investigatory Power Tribunal’s Recent Ruling

Published on June 9, 2016        Author: 

Last week, as discussed in a post by Marko Milanovic, the UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) ruled that it lacked jurisdiction under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) to adjudicate Article 8 and 10 claims brought by persons “situated outside” of the UK (para. 60). The IPT is a specialised judicial body that hears complaints about surveillance by public bodies, including British security and intelligence agencies. IPT decisions are not subject to direct appeal in the UK. We are therefore likely to see this ruling quickly challenged before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).

Background

The backdrop to this litigation is convoluted. I sketch out the context in this post as I believe it will enrich discussion of the jurisdictional issues which are at the heart of this dispute. In 2013, following the Snowden disclosures, Privacy International, together with nine other NGOs, filed a case before the IPT challenging two aspects of the UK’s surveillance regime. First, the claimants challenged UK access to the communications of persons located within the UK collected by the US National Security Agency (NSA) under PRISM and Upstream. Under PRISM, the NSA collected data from US companies including Yahoo and Google. Under Upstream, the NSA intercepted data in bulk from hundreds of undersea fibre optic cables. Second, the claimants challenged Tempora, the British counterpart to Upstream, under which the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) intercepted data in bulk from over 200 cables landing in the UK.

In February 2015, the IPT found that US-UK intelligence sharing – pursuant to PRISM and Upstream – was unlawful prior to 5 December 2014 because the legal framework governing it was hidden from the public (according to the IPT, that framework was sufficiently disclosed over the course of the proceedings so as to render the sharing of intelligence legal from that point forward). Read the rest of this entry…

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UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal Rules that Non-UK Residents Have No Right to Privacy under the ECHR

Published on May 18, 2016        Author: 

In another major development on the surveillance/privacy front, on Tuesday the UK specialized surveillance court, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, ruled that persons not present within the United Kingdom are not within the jurisdiction of the UK in the sense of Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and accordingly do not have any of the rights under that Convention (para. 49 et seq). In other words, a person in say France or the United States subjected to surveillance by GCHQ does not have an ECHR right to privacy vis-a-vis the UK, which accordingly has no Convention claim to answer. This is I think the first time that a British court has expressly dealt with extraterritoriality in the surveillance context. The IPT’s reasoning essentially rests on a Bankovic analogy – if you are in say Serbia and the UK drops a bomb on you, the Strasbourg Court has said that you don’t have the right to life. How could you then have the right to privacy if all the UK did was to simply read your email while you were in Serbia?

I have extensively argued elsewhere why that analogy is wrong (as is Bankovic itself), so I won’t belabour that point further (see here and here). It was entirely predictable that the IPT would adopt this restrictive position, which is perfectly plausible under Strasbourg case law (even if fundamentally mistaken). The IPT was correct in ruling, however, that distinctions as to the Convention’s applicability can’t really be made on the basis of whether the person is present is some other Council of Europe state, or is outside the ECHR’s espace juridique altogether. Anyway, the issue of the Convention’s extraterritorial applicability to mass electronic surveillance abroad is one for Strasbourg to decide and (hopefully) fix, and it will have the opportunity to do so in these cases and others. What the Court will do is of course anyone’s guess, because its decision will inevitable have ripple effects on other scenarios, such as extraterritorial uses of lethal force, e.g. drone strikes.

I have also argued, however, that there is particular scenario in which the applicability of the Convention becomes more attractive (or less dangerous as a matter of policy) – when the surveillance actually takes place within the surveilling state’s territory, even if the affected individual is outside it. Imagine, for example, if the UK police searched my flat in Nottingham while I was visiting family in Serbia – surely I would have Article 8 rights, even though I would not be on UK territory when the search took place. Why then should I not have these rights if an email I send while I am in Serbia is routed through my university server in Nottingham and intercepted by GCHQ there? In both cases the intrusion into privacy happens on the UK’s territory, even if I am outside it. In fact, in its judgment the IPT briefly addresses this scenario, if all too briefly and less than convincingly, although I’m not sure that the point was extensively argued.

In any case, the main paragraphs on the jurisdiction issue are below the fold. The judgment also deals with the very important question of standing/victim status, finding that all but six of the 600+ claimants lacked locus standi even under a very low threshold of showing that they are ‘potentially at risk’ from surveillance measures (applying the European Court’s recent Zakharov judgment, para. 171).

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Trade Agreements, EU Law, and Occupied Territories (2): The General Court Judgment in Frente Polisario v Council and the Protection of Fundamental Rights Abroad

Published on December 11, 2015        Author: 

This is a follow-up to my July post on Action for Annulment Frente Polisario v Council (Case T-512/12), a case before the General Court of the European Union (GC) in which Frente Polisario – the National Liberation Movement for Western Sahara – seeks the Annulment of the EU Council decision adopting the 2010 EU-Morocco Agreement on agricultural, processed agricultural and fisheries products. The GC delivered its judgment yesterday, both recognizing the standing of Frente Polisario and granting the (partial) annulment of the decision, with implications for EU-Morocco relations and for EU external relations law more broadly.

(1) Standing of Frente Polisario under Article 263 TFEU

As regards standing, the most striking aspect of the judgment is that the Court accepted the Frente’s entitlement to plead as a ‘moral person’, with the ‘necessary autonomy’ to challenge a decision of the EU legislator (paras. 50-53), without reference to the sui generis character of Frente Polisario or to the unique situation of Western Sahara. This would seem to open the door for other ‘autonomous entities’, even those with no claim to international legal personality, to challenge EU decisions under Article 263 TFEU.

By the same token, the Court fell short of recognizing the Frente’s legal personality under international law. Read the rest of this entry…

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