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Equatorial Guinea v France: What are the Limits on Prosecution of Corruption-Related Money Laundering by Foreign Officials?

Published on July 29, 2016        Author: 

On 14 June 2016, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) announced that Equatorial Guinea had instituted proceedings against France before the Court. Equatorial Guinea’s claims arise from the French prosecution of Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, First Vice-President of Equatorial Guinea, on charges of corruption-related money laundering. This is the first time that allegations related to large-scale corruption – often dubbed as ‘kleptocracy’ or ‘grand corruption’ – engender a dispute before the ICJ. This post offers an overview of some of the legal issues that the Court may address in the course of this litigation.

Background

Mr Obiang is First Vice-President of Equatorial Guinea and the son of the country’s president, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo (who is, incidentally, the world’s longest-serving president, in power since 1979). At the time when the proceedings were brought, Mr Obiang was Second Vice-President in charge of defence and security, having been promoted to his current post on 22 June 2016.

The two statesmen are no strangers to controversy. Allegations of corruption have been levelled against them repeatedly (see, e.g., here and here). In 2014, Mr Obiang surrendered part of his US-based property in settlement of US v One White Crystal-Covered ‘Bad Tour’ Glove et al, an asset forfeiture case brought by the US Department of Justice that involved his collection of Michael Jackson memorabilia and real estate. A criminal investigation is reportedly underway in Spain and corruption-related human rights litigation against Equatorial Guinea is pending in the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

The French investigation against Mr Obiang arises from a criminal complaint submitted by Transparency International France and Sherpa, two anti-corruption NGOs. Their allegation is that he has pilfered the coffers of Equatorial Guinea and invested the proceeds in France. The French authorities launched an enquiry after the Cour de Cassation’s 2010 judgment that confirmed the standing of NGOs to bring criminal complaints. On 13 July 2012, France issued an international arrest warrant against Mr Obiang. As of now, the pre-trial investigation has been concluded and the investigating magistrate shall decide whether to refer the case to court. Mr Obiang’s attempt to invoke immunity in France fell through as the Cour de Cassation ruled that (1) immunity under customary international law is limited to heads of states, heads of governments, and foreign ministers, and (2) at the time of the alleged commission of the imputed offences, Mr Obiang was merely a minister of agriculture and forests.

In another twist of events, in 2011 – that is, after the Cour de Cassation’s 2010 ruling that paved way for his prosecution – Mr Obiang sold his Parisian mansion to the state of Equatorial Guinea. Equatorial Guinea asserts that the property has henceforth formed part of the premises of its embassy to France. Unimpressed by the manoeuvre, the French investigating magistrate ordered the seizure of the building in 2012.

In Equatorial Guinea’s contention, (1) the French criminal proceedings constitute an unlawful interference with its internal affairs because alleged wrongdoing would fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of Equatorial Guinea, (2) Mr Obiang is entitled to immunity from the French criminal jurisdiction, and (3) the seizure of the building is in breach of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961. Read the rest of this entry…

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Philip Morris v Uruguay: an affirmation of ‘Police Powers’ and ‘Regulatory Power in the Public Interest’ in International Investment Law

Published on July 28, 2016        Author: 

In recent years there has been criticism that international investment treaties and investor-State arbitration conducted under those treaties increasingly, and unacceptably, have encroached upon the legitimate uses of States’ regulatory power. These concerns have not only been expressed in scholarship, but have also been at the forefront of State negotiations in recent multilateral and bilateral trade and investment agreements (see, for example, the recent discussion by Anthea Roberts and Richard Braddock here on the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement). The concerns have led to policy proposals from States and international organisations for greater safeguards for States to be able to enact measures in the public interest without attracting liability under investment treaties.

Investor-State arbitration tribunals appear to be alive to these concerns. On 8 July 2016, a tribunal (constituted by Professor Piero Bernardini, Mr Gary Born and Judge James Crawford) convened pursuant to the Switzerland-Uruguay Bilateral Investment Treaty (‘BIT’) delivered an award which, by majority, upheld the legality of two tobacco-control measures enacted by the Uruguayan government for the purpose of protecting public health. The award contains an extensive analysis of the interaction between States’ regulatory powers to enact laws in the public interest and States’ obligations to protect and promote foreign investment within their territory. This post will focus on two aspects of the award that considered this interaction: the claim pursuant to Article 5 of the BIT (expropriation) and the claim pursuant to Article 3(2) (fair and equitable treatment or FET).

The challenged measures

The claim, brought by the Philip Morris group of tobacco companies against Uruguay, challenged two legislative measures. First, the claimants challenged a law that mandated a ‘single presentation requirement’ on cigarette packaging, such that different packaging or variants of cigarettes were prohibited.

Secondly, the claimants challenged a law that mandated an increase in the size of health warnings on cigarette packaging from 50 to 80% of the lower part of each of the main sides of a cigarette package (‘the 80/80 requirement’). As the the amicus brief submitted by the WHO and Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (‘FCTC’) Secretariat noted, large graphic and text health warnings are increasingly common on tobacco packaging globally and a number of States have enacted (or are considering enacting) laws with the aim of preventing misleading tobacco packaging, as is required of States parties to the FCTC (including Uruguay). Read the rest of this entry…

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Turkey’s Derogation from the ECHR – What to Expect?

Published on July 27, 2016        Author: 

In the aftermath of the failed 15 July coup, Turkey’s government declared a state of emergency and subsequently on 21 July notified the Council of Europe that it “may” derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  So far there is no information of a possible notification to the United Nations concerning derogations from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

Turkey’s ECHR formal notification was preceded by widely reported expectations, fuelled also by a Council of Europe press release, that it was going to “suspend” the ECHR (presumably as a whole) and, interestingly, followed by a 25 July communication to the Council of Europe (see below) that appears to downplay the severity of the derogations.

Derogations from some but not all human rights are permissible under ECHR Article 15 and, similarly, under ICCPR Article 4 when a state is faced with a public emergency that threatens the life of the nation and officially proclaims a state of emergency. A failed military coup would prima facie qualify as serious enough a situation that can be addressed through declaring a state of emergency in the process of restoring normalcy.

Basing myself on the assumption that Turkey’s decision to derogate from some of the ECHR rights as such is to be assessed as permissible, I will below address the constraints that a country is facing under human rights law when lawfully derogating. Read the rest of this entry…

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Environmental Aspects of the South China Sea Award

Published on July 21, 2016        Author: 

Earlier posts (here and here) have provided a general overview of the much-anticipated 12 July Award of an UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal in the Philippines v China case. This post will focus on the environmental aspects of the Award. The Tribunal’s consideration of environmental issues is largely contained in the part of the Award dealing with the Philippines’ submissions 11 and 12(B) ([815]-[993]). While these submissions were phrased differently, they both sought declarations that China had violated its obligations under UNCLOS to protect and preserve the marine environment (submission 11 related to various locations whereas submission 12 related to Mischief Reef). The Philippines’ environmental claims related to two aspects of China’s conduct: firstly China’s alleged toleration or support of environmentally harmful fishing practices by its nationals; secondly, the environmental impact of China’s land reclamation and construction activities.

Treaty Interpretation and Due Diligence

The Tribunal’s interpretation of the general obligation under UNCLOS Article 192 to ‘protect and preserve the marine environment’, and the more specific obligations under Article 194 regarding marine pollution, embedded these provisions within wider environmental law. The Tribunal noted that these obligations require states to exercise due diligence and to ensure that activities occurring within their jurisdiction and control do not harm the marine environment, referring to ITLOS’ 2015 Advisory Opinion regarding a state’s obligation to investigate reports by another state of non-compliance by its vessels with provisions of the Convention concerning protection of the marine environment, and the ICJ’s remark in Pulp Mills on ‘due diligence’ requiring a ‘certain level of vigilance’: [944].

In interpreting Article 194(5) of UNCLOS, which requires states to ‘protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species’, the Tribunal drew on several aspects of wider international environmental law. This included having regard to the definition of an ‘ecosystem’ in Article 2 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the term not being defined in UNCLOS. Based on the scientific evidence before it, the Tribunal had no doubt that the marine environments in question were ‘rare or fragile ecosystems’ and the habitats of ‘depleted, threatened, or endangered species’: [945].
The Tribunal also had regard to CITES, to which both the Philippines and China are parties, in informing the content of UNCLOS Articles 192 and 194(5). The context here was that the sea turtles found on board Chinese fishing vessels were listed under Appendix I of CITES as a species threated with extinction, and the giant clams which had been harvested by Chinese nationals, as well as corals in the area, were listed in Appendix II of CITES: [956]-[957]. The evidence indicated that Chinese-flagged vessels had made widespread use of a particularly damaging technique of breaking up coral with their propellers to extract clams: see [847]-[851], [958]. Read the rest of this entry…

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Remote-Controlled Killing in Dallas

Published on July 19, 2016        Author: 

On 8 July 2016, most likely for the first time in history, Dallas, Texas police used a remotely piloted land vehicle — a type of drone — to bomb a criminal suspect to death. When asked whether the bombing was justified, a former Los Angeles police captain said yes: “This was not a conventional police operation. This was more of a war zone type operation”.

That Dallas could be a war zone for purposes of killing a criminal suspect and that police would use a bomb to do so are new examples of a continuing post-9/11 phenomenon. It is another case indicating the spreading, negative influence of legal arguments developed to weaken the restraints on the use of force. Other examples have been discussed here recently, including legal reasoning to justify the 2003 Iraq invasion and the abusive claims to self-defense in response to terrorism. This post will focus on the artificial war zone and the militarization of police practices.

“War Zones” Beyond War Zones

Just one week before the Dallas bombing, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) released drone death statistics from killings “outside zones of active hostilities.” For years the Obama administration has argued for a broader understanding of what constitutes a battlefield, along with attenuated readings of the right of self-defense and of the right of a state to consent to the use of military force on its territory. In a speech at Harvard Law School in September 2011, John Brennan, currently the CIA director, said, “The United States does not view our authority to use military force against al-Qa’ida as being restricted solely to ‘hot’ battlefields like Afghanistan.” These efforts were first motivated to provide legal cover for the use of drones in targeted killing beyond the combat zones of Afghanistan and Iraq. (For an overview of the history, law, and ethics of using drones for targeted killing, see my review essay, Game of Drones.) Since then, the concept of a right to kill beyond a zone of active hostilities or hot battlefields has taken on a life of its own. It has morphed into the thinking and justifications behind killing with means other than drones, against targets other than Al-Qaida members, and by operators other than U.S. military and intelligence personnel, such as the Dallas police and Chinese law enforcement. Read the rest of this entry…

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Russia and China Challenge the Western Hegemony in the Interpretation of International Law

Published on July 15, 2016        Author: 

On 25 June 2016, the Presidents of Russia and China adopted a common Declaration on the Promotion of International Law in Beijing. The Declaration has already been subject to insightful commentary in the Western blogosphere, for example by Ingrid Wuerth.

The context of the Declaration is that both Russia and China have recently faced criticism for their attitudes towards, and even violations of, international law. In March 2014, the majority of states in the UN General Assembly considered Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula illegal under international law. On 12 July 2016, about two weeks after the Russian-Chinese Declaration was adopted, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in a case initiated by the Philippines, de facto rejected most of Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea.

In this sense, the Russian-Chinese Declaration represents a defensive political document in which the signatory states reject Western suggestions that the two UN SC permanent members have a somewhat problematic relationship with international law. Within the Declaration, Russia and China offer their own interpretation of what the big picture of international law is – an interpretation according to which it is the West, especially the US, that emerges as an actor displaying a problematic record and attitude. It is important that the two powers have now officially come together to put forward a common interpretation on the big picture of international law. At least in Russia, strategic criticism of the Western approach to international law has been prominent in strategic documents for the last ten or so years.

One has to keep in mind that the discourse on international law within Russia and China differs considerably from the way it is typically understood and constructed in the West. However, the realization of this fact is not necessarily too deep in the West where at least academic discourse on international law is usually carried out as an intra-Western affair i.e. Western experts debating with other Western experts. Outside the West, international law is often portrayed as an hegemonic tool of the West. For example, in April 2016, the Director of the Investigative Committee of the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation and a leading practitioner in international law matters in Russia, Alexander Bastrykin, made a statement according to which, international law has for a while been used as an element of Western hybrid warfare against Russia. Read the rest of this entry…

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A Plea Against the Abusive Invocation of Self-Defence as a Response to Terrorism

Published on July 14, 2016        Author: 

The use of force in self-defence against terrorist groups is one of the most controversial issues in the field of jus contra bellum today. Particularly since 9/11, several States have supported a broad reading of the right to use force in self-defence, as allowing them to intervene militarily against terrorists whenever and wherever they may be. A consequence of that conception is that any State could be targeted irrespective of whether that State has ‘sent’ the irregular (in this case terrorist) group to carry out a military action or has been ‘substantially involved’ in such an action, to use the terms of Article 3g) of the Definition of Aggression (annexed to GA Res 3314 (XXIX)) considered by the ICJ as reflecting customary international law. However, an even more substantial number of States do not seem to subscribe to this broad reading of the right to self-defence. The Non-Aligned Movement, for example, representing some 120 States, has regularly expressed its clear reluctance to adhere to this view. Thus, in February 2016, in an open debate before the UN Security Council on ‘Respect for the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations as a key element for the maintenance of international peace and security’, the Non-Aligned Movement reaffirmed that ‘consistent with the practice of the UN and international law, as pronounced by the ICJ, Article 51 of the UN Charter is restrictive and should not be re-written or re-interpreted’ (S/PV.7621, 15 February 2016, at 34).

But what about international lawyers? The reaction on their part has been equivocal. Some have supported a broad interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter, focusing on the possibility to invoke self-defence against terrorists. Others argue in favour of a more ‘restrictive’ and classical reading of the Charter. Following this second line of reasoning, a plea against the abusive invocation of self-defence as a response to terrorism has been drafted by a group of scholars (available here). The aim of this post is to (i) explain in what context and how this plea was conceived, and (ii) briefly describe its main characteristics. Read the rest of this entry…

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A Rejoinder to John Bellinger on the Chilcot Report

Published on July 13, 2016        Author: 

Over on Lawfare, John Bellinger has an interesting post on the Iraq Inquiry which is well worth a read, responding partly to Oona Hathaway’s recent post on Just Security. However, there are a couple of points in Bellinger’s post that I think are highly problematic and would like to address here.

First of all, Bellinger notes that the Inquiry did not expressly criticize the UK (and the US) legal argument for intervening in Iraq, and draws from that the following conclusion:

Even if the Chilcot committee did not want to substitute its own legal conclusions for Goldsmith’s, if the Goldsmith view is as “widely repudiated” as Oona believes, surely the committee (which had former ICJ President Rosalyn Higgins as its legal adviser) would have noted this fact and provided the counter-arguments.  That the committee does not criticize the substance of Goldsmith’s legal conclusions tends to indicate that the committee did not find them “manifestly implausible.”

I don’t think this inference is correct, i.e. that from Chilcot’s silence we can infer anything about the commissioners’ views on the legality of the war. Chilcot expressly said that the legality of the war was outside the Inquiry’s mandate. This would include any judgments about the plausibility (as opposed to correctness) of any particular argument. And he moreover noted that the war was not one of last resort AND that in the Inquiry’s view the UK (and implicitly the US) undermined the authority of the Security Council.  Since the UK/US argument was based on implied Security Council authorization, the Inquiry’s finding is if anything directly contrary to the overall thrust of that argument, at the very least politically so.

Second, Bellinger notes (correctly) that, as a matter of principle, the 678/687 revival argument was not new, i.e. it was used before to justify several bombing campaigns in Iraq. But that the revival argument was not new has little bearing on whether it is plausible or correct, the political optics aside. It was always highly controversial, and received a lot of criticism in the legal literature even when it was used on a vastly smaller scale than the full invasion and regime change of 2003.

Nor does the fact that the government lawyers of five states (US, UK, Australia, Poland, Spain) endorsed that argument inherently make it plausible. I suppose a lot depends on the exact criterion by which we judge plausibility. I am reminded in that regard of a panel discussion on the Ukraine crisis that I chaired at last year’s ESIL conference in Oslo. There were a couple of hundred people in the room, and at one point I asked for a show of hands on how many of the international lawyers in that room thought that that Russia’s intervention in Ukraine was lawful – only one person did so. I then asked the same question about the US intervention in Iraq, and again only one person did so (it was not the same guy!). That is obviously just an unscientific data point, but it still aligns with my anecdotal impression that 99% of international lawyers outside the US (and even there the percentage is not much smaller) think that the Iraq war violated the UN Charter. That (some of) the government lawyers of five states thought otherwise doesn’t change much, I think, about the judgment that the profession as a whole has passed on the Iraq war, which I admit is also inevitably influenced by the unmitigated disaster it eventually turned out to be.

Thirdly, and most importantly, I think Bellinger doesn’t take into account that even among these five states there were significant differences in how they actually approached the revival argument. In particular, even the UK, the US closest ally, per the advice of Lord Goldsmith, considered that the US version of the revival argument was legally wrong. Just as a reminder, under both versions of the revival argument the authority to use force under SC res 678 was suspended but not extinguished by 687, and could be revived by a material breach of the conditions imposed on Iraq by 678 and subsequent resolutions. However, under the US version of this argument it was for individual states (i.e. the United States, i.e. President George W. Bush) to decide whether Iraq was in material breach, but under the UK version that judgment had to be made collectively, by the Security Council. This is why, under its legal view, the US had no need of resolution 1441, but on the UK view that resolution was indispensable, i.e. without it the 678 authority could not be revived.  This is also why, in his 7 March formal legal advice , at para. 9, Lord Goldsmith noted that he ‘was not aware of any other state which supports [the US] view.’

Finally, this is also why, as Dapo and I argued in our submission to the Iraq Inquiry, which was joined by many other scholars, Lord Goldsmith’s last-hour change of heart about the interpretation of 1441 could not be justified by discussions with US interlocutors and by reference to US ‘red lines’ that US negotiators could not possibly have conceded, since the US red lines were predicated upon the US version of the revival argument and not the UK one. In other words, the US may well have succeeded in upholding its red lines, but this would not automatically have meant that the UK succeeded in getting from 1441 what it needed to get to invade Iraq. (Notwithstanding the point of principle Richard Gardiner and Michael Wood have made before on whether UNSC resolutions can be interpreted by reference to what some of the negotiators privately thought they had or had not achieved).

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Philippines v China: first thoughts on the Award in the South China Seas Case

Published on July 12, 2016        Author: 

Any international lawyer looking at a news site in the last few hours will have seen that the final award has been handed down at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Philippines v China dispute brought under the UN Convention on the Law Sea Annex VII procedure. The arbitral tribunal’s decision is simply historic. While Philippines has lost on a number of smaller points, the scale of its win overall is much greater than most commentators were expecting.

What follows is a very preliminary comment – and I stress that faced with a 500 page decision I may well revise my views later. It is also more in the nature of an explainer than a deep dive on any of the many legal questions already highlighted below. (This is also an excessively long post, for which I apologise.) However, on a first, quite brief, examination the tribunal has attempted to be meticulously fair to China and has applied the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea strictly and thoroughly. It has delivered a result which was, by and large, predictable.

James Kraska of the US Naval College has summarised the key holdings as:

  • the nine dash line has no basis in law,
  • there are no islands in the disputed area within the meaning of Article 123, UNCLOS,
  • China has interfered in the Philippines’ EEZ; and
  • China’s actions have aggravated the dispute.

I would add to this list three matters. First, the Tribunal has concluded that Mischief Reef is a low tide elevation over which no State can claim sovereignty or possession. This means it is simply a maritime feature within the Philippines exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Chinese island-building activities there are thus not merely without legal effect but are in violation of the sovereign rights of the Philippines.

Second, it has found that China has breached various obligations under UNCLOS regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment by having caused severe and irreparable harm to coral reef ecosystems in its construction of artificial islands in the South China Seas.

Third, international tribunals normally bend over backwards to avoid findings of bad faith against a state. That is, one cannot act in bad faith without violating some other substantive right. So most tribunals consider it sufficient to stop at determining that a right or duty has been violated. This tribunal has found China violated Article 300 of UNCLOS: the duty to act in good faith. This is an extraordinary rebuke and a clear indication that the law of the sea dispute resolution system will not be cowed by the posturing of the superpower. As a matter of principle, it takes a principled stand on the supremacy of the rule of law. As a matter of pragmatism, it flies in the face of the conventional wisdom that angering China over this dispute could jeopardise the stability of the law of the sea system.
Read the rest of this entry…

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The Philippines v. China Arbitral Award on the Merits as a Subsidiary Source of International Law

Published on July 12, 2016        Author: 

“Great Game” politics in the Asia-Pacific has just changed irrevocably, especially for all parties, claimants, and affected constituencies in the South China Sea, after the Annex VII UNCLOS arbitral tribunal released its 12 July 2016 Award in Republic of the Philippines v. People’s Republic of China (Permanent Court of Arbitration Case No. 2013-19).  While we will be featuring posts over the coming days on this award that dissect and analyze the award, its international legal significance, and its larger geopolitical consequences for all claimants to the South China Sea dispute and third-party actors (such as the United States), for now, a close read of all 479 pages of this arbitral award reveals it to be an extremely rich and fertile piece of international jurisprudence, one that will certainly have far-ranging doctrinal impacts as an international judicial decision that is also an authoritative subsidiary means for determination of the international law rules under UNCLOS, especially on questions such as the:
1) normative weight of “historic rights” and differentiating the same from “historic title” and “historic rights short of sovereignty”, and clarifying what could still possibly amount to historic rights that States could still validly assert within the UNCLOS treaty regime;

2) authoritative criteria for determining the existence of low-tide elevations (LTEs), noting that the legal consequences of which were not completely settled in the International Court of Justice’s judgment in Qatar v. Bahrain;

3) objective criteria for the authoritative interpretation of Article 121 UNCLOS;

4) objective and subjective criteria for testing the lawfulness and unlawfulness of a coastal State’s asserted ‘enforcement’ activities; and the

5) objective or scientific factors that could be taken into account to determine the existence of actionable environmental damage to the marine environment under Articles 192 and 194 UNCLOS.

Interestingly, the arbitral tribunal did not assume jurisdiction in this case over the interpretation of “military activities” within the meaning of Article 298 of UNCLOS, which the Philippines had asserted in regard to various military and paramilitary incidents with China over Second Thomas Shoal. It would be interesting to see, in the coming days, how the United States reacts to this development, since it has frequently insisted on the prerogative of the coastal State to make the authoritative determination of what “military activities” could be justifiably excluded from compulsory dispute settlement under UNCLOS Article 298(1)(b).

The evidentiary rules and fact-finding procedures of this tribunal will also, I suspect, also provoke considerable commentary, if not critique, since the tribunal drew heavily from numerous statements, published views, and opinions that were attributed to the respondent in this case. One can also expect questions to be raised on why the respondent never chose to participate in the proceedings if only to challenge jurisdiction, to contest the veracity or authoritativeness of the Philippines’ technical, environmental, hydrographical, and other expert submissions under protest, or to otherwise set its own narrative, instead of permitting China’s narrative to be formed from the tribunal’s reconstruction of innumerable media statements and statements of officials.

Clearly, this award has greater consequences beyond China’s repeated refusal to recognize it (at least for now). As a subsidiary means for determining international law, it is conceivably difficult for any of the claimants – the Philippines included – to ignore the legal effect of this ruling and its impact on all future steps to be undertaken in the actual maritime boundary delimitation negotiations. The ruling will likely affect the landscape of interpretation for the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties to the South China Sea, and the ongoing work agenda of the ASEAN-China Working Group on the Code of Conduct for the Parties to the South China Sea. Whatever the stated preferences may be of China or the new Duterte administration in the Philippines, and regardless of objections to the veracity of factual findings of the tribunal, the very existence of the Philippines v. China arbitration award as a subsidiary means for determining the rules of international law arguably changes the very scope and interpretation of actual applicable law to be considered by parties to this dispute.

We look forward to featuring a broad spectrum of views from various international lawyers and scholars on this landmark arbitral award, as we track contemporaneous developments in the Asia-Pacific region, and invite further discussion especially on next steps ahead for the actual disputes between the claimants on maritime boundary delimitation. Read the rest of this entry…

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