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ICJ Denies Belgium’s Request for Provisional Measures in the “Prosecute or Extradite” Case

Published on May 29, 2009        Author: 

Joanna Harrington is an Associate Professor with the Faculty of Law at the University of Alberta in Canada, where she teaches constitutional law, international law, and international criminal law. Her scholarship often examines the interplay between international human rights law and criminal law, and international law and constitutional law in general. She has written previously on matters of interim measures, arguing for the application of the ICJ’s jurisprudence to requests arising within the context of communications before the international human rights treaty monitoring bodies: see “Punting Terrorists, Assassins and Other Undesirables: Canada, the Human Rights Committee and Requests for Interim Measures of Protection” (2003) 48 McGill LJ 55.

 I wish to thank Dapo Akande, the editor of EJIL Talk!, for the invitation to express my initial (and perhaps hasty) thoughts on yesterday’s decision by the International Court of Justice (see here) concerning Belgium’s request for the indication of provisional measures in the proceedings lodged against Senegal concerning the “obligation to prosecute or extradite” Hissène Habré, the former President of Chad (1982-1990), for the commission of serious international crimes, including crimes of torture and crimes against humanity.[1] Habré has been living in Senegal since he was overthrown in 1990; however, in light of recent statements made by the Senegalese head of state intimating that Habré may be allowed to leave the territory,[2] Belgium sought an order from the ICJ requiring Senegal to ensure that such a departure did not occur. Senegal opposed Belgium’s request, challenging Belgium’s interpretation of the statements made by its President as well as the general admissibility of Belgium’s case, while also arguing that such an order was not needed given the existing controls concerning Habré. By 13 votes to one, the Court declined to make the requested order, finding that:

“the circumstances, as they now present themselves to the Court, are not such as to require the exercise of its power under Article 41 of the Statute to indicate provisional measures.”[3]

 A key factor contributing to the Court’s decision were the solemn assurances provided by Senegal, both on its own initiative and in response to a direct question put by a Member of the Court during the hearings, that it will not allow Habré to leave its territory before the Court has given its final decision.[4] Credit goes to Judge Greenwood, a recent appointment to the Court, for asking Senegal at the end of the first round of the oral observations whether it would be prepared to give a solemn assurance to the Court that it will not allow Habré to leave while this case is pending.[5] Although Senegal had said as much in its submissions, the question prompted Senegal to solemnly confirm in its closing statement to the Court that:

“Senegal will not allow Mr. Habré to leave Senegal while the present case is pending before the Court. Senegal has not the intention to allow Mr. Habré to leave the territory while the present case is pending before the Court.”[6]

 With this solemn declaration, the denial of Belgium’s request for the indication of provisional measures was a likely result, notwithstanding Belgium’s efforts to suggest that a “clear and unconditional” assurance “could be sufficient” but the need for certain “clarifications” made an order from the Court preferable.[7] The ICJ’s decision may thus be viewed as a non-result in terms of the actual request that was put before the Court, and the fact that the parties were generally in agreement as to the law governing the indication of provisional measures. Nevertheless, the reasoning behind the Court’s order is worth consideration, as are the issues raised in the relatively lengthy dissent of Judge Cançado Trindade, another new appointment to the Court.

 The Existence of a Dispute and the Involvement of the African Union

In addressing a request for the indication of provisional measures, the Court must first satisfy itself that it has prime facie jurisdiction as regards the merits of the case. Read the rest of this entry…

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Cheney Chatter and Complicity

Published on May 15, 2009        Author: 

Jordan Paust is the Mike & Teresa Baker Law Center Professor at the University of Houston, a former U.S. Army JAG officer and member of the faculty of the Judge Advocate General’s School.  His book, Beyond the Law: The Bush Administration’s Unlawful Responses in the “War” on Terror, was published by Cambridge University Press.

Former Vice-President Dick Cheney is chatting about his role in assuring approval and use of manifestly unlawful interrogation tactics such as waterboarding during the eight-year Bush Administration.  According to Cheney, he has “[n]o regrets” that he was directly involved in the approval of severe interrogation methods, including waterboarding, and he has admitted that he was involved in helping to get the process cleared by President Bush.  “[T]his was a presidential decision,” Cheney said, “and the decision went to the President.  He signed off on it.” (see here)

On September 16, 2001, Cheney publicly declared that “[a] lot of what needs to be done … [“on the dark side”] will have to be done quietly, … using … methods that are available to our intelligence agencies … to use any means at our disposal, basically, to achieve our objective.”  He added: “we” “have the kind of treatment of these individuals that we believe they deserve.”  For the next two years, many of his preferences were effectuated by his top lawyer, David Addington.  Moreover, it has been reported that Cheney attended meetings of the National Security Council’s Principals Committee in the White House Situation Room during 2002 and 2003, at which specific tactics such as waterboarding and the “cold cell” were addressed and expressly and/or tacitly approved and abetted.  It has also been reported that during this time there was “live feed” or “real time” viewing of parts of actual interrogations, including that of al Qahtani at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

According to the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), SERE tactics were being used against detainees at Guantanamo in September 2002 and that, during October 2002, military intelligence interrogators “used military dogs in an aggressive manner to intimidate” al Qahtani.  In November 2002, FBI Deputy Assistant Director Harrington reported that al Qahtani had exhibited symptoms of “extreme psychological trauma.”  Around the third week in November, he was subjected to what was known as the “First Special Interrogation Plan,” a plan to use tactics later detailed in an 84-page log describing their use during a six-week period.  CCR reported that among several tactics used were: threats against his family, forced nudity and sexual humiliation, threats and attacks by dogs, beatings, and exposure to low temperatures for prolonged times. Each of these tactics is patently illegal under the laws of war, human rights law, and the Convention Against Torture, among other relevant international legal proscriptions and requirements.  As my article The Absolute Prohibition of Torture [forthcoming in 43 Valparaiso Law Review 1535 (2009)] documents, death threats, use of dogs to create intense fear, beatings, the cold cell or a related inducement of hypothermia, and waterboarding are each manifest forms of “torture” that are absolutely prohibited under all circumstances and regardless of the status of the victim.  If they were not torture, they would also be absolutely prohibited as cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, along with the other tactics mentioned.

Cheney’s direct involvement is evidence of complicity in international crime.  Read the rest of this entry…

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Norm Conflicts and Human Rights

Published on May 13, 2009        Author: 

Consider the following scenario: the United Kingdom, together with the United States and other allies, invaded Iraq in 2003. From that point on, there was an international armed conflict between the UK and Iraq. Further, as it obtained effective control over certain parts of Iraqi territory, the UK became the occupying power of these territories. Under Art. 21 of the Third Geneva Convention, and Arts. 41-43 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the UK had legal authority to subject enemy POWs and civilians to internment.

Yet, on the other hand, the UK is a state party to the European Convention on Human Rights. In some circumstances, the ECHR applies extraterritorially. What those circumstances are is an (overly) complex question, but the UK has conceded in the Al-Skeini case before its domestic courts that the ECHR applies to extraterritorial detention.

Unlike Article 9 ICCPR, which sets a standard by prohibiting arbitrary arrest and detention, Article 5 ECHR contains a categorical prohibition of detention, except on a limited number of grounds. Preventive detention or internment on security grounds is not one of them. Further, Article 5(4) ECHR requires judicial review of any detention, while Art. 5 GC III only provides for status tribunals if POW status is doubt, and Art. 43 GC IV expressly permits review of detention by mere administrative boards.

So, on one hand we have IHL treaties expressly authorizing preventive detention or internment. On the other we have the ECHR expressly prohibiting such detention. No amount of interpretation can bring the two rules into harmony – they are in a state of genuine norm conflict. That norm conflict could have been avoided had the UK made a derogation under Art. 15 ECHR, but it did not do so (and there is a further question whether it could have actually done so, which needs ti be clarified in the future, though in my view the answer is clearly in the affirmative).

Read the rest of this entry…

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Some Remarks on the Legal Implications of Foreign Visits by Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir After the ICC Arrest Warrant

Published on May 11, 2009        Author: 

Materneau Chrispin is currently a PhD Candidate in International Law at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland

On March 4, 2009, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an Arrest Warrant against Omar Al Bashir (see here), the current Head of State of Sudan. That warrant was the latest step taken against Al Bashir in the criminal proceedings that have been initiated against him as indirect perpetrator or indirect co-perpetrator of various counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes, which fall under ICC jurisdiction.

Al Bashir’s reaction to the issuance of that arrest warrant has been the rejection of such warrant, open mockery and defiance of the ICC. Moreover, Sudanese authorities have also expelled many foreign NGOs providing assistance to the victims of the conflict in Darfur, especially refugees. The move by the ICC has been criticized by many as being untimely and somewhat unhelpful in view of all the political considerations to be taken into account relative to the ongoing conflict in Darfur. Somehow, that controversy falls within the purview of the more general debate on Justice vs. Peace in international law. Nonetheless, the ICC warrant remains a valid act issued by that international tribunal on the basis of the referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC by the United Nations Security Council.

Such a referral was made by UN Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005). It fully gave the ICC jurisdiction over the crimes committed in Darfur. Indeed Article 13 (b) ICC Statute establishes the referral mechanism as the mean for the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction over crimes in a State that is not a party to the Rome Statute, which is the case of Sudan. That article that deals with exercise of jurisdiction by the Court reads as follows:

 A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;

In the light of that referral, how should we assess, as a matter of international law, the behaviour of the States that have not only criticized the warrant, but welcomed President Al Bashir on their territories after the arrest warrant had been issued against him by the ICC?

Any analysis of the issue should start with the Security Council resolution that introduced the case to the ICC. That resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It is therefore binding on all member States of the UN per article 25 of that Charter which provides that “[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter”. On the basis of article 103 of the same Charter, obligations of Member States flowing from resolutions adopted by the Security Council prevail over any other obligations that they would be bound by.

Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005) does not contain strong language that would create a compelling legal obligation for UN member States to cooperate with the ICC in all the steps that it would take in the Darfur situation. However, paragraph 2 of its operative part formulates obligations not only for Sudan, but also for all member States that are urged by the Council to fully cooperate with the Court in the Darfur case. Indeed that paragraph indicates that the Security Council Read the rest of this entry…

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Humanitarian intervention: neither right, nor responsibility, but necessity?

Published on May 5, 2009        Author: 

I’d like to offer a small “think piece” contribution to a bigger debate, in which I try and tease out a question that has troubled me: do we need a positive right of humanitarian intervention? What would happen if we conceded it was prima facie an unlawful use of force, but was legally (not just morally) justifiable or excusable in a particular case? My tentative conclusion is that the defence of necessity might prima facie be available to justify a use of force in an humanitarian intervention but would face some significant problems on close scrutiny.

We’re all by now familiar with a certain account of the development of the idea of humanitarian intervention. Let me offer a stylised version of this narrative, with its inevitable oversimplifications by way of introduction.

On one account humanitarian intervention begins as an idea supported by academics, is then invoked (not always consistently) by a small handful of States in concrete cases from the 1990s onwards, is opposed by the 170 member States of the Group of 77 and has now been at least partially supplanted by the “responsibility to protect” (R2P). Paragraph 139 of the World Summit Outcomes Document, however, would appear to reduce R2P to an agreement that the UN is the only legitimate forum for authorising intervention and that the Security Council should act in cases of humanitarian catastrophe. There is very little sign, though, of UN practice in support of this vision of R2P as a collective, institutional responsibility. On this stylised account, what began as an attempt to modify the positive rules on the use of force and non-intervention appears to have been folded back in to the status quo ante. (Albeit that a caveat might have to be entered regarding interventions endorsed or carried out by regional organisations.)

What has always puzzled me about the debate over forceful humanitarian intervention is that proponents and critics have invariably cast it being either a right or a duty. Are there any obstacles to conceptualising it as a justification or excuse for an otherwise illegal use of force? After all, the “right” of self-defence is easily considered such a “circumstance precluding wrongfulness” (i.e. a defence), and is categorised as such in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility.   Read the rest of this entry…

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US Appeals Court holds that Former Foreign Officials Entitled to Immunity in Civil Suit alleging War Crimes

Published on May 3, 2009        Author: 

The Second Circuit of the US Court of Appeals has recently (April 16, 09) held  in Matar v. Dichter that the former head of the Israeli General Security Service is immune in a civil suit brought under the US Aliens Tort Claims Act (28 USC  § 1350) alleging war crimes and extrajudicial killing. The suit relates to Dichter’s participation in an attack on a suspected Hamas leader (Saleh Mustafah Shehadeh) in July 2002. Shehadeh’s apartment was bombed by an Israeli military jet in attack which destroyed the apartment building and surrounding buildings. Apart from Shehadeh, 14 other people were killed in the attack. This case is part of  a growing list of US cases addressing the legal basis of the immunity of foreign officials. There is a split among the Circuits of the Court of Appeals as to whether foriegn officials are to be considered as an “agency or instrumentality” and thus entitled to immunity under §1603 the US’s Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) (for recent analysis, see Bradley, Foreign Officials and Sovereign Immunity in US Courts, ASIL Insights, Mar, 2009). Dichter’s argument that he was immune under the FSIA was accepted by the first instance District Court (see here). In an earlier case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had held that:

“an individual official of a foreign state acting in his official capacity is the ‘agency or instrumentality’ of the state, and is thereby protected by the FSIA.”  In re Terrorist Attacks on 15 September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 81 (2d Cir. 2008)

However, in Matar v. Dichter, the Second Circuit upheld Dichter’s immunity, but noted that the question presented in this case was whether formerforiegn officials are entitled to immunity under the FSIA. Taking a different approach, the Court stated:

We decline to decide this close question because, whether the FSIA applies to former officials or not, they continue to enjoy immunity under common law. (P. 10)

In upholding the immunity of former officials under the common law, the Second Circuit relied on the views of the US Executive Branch (see here and here) which has long argued that it is not the FSIA that provides immunity to foreign officials (serving or former) in US law but rather the common law and customary international law. Also, the US Executive’s Statement of Interest (see here) argued that, under customary international law, there is no exception to the immunity of foreign officials based on alleged violations of jus cogens norms. This view was accepted by the Second Circuit, correctly in my view. In a previous post, I have argued that there is no jus cogens exception to immunity.

Although, at first glance, these cases relate only to how international law of state immunity is translated to US law, they raise issues of more general interest to international lawyers. The first question raised by these US cases is whether the functional immunity of foreign officials (the immunity of foreign officials with respect to acts performed in the exercise of their official capacity) is the same as the immunity of foreign States. If the two are the same then there is good reason for holding that foreign officials are a manifestation of the State for the purpose of according immunity and there would be good reason to interpret the FSIA (and similar immunity legislation, eg in the UK and Australia) as extending to individual officials. However, this would be erroneous. Read the rest of this entry…

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US District Court Rules on Guantanamo Detention Standard

Published on April 25, 2009        Author: 

A US District Court has just released the first judicial opinion on the detention standard applicable to detainees in Guantanamo (formerly known as ‘enemy combatants’), subsequent to the filing of the Obama administration’s brief that we have previously extensively discussed. Judge Walton’s opinion shows a valiant effort to grapple with the applicable international humanitarian law. Regrettably, however, I don’t think that his reasoning is free of all legal difficulties.

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Obama Administration to consider prosecution of lawyers for Torture: But why just the lawyers?

Published on April 23, 2009        Author: 

On Tuesday, President Obama suggested that the United States might consider prosecution of some of the individuals who are connected with the harsh interrogations techniques used by the CIA on Al Qaeda detainees (see here). Earlier, the US President had made it clear previously that those CIA personnel who had relied in good faith on the legal memos written by the Office of Legal Counsel in the US Dept of Justice would not be prosecuted. On Tuesday, he reiterated that stance though using slightly different language. He stated it would not be appropriate to prosecute those “who carried out some of these operations within the four corners of legal opinions or guidance that had been provided from the White House” (see the White House transcript here). This statement and what appeared to me to be an emphasis on those who acted strictly within the confines of the opinion (Obama even used his hands to draw a rectangular box as he said the words “four corners” of the opinion) suggests that Obama is open to the prosecution of some of the CIA interogators. It also also highlights the significance of the revelation that some of the interrogations went beyond the limits set out the memos (see the story in the New York times and the discussion by Kevin Jon Heller at Opinio Juris). In an earlier post on this blog, I stated that there are reasonable (though not undisputable) grounds for arguing that under international criminal law, CIA officials who conducted the interrogations in reliance on the advice of US government lawyers might be able to rely on the mistake of law/superior orders defence codified in Art. 33 of the ICC Statute.

Even more significant is Obama’s refusal to rule out prosecution of those lawyers who authored the opinions that justified the interrogation techniques. Obama stated the US Attorney General will make a decision on the investigation or prosecution of those who formulated the legal opinions. One question that arises here is: why focus on the lawyers? Much of the discussion has centered on their role. Obama’s response was to a question asking for clarification on the position of those who devised the policy on enhanced interrogation techiques. However, his answer which did not rule out prosecutions only referred to “to those who formulated those legal decisions.” But what about the others? The people who actually suggested the techniques and pushed for their use. Are they subject to investigation too? No doubt, answering that question is politically difficult given that questions will be raised as to how high up the chain one goes. And we know from recent reports that the approval of those policies was at the very highest levels of government. However, if the administration is to consider prosecutions at all, there seems to be little reason to stop with the lawyers. Indeed the Torture Convention, to which the US is party imposes an obligation on US to submit cases of torture to its prosecuting authorities.

Perhaps the reason that the focus is just on lawyers is because US criminal law recognises a mistake of law defence in circumstances where international criminal law does not.  Read the rest of this entry…

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Filed under: EJIL Analysis, Torture
 

Piracy off Somalia: a sketch of the legal framework

Published on April 20, 2009        Author: 

Dr Douglas Guilfoyle is a Lecturer in Law at University College London.  His research has focussed on the law of the sea and international and transanational criminal law. He is the author of ‘Piracy Off Somalia: UN Security Council Resolution 1816 and IMO Regional Counter-Piracy Efforts’ (2008) 57 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 690-699. His book Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea will be published by Cambridge University Press later this year.  

We’re all familiar now with the pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia’s east coast, especially following the hijacking of the Sirius Star 500 nm off the coast of Kenya in November 2008 and the more recent uses of lethal force by French and US navies to free hostages seized by pirates. Although, the international law of piracy is quite straightforward, its implementation – especially in a situation as complex as the Gulf of Aden – is rather more difficult. Some of the problems are legal and some practical. The law applicable to piracy off Somalia is presently a mix of customary law, UN Security Council Resolutions and treaty law. If pirates are captured, questions of national law and international human rights obligations also arise.

In my view, there is no short-term, military “fix” for piracy. It remains to be seen whether recent uses of lethal force against pirates will deter them, or escalate violence against ships and hostages. In the short term, the best we can hope for is better regional co-operation and judicial capacity-building in Kenya – the destination for many captured pirates. The later is presently being undertaken by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime with a substantial grant from the German government.

The customary law

The core of the customary law of piracy, as codified in Articles 101-107 and 110 of the UN Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) is relatively simple. Piracy consists of: (i) any act of violence; (ii) committed for private ends; (iii) on the high seas or in a place beyond the relevant jurisdiction of any State; and (iv) which is committed by one vessel against another. Any State may send a warship to board a pirate vessel, arrest those on board and subject them to the jurisdiction of its courts. Warships may also use reasonable force to that end.

It is commonly held that piracy does not cover politically motivated acts. This, I believe, is a myth (for reasons I have explained elsewhere). Any act of violence lacking State sanction is, in my view, an act “for private ends”. The limitations within the definition of piracy are fairly obvious. It does not cover internal hijacking or events within territorial waters (the latter is normally termed “armed robbery against ships” and regarded as a matter for coastal-State law enforcement), nor does the law of piracy allow pirates to be pursued from the high seas into territorial waters.

 One of the problems with the current attempt to combat piracy is that though, as a matter of international law, all States have jurisdiction to try pirates, few States have adequate national laws for the prosecution of pirates who have not committed offences against either their nationals or flag vessels. This has lead to some startling results, such as the German navy releasing some captured pirates on the basis that they had no authority to detain them. While UNCLOS requires that States must co-operate to suppress piracy (Art. 100) it only provides that a capturing warship may send pirates for trial before its courts (Art. 105). The inference is that States are under no duty to have adequate national offences for trying pirates and may co-operate in the suppression of piracy by other means (such as “deter and disrupt” patrols). If States are under a positive obligation to have such laws, the majority have been continually in breach since before the 1920s League of Nations codification project. There is also no clear duty upon port States to receive pirates captured by a third State for trial.

 The UN Security Council Resolutions

The relevant resolutions on Somali piracy are 1816, 1838, 1846 and 1851, all containing the talismanic Chapter VII authority to use “all necessary means” to counter piracy. In broad-brush terms, these Resolutions encourage States to develop a cooperative framework to counter piracy in the region as well as granting specific authority to “cooperating States” to enter Somalia’s territorial sea to repress piracy in a manner consistent with the international law applicable on the high seas. 1851 authorises “cooperating States” to go further and engage in counter-piracy action on Somali soil. Read the rest of this entry…

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The Water Cure with Saline Solution, or How a Modern Bureaucracy Does Torture

Published on April 18, 2009        Author: 

Having now read the four recently released ‘torture’ memos, I was perhaps most struck with their bureaucratic tone and the sterile overall narrative that they presented. The earlier Yoo/Bybee memos dealing with general issues such as the meaning of the term ‘torture’ in the UN Convention against Torture and US implementing legislation were rightly criticized for their facetious analysis. On that point, these four memos – or at least the three 2005 memos signed by Bradbury – are on the whole admittedly not as obviously bad. The legal analysis at times even sounds plausible – thought it is manifest that the advice given is actually not advice, but an apology for an already predetermined outcome. It is also riddled with caveats, with the OLC regularly saying that there is room for reasonable disagreement with its conclusions, or that a court might not arrive at the same result, etc. The occasional plausibility of the analysis is aided by the fact that the OLC is interpreting US statutes implementing the CAT, and that these contain Senate understandings and definitions which require narrower interpretations than the text of the treaty itself (this is what allows, for example, for strained interpretations of what constitutes severe mental pain or suffering).

But where these memos differ from the previously disclosed ones is in that they are an attempt to analyze (or, rather, justify) the various specific interrogation techniques used by the CIA against its high-value detainees. In other words, they apply the law to the facts, and the OLC had to get the facts from somewhere. That somewhere was, of course, the CIA itself – its interrogators, doctors, psychologists or what have you. And therein lies the rub. Just as the CIA interrogators can claim that they relied on OLC legal advice in good faith, so can the OLC lawyers claim that they relied in good faith on the CIA’s presentation of the facts.

Just read, for example, the sterile narrative of the various measures to be employed against Abu Zubaydah, the first high-value detainee, in the first new memo. The possible adverse effects of the (cumulative) application of these various measures on Abu Zubaydah’s physical and mental health are constantly and consistently downplayed, and are generally portrayed in euphemistic terms as mere ‘discomfort’ or ‘distress’, rather than suffering. Factual determinations, such as that there was no suffering, are based on the account of doctors participating in interrogation, or on the experiences of the US military’s own SERE program that attempts to train resistance to these interrogation techniques. No attempt is made at any time to ascertain directly the views of the detainees themselves, or the actual reality of the interrogations – the CIA is always taken at its word. Contrast, for instance, the OLC’s account of the techniques to be used against Abu Zubaydah, and Abu Zubaydah’s own (probably quite credible) harrowing account in the recently leaked ICRC report (at Annex I).

That none of the techniques arises to the level of torture comes as no surprise. Indeed, it could be reasonably said that most of the techniques do not amount to torture, especially if used in isolation. What did come as a bit of a surprise was the ‘bug in a box’ method – since Abu Zubaydah was determined to have an irrational fear of insects, it was proposed to put him in a confined box with an insect that could then merrily crawl all over him. Though the insect would have been harmless, Abu Zubaydah would have been told otherwise. Naturally, this bug method was also not considered to be torture by the OLC, but it was in fact never used even though it was authorized – it was probably thought to have been just a tad too medieval for modern sensibilities. Or too Orwellian.

Read the rest of this entry…

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Filed under: EJIL Analysis, Torture