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Home Archive for category "EJIL Analysis" (Page 2)

Killing by Omission

Published on April 20, 2016        Author: 

On Monday, the Forensic Architecture team at Goldsmith College, London, published Death by Rescue. The report exposes a rather complex set of facts, but the basic argument is as simple as it is alarming.

Operation Triton, facilitated by Europe’s border security agency, Frontex, began on 1 November 2014 and is mandated to enforce Italy’s maritime border. Triton replaced an earlier and much wider Italian Navy operation, Mare Nostrum, which began in October 2013 and was mandated to save migrant lives beyond Italy’s territorial waters. When EU officials decided on the more limited scope of Triton, they knew their decision would result in the drowning of numerous migrants. As one Frontex official wryly noted, “the withdrawal of naval assets from the area, if not properly planned and announced well in advance, would likely result in a higher number of fatalities.” But the European Commission turned a blind eye – leading to a spike in migrant deaths, which the authors, Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani meticulously document.

From a legal perspective, this set of circumstances raises the question whether the migrants’ rights were violated, and if so, whether EU actors can be held legally accountable. In my view, the report exposes no illegal activity by European agents, either at the operational or at the policymaking level. Perhaps more troubling, the report raises the specter of unaccountable violence ingrained in the very structure of international law. If international law is somehow to blame for circumstances that made these utterly preventable deaths possible, then perhaps it is law itself that should be indicted.

Law of the Land, Law of the Sea

To explain what I mean by that, several rather theoretical remarks are required.

In common law countries, one of the first things law students learn is that law imposes no duties of rescue upon individuals qua individuals.  The classical jurisprudence on this includes comically macabre examples. A characteristic hypothetical describes a bystander witnessing a drowning baby. Law professors often use the initially astonishing absence of a duty of rescue to illustrate a basic tenet of legal positivism: the distinction between legal and moral prescription (or “the separation thesis”). Students are expected to adopt this distinction as a second nature. Rescuing the drowning stranger, they are comforted, is morally required. Of course, there are important exceptions to the general absence of a duty of recue. The basic point nevertheless stands: law does not impose a duty of rescue. Law does not always follow moral prescription. Read the rest of this entry…

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The EU-Turkey Statement: A Treaty That Violates Democracy (Part 2 of 2)

Published on April 19, 2016        Author: 

In yesterday’s post, I discussed why the EU-Turkey joint statement should be regarded as a treaty under international law, replete with consequences on EU Member States as a matter of international law.  In this concluding post, I argue that EU Parliamentary prerogatives were violated in the substance of this agreement and the manner by which such agreement was reached.

…That Violates the Parliament’s Prerogatives

Since the 18 March statement is an international agreement binding on the Union, it should have been adopted, on the EU’s side, on the basis of Article 218 TFEU. This provision never mentions the European Council: it is the Council that authorises the opening of negotiations and that concludes (i.e. ratifies) them. More importantly, Article 218(6) TFEU stipulates that, in most cases, the Council may conclude an agreement only after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.

The Parliament’s consent is required, in particular, when the international agreement covers fields to which the ordinary legislative procedure applies. This is the case of the 18 March statement, which concerns the readmission of citizens of third countries (although the statement does not explicitly mention the word ‘readmission’, it clearly refers to this concept, cf. the definition of ‘readmission’ in the EU-Turkey readmission agreement, Article 1). The EU’s competence to enter into readmission agreements is explicitly acknowledged by Article 79 TFEU, which regulates the EU’s ‘common immigration policy’. In this field, the ordinary legislative procedure applies (ex Article 79(2) TFEU). Hence, pursuant to Article 218(6) TFEU, the Council may conclude readmission agreements only after having obtained the consent of the European Parliament. The EU-Turkey readmission agreement was indeed concluded after having obtained the consent of the European Parliament – but that was not the case for the 18 March statement.

One may wonder whether the statement, by virtue of its specific features, could have been legitimately concluded in the form of an ‘executive agreement’, that does not require Parliamentary approval. It would seem, in fact, that EU institutions sometimes enter into executive agreements with foreign authorities, especially for the management of relatively ‘technical’ issues, such as the establishment of EU Delegations or the conduct of relations with international organisations. Be that as it may, I would argue that a readmission agreement cannot be concluded as an ‘executive agreement’. This argument is supported by a literal and systematic reading of the TFEU. Readmission agreements (envisaged by Article 79(3)) can be concluded only after having obtained the consent of the Parliament (Article 218(6)), since the ordinary legislative procedure applies in this area (Article 79(2)). If an EU institution could enter into a readmission agreement through another procedure, Article 218(6) would be deprived of its content.

The importance of the letter of Article 218(6) is reinforced by the case-law of the Court of Justice. According to an established jurisprudence, Article 218 TFEU ‘constitutes, as regards the conclusion of international treaties, an autonomous and general provision of constitutional scope, in that it confers specific powers on the EU institutions’ (Negotiating directives, para 62). Since Article 218(6) establishes a balance between the Council and the Parliament, the adoption of agreements in the simplified form, such as the 18 March statement, tips the balance against the Parliament. This can hardly be accepted: the Parliament’s involvement in the treaty-making area ‘is the reflection, at EU level, of the fundamental democratic principle that the people should participate in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative assembly’ (Mauritius, para 81).

It emerges from the above considerations that the 18 March statement was concluded in infringement of the Parliament’s prerogatives, and is consequently vitiated by violation of the essential procedural requirements imposed by Article 218(6) TFEU.

Conclusion

The EU-Turkey statement of 18 March appears criticisable for several reasons. Not only is it ethically questionable and problematic in terms of human rights protection, but it also challenges the democratic principles on which the EU is founded. The good news is that this statement might be subject to judicial review. Being a binding act, vitiated by violation of essential procedural requirements, the agreement may possibly be annulled under the procedure of Article 263 TFEU (cf. France v Commission, paras 16-17). It is also possible, at least in principle, that the agreement may be incompatible with substantive primary rules, notably those concerning fundamental rights protection.

If the Court of Justice is to review the legality of the 18 March statement, someone must obviously bring action against it. The European Parliament is the ideal candidate. Hopefully, (some of) its members might be more sensitive to humanitarian concerns than the governments of EU States. The European Parliament may also wish to defend the democratic principle at large, since they constitute the basis of its own legimacy. Moreover, the Parliament has an interest in protecting its own prerogatives: there is indeed the risk that the Member States, left to their own devices, may decide to ignore Article 218(6) TFEU in the future, too.

The Parliament may perhaps be tempted to turn a blind eye to the 18 March statement, to avoid exposing itself to criticism. The EU-Turkey deal is a hot potato that politicians are likely to avoid, if at all possible: political and legal uncertainty may seem preferable in the short term. Backroom deals of this sort are not uncommon in the history of the EU, but, in my view, they are no longer acceptable. If the EU’s democratic deficit is to be filled, political leaders – notably, the members of the European Parliament – should take responsibility for the EU’s actions. That is especially the case when the lives of thousands of people are at stake. Not only does the Parliament have a right to bring action against the 18 March statement, but it has also a moral duty to do so.

The annulment of the 18 March statement may not have immediate consequences, since it would hardly prevent Greece from considering asylum-seekers’ applications as ‘inadmissible’ and, ultimately, from sending them back to Turkey. The annulment of the 18 March statement may nonetheless serve a twofold purpose. It would draw attention to the consequences of statement, in terms of human rights protection and democratic governance. It may also contribute to stigmatise the action of the Member States, thereby discouraging them from seeking similar solutions in the future. The recent non-paper on readmission to Afghanistan, that prefigures the deportation of 80.000 people, suggests that further ‘questionable’ agreements may be on their way.

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The EU-Turkey Statement: A Treaty That Violates Democracy (Part 1 of 2)

Published on April 18, 2016        Author: 

While the terrorist attacks in Brussels understandably attracted most of the attention during the last weeks, migration issues, and particularly the situation in Greece and Turkey, remain high on the EU’s agenda. The EU and Turkey recently stepped-up their cooperation in migration matters by adopting a joint statement, that soon appeared questionable in terms of international and European asylum law (Chetail 2016; Labayle and de Bruycker 2016; Mandal 2016; Peers 2016; Roman 2016). Through this contribution, I intend to demonstrate that the EU-Turkey statement is problematic also because of another reason: it was adopted in violation of the European Parliament’s powers and of the democratic principle at large. Therefore, the Parliament has the right, and the moral duty, to bring action against the statement before the Court of Justice.

Bad for Refugees

Both Turkey and the EU are concerned by the migratory crisis prompted, inter alia, by the Syrian civil war. They have negotiated a number of instruments during the last few months, including a Joint Action Plan in October 2015 and a statement on 7 March 2016. The cooperation framework was completed on 18 March, through the adoption of a joint statement, which took effect on 20 March.

Through the latter statement, Turkey committed to readmit migrants who have not applied for asylum in Greece or whose application has been found ‘inadmissible’ or unfounded under the EU’s Asylum Procedures Directive. On the other hand, the EU accepted that, for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, a Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU (the so-called ‘1:1 scheme’), with a maximum of 72.000 persons. The EU also committed to accelerate the visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens and to ‘speed up’ the disbursement of 3 billion euros allocated under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (a fund constituted by the EU and its Members, which provides humanitarian assistance to refugees in Turkey and their host communities).

It has been argued that the 18 March statement is ‘Kafkaesque’ and ‘morally wrong’ (ECRE 2016), because it sets up a ‘trade in human misery’ (Peers 2016). The statement may also run afoul of European and international law, since it might lead to collective expulsions and may not give asylum-seekers an effective opportunity to apply for international protection in the EU. If Greece defined Turkey as a ‘safe third country’, it would be able to consider any application for international protection by asylum-seekers transiting through Turkey as ‘inadmissible’, after a simple interview (see Articles 33, 34 and 38 of the Asylum Procedures Directive). It would seem that Greece indeed considers Turkey as a ‘safe third country’ (see Commission’s 10 February Communication, footnote 38). Hence, Greece may send back to Turkey any asylum-seeker whose application it considers to be ‘inadmissible’ – that is, virtually any asylum-seeker.

Read the rest of this entry…

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ECtHR Armani Da Silva v UK: Unreasonable Police Killings in Putative Self-defence?

Published on April 14, 2016        Author: 

Two weeks after the London public transport bombings of 7 July 2005, British law enforcement mistook the Brazilian electrician Jean Charles de Menezes for another suicide bomber. As he entered a subway carriage, specialist firearms officers killed him with a series of head shots in the mistaken belief that he was about to set off a bomb. The government’s Independent Police Complaints Commission determined that de Menezes was killed due to “very serious mistakes” that were avoidable. The London Metropolitan Police was prosecuted under the Health and Safety Act 1974 and convicted to pay a GBP 175,000 fine. Compensation claims by the family were settled through an ex gratia payment.

However, de Menezes’ family still brought the case to the European Court of Human Rights since none of the individual officers implicated in the killing were prosecuted. In Armani da Silva v. United Kingdom, the Court’s Grand Chamber has just held that the United Kingdom did not fail to uphold its procedural obligation under the right to life (Art. 2 ECHR) to effectively investigate the de Menezes shooting and prosecute the individual officers involved.

One of the central legal points of the judgment concerns the standards that human rights law establishes for handling killings in putative self-defence, where an attack exists only according to the mistaken belief of the law enforcement officer using force against the presumed attacker. Arguably, the Armani da Silva judgment got the standards wrong. Read the rest of this entry…

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Kosovo’s Membership in the PCA: Some comments on Professor Zimmermann’s post

Published on April 13, 2016        Author: 

It was nice to read Professor Zimmermann’s post on the issue of membership of Palestine and Kosovo in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), as this matter should get more attention from the community of international lawyers. I have already dealt with some of the relevant legal issues in an ESIL Reflection of 11 March 2016 which Professor Milanović has kindly referred to in a comment to Professor Zimmermann’s post. I would like to use this opportunity to engage with some issues raised by Professor Zimmermann, namely: whether the Netherlands should have raised proprio motu the issue of Kosovo’s accession to the 1907 Convention; whether there has been an ‘entente ulterieure’ among the member States of the PCA; what are the powers of the PCA Administrative Council and what is the value of its decision of 4 January 2016, and; what is the way forward concerning Kosovo’s accession to the 1907 Convention.

Calling a meeting of the PCA Administrative Council proprio motu

There was no need for the Netherlands as State depositary to raise proprio motu the matter of Kosovo’s accession to the 1907 Convention within the framework of the PCA Administrative Council. Any State who had an issue with Kosovo’s accession could have called for a meeting of the Administrative Council, even at short notice, like Serbia did, albeit not being a party to the 1907 Convention. Also, it must be noted that by the time of the 4 January 2016 meeting of the PCA Administrative Council, only three out of the 116 Member States of the PCA, namely Russia, Serbia and Mexico seemed to have raised an issue concerning Kosovo’s membership in the PCA. Finally, given that more than half of the member States of the PCA recognize Kosovo as an independent State, there was no need for the Netherlands to raise this issue proprio motu.

Entente ultérieure among PCA member States

Contrary to what Professor Zimmermann claims, there has been no ‘entente ultérieure’ along the lines of Article 60 of the 1899 Convention and Article 94 of the 1907 Convention. The December 1959 agreement among the PCA member States simply authorized the Government of the Netherlands, as State depositary, to send an invitation to new members of the United Nations which were not yet a party to the PCA or whose membership position was unclear. The aim was to increase the membership of the PCA. The document to which Professor Zimmermann refers to as ‘UN support’ is a Study prepared by the Secretariat in 1968 concerning the succession of States to multilateral treaties. Read the rest of this entry…

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The Assembly of State Parties to the International Criminal Court Decides to Delete Article 124 of the Rome Statute

Published on April 12, 2016        Author: 

A little noticed but still significant event during last year’s Assembly of State Parties of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was the decision to delete article 124 of the Rome Statute. Article 124, titled “Transitional Provision”, reads as follows:

Notwithstanding article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, a State, on becoming a party to this Statute, may declare that, for a period of seven years after the entry into force of this Statute for the State concerned, it does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to in article 8 when a crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its territory. A declaration under this article may be withdrawn at any time. The provisions of this article shall be reviewed at the Review Conference convened in accordance with article 123, paragraph 1.

The gist of article 124 was to allow State Parties, upon becoming Party to the Rome Statute, to preclude the Court from exercising jurisdiction over war crimes (article 8) for a period of seven years. Only France and Colombia ever made use of article 124, and each country did so for very particular reasons, which I will not elaborate further here. Suffice it to note that France withdrew its declaration under article 124 in 2008 and that the Columbian declaration made in 2002 expired in 2009. Still, for a court that prides itself on permitting no reservations, no statute of limitations, and no immunities from prosecution, even for heads of state, many have considered article 124 as an inappropriate exemption from the Court’s quintessential principle that there shall be no impunity for any of the crimes under its jurisdiction.

The deletion of article 124 is important not only in its own right, but also because of how it occurred. State Parties deliberated extensively about whether to adhere to the standard amendment procedure outlined in article 121 or if a simple decision by the Assembly would suffice. The result of this debate can be indicative of how States will approach procedural questions of a similar nature in the future, not least when the Assembly in 2017 moves to activating the crime of aggression (on which see this post). Read the rest of this entry…

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Understanding the ICTY’s Impact in the Former Yugoslavia

Published on April 11, 2016        Author: 

As a follow-up to the ICTY extravaganza we’ve had on the blog in the past few weeks, I wanted to post about two companion articles I recently put on SSRN that readers might find of interest. The first is ‘The Impact of the ICTY on the Former Yugoslavia: An Anticipatory Post-Mortem’, and it is forthcoming in the American Journal of International Law; the second is ‘Establishing the Facts About Mass Atrocities: Accounting for the Failure of the ICTY to Persuade Target Audiences,’ and it will be published in the Georgetown Journal of International Law.

The AJIL piece looks at whether the ICTY managed to persuade target populations that the findings in its judgments are true. To answer that question, foundational for transitional justice processes, the article discusses the findings of a series of public opinion surveys in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia (designed by the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, sponsored by the OSCE and conducted by Ipsos – detailed charts, mostly in Serbo-Croatian but some in English, are available here) and Kosovo (sponsored by the UNDP and conducted by a local polling agency, here and here).

The detail and amount of data obtained through these surveys provide an unprecedented level of insight into the reception of factual determinations by international criminal tribunals by target audiences. The surveys show that denialism and revisionism are rampant in the former Yugoslavia. For example, twenty years on, barely one-fifth of the Bosnian Serb population believe that any crime (let alone genocide) happened in Srebrenica, while two-fifths say that they never even heard of any such crime. The acceptance levels for many other serious crimes are in the single digits. They also demonstrate a strong relationship between the respondents’ ethnicity, their perception of the ICTY’s bias against members of their own group, and their distrust in the ICTY and in its findings, which increases the more the ICTY challenges the group’s dominant internal narratives.

Survey findings

This is, for example, how divided realities look like in today’s Bosnia (BiH Muslim/Croat Federation results on top; Republika Srpska at the bottom) – note that these are some of the most serious crimes committed in the Bosnian conflict, all of them addressed in major ICTY cases:

image001

Read the rest of this entry…

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A New Theory for Enforcing ICJ Judgments? The World Court’s 17 March 2016 Judgments on Preliminary Objections in Nicaragua v. Colombia

Published on April 6, 2016        Author: 

The International Court of Justice simultaneously issued two intriguing judgments on 17 March 2016, both involving applications filed by Nicaragua against Colombia, and both of which have some nexus to the Court’s 19 November 2012 Judgment in Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia). To recall, the Court in its 2012 Judgment had affirmed Colombia’s sovereignty over seven islands, drawn a single maritime boundary delimiting the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones of Nicaragua and Colombia, and rejected Nicaragua’s request to have Colombia declared in breach of international law for allegedly denying Nicaragua’s access to natural resources to the east of the 82nd meridian. (2012 Judgment, dispositif, para. 251)

Thereafter, Nicaragua instituted two Applications on matters appearing to flow from, but alleged to be extraneous to, the Court’s 2012 maritime delimitation Judgment. In its 2013 Application in Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia) [hereafter, “Application on Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces Violations”], Nicaragua alleged, among others, that Colombia violated Nicaragua’s rights pertaining to maritime zones defined under the Court’s 2012 maritime delimitation Judgment and that Colombia had also breached the obligation not to use or threaten to use force. On the other hand, in its 2013 Application in Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia) [hereafter, “Continental Shelf beyond 200 NM Application”], Nicaragua requested the Court to declare “the precise course of the maritime boundary between Nicaragua and Colombia in the areas of the continental shelf which appertain to them beyond the boundaries determined by the Court in its Judgment of 19 November 2012” [hereafter, “first Request”], as well as “the principles and rules of international law that determine the rights and duties of the two States in relation to the area of overlapping continental shelf claims and the use of its resources, pending the delimitation of the boundary between them beyond 200 nautical miles from Nicaragua’s coast.” [hereafter, “second Request”] (Continental Shelf beyond 200 NM Application, para. 12).

At the core of Colombia’s preliminary objections in both cases was the argument that the Court had already resolved the alleged matters in the 2012 Judgment, and accordingly, incidents related to these matters thereafter ought to be enforced under the canonical rule in Article 94(2) of the UN Charter (“[i]f any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.”). Nicaragua’s theory was essentially based on the characterization of fresh disputes with Colombia that may have some factual/legal nexus with the 2012 Judgment, but were, ultimately, left undetermined or outside the purview of the 2012 Judgment. It is highly interesting to see how this theory mainly prevailed in the Court’s 17 March 2016 Judgment on Preliminary Objections in Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia) [hereafter, “Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces Violations Judgment on Preliminary Objections”] and its 17 March 2016 Judgment on Preliminary Objections in the Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between Nicaragua and Colombia Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia) [hereafter, “Continental Shelf beyond 200 NM Judgment on Preliminary Objections”]. The Court’s unprecedented acceptance of jurisdiction for certain claims in both of these Nicaraguan applications certainly provoke new lines of inquiry on lines of demarcation between issues of enforcement of the Court’s judgments, and related but separate claims that could be instituted fresh with the Court, without triggering the rule on enforcing ICJ judgments through the more political forum of the Security Council. How was the Court able to assume jurisdiction in these cases, and what do these decisions bode for the settled rule on the finality of the Court’s judgments?

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Palestine at the Gates of the Peace Palace: The long and windy road towards Palestinian membership in the Permanent Court of Arbitration

Published on April 5, 2016        Author: 

To Be or not to be a Party …

It took two lengthy sessions of the Administrative Council of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (‘PCA’ ) before it decided, on March 14, 2016, to confirm that the ‘State of Palestine’ is a contracting party to the 1907 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (‘1907 Convention’) and hence also a member of the PCA. The decision was made by vote, for the first time in the long history of the PCA, with 54 states voting in favor and 25 abstentions. Notably, the parallel accession of Kosovo is still ‘under review’. This development raises a whole set of legal issues ranging from the role of the depositary in situations of contested statehood, to issues of treaty interpretation, as well as finally the legal consequences of Palestine now having become a member of the PCA.

In order to understand the legal implications of the decision, it is necessary to recall some of the most important steps that led to its adoption. Both Palestine and Kosovo, had within a short space of time (namely on 30 October 2015 (Palestine) and on 6 November 2015 (Kosovo)), submitted their accessions to the 1907 Convention. These accessions were acknowledged by the depositary, the Dutch government, on 17 November 2015 on its depositary website. The website also indicated that the said Convention would enter into force for Palestine on 29 December 2015 and for Kosovo on 5 January 2016, a move that was (somewhat prematurely, as we will see) welcomed by the Kosovo Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Upon the request of Serbia, the Administrative Council of the PCA then met on January 4, 2016, i.e. just one day before the Kosovar accession was supposed to become effective, and decided to keep the situations of Kosovo and Palestine ‘under review’, which in turn led the Depositary to ‘strike out’ the accessions of Palestine and Kosovo, with both of them then listed in the following manner:

“Parties (5 January 2016):

Party                            Ratification                  Entry into force

Kosovo                        06-11-2015 (T)           05-01-2016                

Palestine                       30-10-2015 (T)           29-12-2015 

This in turn then led to a request by a group of Arab States for yet another urgent meeting of the Administrative Council of the PCA. This meeting was supposed to deal with the status of Palestine vis-à-vis the 1907 Convention, given that by the time the above-mentioned decision of January 4, 2016 had been made to keep the situations of Kosovo and Palestine ‘under review’, Palestine had already become a contracting party of the Convention with effect from December 29, 2015. Hence, the action by the depositary had amounted, as far as Palestine was concerned, to a de facto suspension of a pre-existing treaty membership. Read the rest of this entry…

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The Sorry Acquittal of Vojislav Seselj

Published on April 4, 2016        Author: 

Last week a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia acquitted Vojislav Seselj, an ultra-nationalist Serb politician, for crimes committed in Croatia, Bosnia and even Serbia itself. It did so by 2 votes to 1. Readers will already be familiar with the disaster that was the Seselj trial, which is now further compounded by the judicial fiasco that is the trial judgment. Fiasco is in fact the word used by the presiding French judge, Jean-Claude Antonetti, to describe the case in the conclusion of his profoundly dilettantish 500-page concurring opinion. This concurrence is a perfect sequel to his equally unreadable 600-page doozy in the Prlic case, and he uses it to blame everybody but himself for everything that went wrong in the case which is, well, everything. The judgment (in French) is here, as is the dissenting opinion of Judge Lattanzi (‘dissenting’ is not a strong enough word, as she herself says); the summaries of the judgment and the dissent in English are here and here.

Corax, Danas 4.4.2016.

There are so many problems with this judgment that it’s hard to know where to start, so let me paint you the big picture. The main issue is not with the acquittal, which may or may not be the appropriate result, but with how that result was reached. The entire judgment is a reductionist dismissal of the case presented by the prosecution, which is always taken as ungenerously as is humanly possible, while at the same time castigating the prosecution (without any hint of self-irony) for presenting a reductionist version of the complex reality of the wars of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.

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