Home Archive for category "EJIL Analysis" (Page 2)

When Does the Use of Force Against a Non-State Armed Group trigger an International Armed Conflict and Why does this Matter?

Published on October 18, 2016        Author: 

Over at Just Security (see for example herehere and here) and also at Opinio Juris (see here and here) there has been a very interesting discussion on whether aspects of the conflict in Syria should be regarded as international armed conflicts (IACs) rather than simply non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). These discussions have followed on from the release of the ICRC’s revised Commentary to the First Geneva Convention (GCI) of 1949 in which the ICRC, in its commentary to Common Article 2 dealing with international armed conflicts (one between the High Contracting Parties to the GCs), states that where a state uses force against a non-state group on the territory of another state without the consent of the territorial state it would amount to an international armed conflict between the intervening state and the territorial state. So as Adil Haque pointed out on EJIL:Talk! in April, the ICRC position would mean that the US (and other states using force in Syria without the consent of the Syrian government) is involved in an IAC in Syria. Adil has explained his support for the ICRC position in posts on this issue on Just Security (see here and  here). Others like Terry Gill, Sean Watts and Kenneth Watkin have disagreed (see here, here, here, and here).

I am on record as being a supporter of the position that the ICRC has now come to. I wrote a piece (available here on SSRN) many years ago, which was part of a major study on Classification of Conflicts in which I say precisely what the ICRC has now said (and I’m delighted that the ICRC’s revised commentary cites that work). I am not going to repeat my arguments in this post and they can be found here. In summary, my view is that an international armed conflict is a conflict between states, and a conflict arises between states when one state uses force against another state. What does it mean for a use of force to be against another state? It means simply that the force is used on the territory of the other state without its consent. Note that this says nothing about whether that use of force is lawful or unlawful under the jus ad bellum. Such non-consensual uses of force may or may not be lawful under that body of law, and the application of IHL remains independent of the legality of the use of force under the jus ad bellum. It is also important to remember that saying that there an IAC between the two states says nothing about whether there is a NIAC between the state using force and the non-state group. There will, in many cases, be such a NIAC. This will raise questions about the relationship between the two conflicts: the IAC and the NIAC. However, the notion of mixed conflicts is by no means unusual or confined to this context. In the Nicaragua case the ICJ noted that it was addressing a situation where there was an IAC and a NIAC. The same was also true with regard to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia or before that in Vietnam, which were also mixed.

In this post I wish to concentrate on why it might matter whether a use of force directed at a non-state actor on the territory of a non-consenting state is an IAC or a NIAC. What exactly would turn on this question. Here I provide a general response to that question rather than one directed particularly at answering the question (which has been the subject of some of the commentary on Just Security and Opinio Juris) of what would turn on whether the US is involved in an IAC in Syria. Some of the points below would be relevant for the US in that particular conflict, others might not be.

Here are a few reasons why it might make a difference whether a state using force on the territory of another without  the consent of the other is involved in an IAC (in addition to a NIAC, if one already exists). Read the rest of this entry…

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Slovenia v. Croatia: The First EU Inter-State Case before the ECtHR

Published on October 17, 2016        Author: 

On 15 September 2016 the Government of Slovenia lodged an inter-State application against the Republic of Croatia before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), related to the claims of Ljubljanska banka towards Croatian companies. Pursuant to Article 33 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), the Republic of Slovenia informed the Court that the Republic of Croatia had violated the provisions of the Convention when the latter’s judicial and executive authorities systematically undertook actions to unlawfully deny Ljubljanska banka the right to property. For a period of 25 years the bank has not been able to recover its claims from Croatian companies. The application states that this has allowed the debtors of Ljubljanska banka in Croatia to avoid repaying their debt – currently estimated to be 360 million Euro. This amount is very similar to the one Slovenian taxpayers were requested to pay after the Grand Chamber delivered its decision in Ališić two years ago, one of the largest cases in ECtHR’s history considering its massive financial implications for Slovenia’s two million population. Although one might say that the Slovenian government timed its application so as for the recent Croatian elections to pass, the date of the application was in fact more closely related to the latest decision of the Croatian Constitutional Court on the subject-matter which was adopted in March this year.

A wider legal audience, which may otherwise not be interested in Yugoslav succession issues, might nevertheless show an interest in the present case since it presents the first inter-State case before the ECtHR between two EU Member States, and also because it raises the question of potential concurrence of jurisdiction between the ECtHR and the CJEU (a topic much debated under the EU’s accession to the ECHR negotiations). Although current EU Member States have in the past been involved in mutual disputes before the ECtHR,  both contracting parties have never been EU Member States at the time of those proceedings (application by Austria v. Italy was lodged in 1960 (No. 788/60); Denmark and Sweden filed an application against Greece in 1967 (No. 3321/67 and 3323/67); while two cases of Ireland v. UK date back to 1971 and 1972 (No. 5310/71 and 5451/72)).

The application of Slovenia’s Government against Croatia is also of importance as it is an unusual case in the sense that Article 33 ECHR is being applied for the protection of interests of a legal, rather than a natural, person (e.g. the case of Georgia v. Russia (I) (No. 13255/07) concerned the alleged collective expulsion of Georgian nationals from the Russian Federation). The general public of Slovenia has for this reason responded to the news of the application with doubts as to whether legal persons could in fact be considered to have “human” rights. However, despite the fact that only Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR on the protection of property expressly recognizes legal persons as recipients of fundamental rights, several other human rights in the ECHR are also granted to them. Apart from the recent application of Ukraine v. Russia, which partly attempts to protect the rights of legal persons, all other inter-State actions before the ECtHR have concerned natural persons.

As the long journey towards ECtHR’s decision in the case at hand has only just begun, this post shortly describes the background of the case.

Read the rest of this entry…

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The Doctrine of Indispensable Issues: Mauritius v. United Kingdom, Philippines v. China, Ukraine v. Russia, and Beyond

Published on October 14, 2016        Author: 

On 14 September 2016, Ukraine instituted proceedings against Russia under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Ukraine is requesting that an UNCLOS tribunal declare, inter alia, that Russia has violated the Convention by interfering with Ukraine’s rights in maritime zones adjacent to Crimea.

At first, there appears to be no jurisdictional problem. Aside from the exceptions laid out in Part XV of UNCLOS, the tribunal has jurisdiction over “any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of [the] Convention” (Art. 288(1) UNCLOS), which would permit a declaration that Russia has violated the Convention. Nevertheless, such a declaration would necessarily require a preliminary determination that Ukraine still has sovereignty over Crimea (under the “land dominates the sea” principle), and the tribunal does not have jurisdiction over territorial sovereignty disputes. Therefore, the tribunal must decide whether it may still exercise jurisdiction over the dispute concerning Russia’s violation of the Convention.

Ukraine v. Russia presents what one may call the “implicated issue problem.” Generally speaking, the implicated issue problem arises when an international court or tribunal has jurisdiction over a dispute, but the exercise of such jurisdiction would implicate an issue over which the court or tribunal does not have jurisdiction ratione materiae. The court or tribunal must therefore determine whether it may still exercise jurisdiction over the dispute. Read the rest of this entry…

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On the Paris Agreement’s Imminent Entry Into Force (Part II of II)

Published on October 12, 2016        Author: 

This is Part II of a two-part post.

What are the Consequences of the Paris Agreement’s Entering into Force?

The Paris Agreement is to enter into force on 4 November 2016, 30 days after the second of its two thresholds was passed on 5 October 2016. On that day, the emissions covered by those Parties to the Convention that ratified or accepted the Agreement amounted to 56.75% of global total emissions; crossing the 55% bar required by the agreement. (see Part I)

So, what does this mean? I would like to highlight 10 points.

First of all, the Agreement becomes international law. It is an international treaty, i.e. an international agreement concluded between states in written form and will be governed by international law (Art. 2.1 (a) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – VCLT).

While 197 Parties to the UNFCCC adopted the Paris Agreement and 191 signed it so far, it is important to note that it will only bind those 74 states and the EU (as of 7 October 2016) which have expressed their consent to be bound by it through ratification, acceptance or approval. Each of these states for which the Agreement is in force will then become a “Party” to the Agreement. This means that despite the commonly used adage, it is not a universal agreement. Rather, at the time of entry into force, it captures only about 2/5 of the Parties to the Convention, with others hopefully joining over time.

According to the principle of “pacta sunt servanda”, Parties are obliged to keep the treaty and must perform it in good faith (VCLT, Article 26). Good faith suggests that Parties need to take the necessary steps to comply with the object and purpose of the treaty. Neither can Parties invoke restrictions imposed by domestic law as reason for not complying with their treaty obligations. Read the rest of this entry…

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Joint Series on International Law and Armed Conflict: Janina Dill on Assessing Proportionality

Published on October 11, 2016        Author: 

The final installment of our joint blog series arising out of the 2016 Transatlantic Workshop on International Law and Armed Conflict, ‘Assessing Proportionality: An Unreasonable Demand on the Reasonable Commander?’- by Janina Dill (London School of Economics) is now available on Intercross.

Here’s a snippet:

jdill-182Proportionality in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) demands that the attacker weighs incommensurate values: the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated to arise from an attack against the expected incidental harm to civilians and damage to civilian objects. It is common place that for that reason (amongst others) it is difficult to applyArticle 51(5)b of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions and the corresponding principle of customary law to real world cases (here, here, here, here, here). The legal rule seemingly bends to endorse diametrically opposed interpretations of the same attacks; salient examples include some Israeli air strikes in the 2014 campaign in Gaza (hereand here). References to proportionality in the court of public opinion therefore often fan the flames of discord rather than adjudicate between diverging views. In the court of law, specifically in the chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, proportionality has largely failed to add to the justiciability of unlawful attacks.

At the same time, proportionality – and indeed the task of comparing seemingly incommensurate values – are not unusual in law. What then is the problem with the principle of proportionality in IHL?

Proportionality according to the reasonable observer

A common approach to assessing an agent’s judgment of excessiveness is to look at it from the point of view of a “reasonable observer”. However, an empirical investigation of attitudes towards collateral damage yields anything but a concretization of what proportionate incidental harm looks like. When asked to put themselves in the place of a commander partaking in a mission to clear an Afghan village of Taliban fighters, 27% of British respondents and 20% of American participants in a survey I conducted in 2015 said they would not accept any foreseen civilian deaths as a side-effect of an attack meant to kill a group of Taliban fighters. At the same time, 17% of British and 21% of American respondents said they would accept however many casualties the attack would cause. 44% and 41% of the populations respectively hence rejected the very premise of proportionality in war: the prospect of a military advantage warrants a positive, but limited number of unintended, yet foreseen civilian casualties.

Read the full post over on Intercross. 

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On the Paris Agreement’s Imminent Entry Into Force (Part I of II)

Published on October 11, 2016        Author: 

This is Part I of a two-part post.

Rapid Entry Into Force or the “Rush to Ratify”

The Paris Agreement will enter into force on 4 November 2016. The agreement requires the deposition of instruments of ratification or acceptance by at least 55 Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change accounting for at least 55% of global greenhouse gas emissions. With the latest ratifications by the EU, Canada and New Zealand respectively – only a couple of days after India deposited its instrument of ratification – these conditions were fulfilled yesterday, on 5 October 2016. By that day, 72 Parties to the Convention had deposited their instruments accounting in total for 56,75 % of total global greenhouse gas emissions. The agreement will enter into force 30 days from this day – less than a year since its adoption!

Such rapid entry into force arguably is record-breaking; unparalleled in multilateral treaty making – environmental or not.

The adoption of Paris Agreement in December 2015 was hailed as a victory of multilateralism; as a sign of hope that the states of this world can get together and cooperate in the face of a global commons challenge. Yet, in Paris negotiators were in the dark about how long it would take before the agreement would become law; an international treaty. Certainly no-one expected this to happen within less than a year or only a little over six months since it was opened for signature on 22 April 2016 in New York.

It was no small achievement that states managed to reach an agreement on such complex issue as climate change. Yet, garnering their political will behind its legal bindingness is a significant feat which calls for some reflection.

How was it possible? Read the rest of this entry…

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Capitulation in The Hague: The Marshall Islands Cases

Published on October 10, 2016        Author: 

When questions around nuclear weapons are brought before the ICJ, we don’t expect easy answers – too far apart are the realities of power politics from any defensible conception of what the world ought to look like, and international law is caught in the middle. In the 1996 Advisory Opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons, the Court gave this fundamental tension an expression, even if it came up with answers (or non-answers) that left many dissatisfied. In this week’s judgment in the cases brought by the Marshall Islands – on the obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament – it does not take up the challenge at all. It instead evades the problem, and hides its evasion behind a façade of formalist legal reasoning.

As Christian Tams has already sketched in his first reaction to the judgment on this blog, the cases were dismissed on the grounds that no ‘dispute’ existed between the Marshall Islands and the UK, India and Pakistan. This is novel not only because never before has an entire case been dismissed on these grounds by the ICJ, but also because it stretches the interpretation of a ‘dispute’ beyond previous understandings: a dispute now requires some form of ‘objective awareness’ of the respondent state prior to the filing of the case. It is true that the requirement of an existing dispute has gained greater relevance in recent years, has played a consequential role in a number of cases, and has taken on a somewhat wider meaning than in earlier jurisprudence. Read the rest of this entry…

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Joint Series on International Law and Armed Conflict: Procedural Regulation of Detention 

Published on October 7, 2016        Author: 

The latest post in the Joint Series on International Law and Armed Conflict is by Lawrence Hill- Cawthorne on the procedural regulation of detention.

I am pleased to have been asked to write a short blog post to outline some of the issues I raised as a discussant for the panel on the procedural regulation of detention at the Fourth Transatlantic Workshop on International Law and Armed Conflict, which took place in Oxford this summer. This is of course an area in which we have recently seen considerable controversy and rapid developments in practice, with cases such as the Serdar Mohammed litigation (on which see here and here) and Hassan v UK (on which see here) dominating much of the recent debates.

The present post does not seek to repeat the above debates but instead it picks out a few controversial points from these much broader discussions that remain unresolved. Everything that is said here is explored in more detail in a recent book that I have written on this topic. The questions that I wish to address here are:

  1. In light of Hassan, which requires that, when making an assessment of compliance with international human rights law (IHRL) in an international armed conflict, a renvoi must be made to international humanitarian law (IHL), what controversies persist concerning:

    1. The review procedures for civilian internment and
    2. The procedural regulation of combatant internment?
  2. To what extent has the law of international and non-international armed conflict converged here?

Detention in International Armed Conflict

The Hassan judgment offered a view as to the relationship between the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and IHL, reading into Article 5 ECHR the grounds and procedures governing internment under the latter regime. Though seemingly simple, the IHL rules on internment, and the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) reasoning in Hassan, leave a number of questions unanswered. Read the rest of this entry…

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Joint Series on International Law and Armed Conflict: Rachel VanLandingham on the Procedural Regulation of Detention in Armed Conflict

Published on October 6, 2016        Author: 

The fourth post in our joint blog series arising from the 2016 Transatlantic Workshop on International,’The Procedural Regulation of Detention in Armed Conflict’- by Rachel E. VanLandingham (Southwestern Law School, Los Angeles) is now available on Lawfare.

Here’s a snippet:

vanDuring our conference, I was asked to generate discussion regarding the procedural regulation of detention during armed conflict, particularly during non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). Though lawyers love process, there is a tendency for both soldiers’ and civilians’ eyes to glaze over when they hear the words “procedures,” as they invoke memories of mind-numbing bureaucratic process endured at one’s department of motor vehicles. Yet procedures are vitally important, as they transform values into reality; they are how fairness marries with pragmatism to produce just results. In wartime detention, they ensure exigent detention is reasonable, and work to satisfy fundamental notions of fairness; furthermore, giving process that is due helps reinforce the legitimacy and hence strategic efficacy of military operations. Establishing and following procedures is just as vital an endeavor in ensuring that individuals detained during armed conflict pragmatically should be detained and lawfully can be detained, as it is in ensuring militaries intentionally target military objectives and not civilians.

While detention is internationally recognized as “a necessary, lawful and legitimate”component of military operations, there remain serious legal gaps regarding how detention should be conducted in the most common type of war, those between states and non-state armed groups. While the Geneva Conventions provide robust, detailed rules regarding how and when to detain both civilians and combatants during international armed conflict (IAC), there is no equivalent for NIACs. It is in states’ best interest to remedy this gap, both to avoid repeating past gross abuses and pragmatically, because such procedures are directly linked to operational success.

The issues most relevant to procedural regulation of NIAC detention fall roughly into three categories: the legal authority to detain; standards of (reasons for) detention; and notification plus review mechanisms.

Read the rest over on Lawfare.

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