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Home Archive for category "EJIL Analysis"

The ECtHR’s Largest Ever Award for Just Satisfaction Rendered in the Yukos Case

Published on August 15, 2014        Author: 

mccarthy

Dr Conor McCarthy is a barrister at Monckton Chambers, London and formerly fellow of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law.

On 31 July 2014 the European Court of Human Rights issued its decision in the just satisfaction phase of proceedings in Yukos v. Russia. In its judgment the Court made its largest ever award of compensation, ordering Russia to pay in the region of € 1.9 billion to the shareholders of the company at the time of its liquidation. In 2012, the Court had found Russia to be in violation of the rights to a fair hearing and the protection of property under the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocol 1. The Court’s compensation decision follows on from the recent final awards of three arbitral tribunals, constituted under the Energy Charter Treaty, which found that the Russian Federation had taken measures with the effect equivalent to an expropriation of Claimants’ investments in Yukos, contrary to Article 13 (1) of the treaty. These final awards were issued on 18 July 2014. Russia was ordered to pay almost $ 50 billion in compensation in these proceedings. Claims arising from the circumstances surrounding Yukos liquidation have also been taken before the ICC International Court of Arbitration as well as in national courts in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands as well as, of course, in Russia itself. This post focuses on the ECtHR’s decision, with some reflections on its significance.

Background

The events underlying the Yukos case occurred in the early 2000s, a period of considerable economic and political upheaval in Russia. Between 2002 and 2003 the Russian authorities investigated the tax affairs of Yukos. This culminated, in April 2004, in the company being assessed as having accumulated huge tax liabilities, in part, according to the findings of the Russians authorities, as a result of Yukos having used impermissible sham companies to evade tax. Yukos was ordered to pay approximately € 1.4 billion in tax arrears for the year 2000, € 1 billion in interest and a further € 0.5 billion in enforcement penalties. In the same month proceedings were initiated against Yukos alleging improperly declared tax liability and seeking the attachment of the company’s assets as security for the claim. A hearing was held at the Moscow City Commercial Court in respect of the tax assessment between 21 and 26 May 2004, with much of the evidence in support of the assessment (running to several tens of thousands of pages) being served on 17 May 2004 and in subsequent days immediately prior to the hearing. The assessment was upheld, with Yukos being found liable to pay well over € 1.3 billion in respect of tax in the year 2000, together with almost € 1 billion in interest and € 0.5 billion in penalties. Subsequently, the penalty imposed on Yukos (approximately € 0.5 billion) was doubled when the tax authorities determined that Yukos had used similar tax arrangements in 2001 to those used in 2000.

Yukos sought to appeal the decision of the Commercial Court. The appeal was dismissed by the Appeal Division of the Moscow City Commercial Court on 29 June 2004. On 30 June 2004, the Appeal Court issued a writ for the enforcement of Yukos’s assessed liabilities, compelling compliance within 5 days. Upon Yukos’s failure to pay the sums within the required period, further penalties of 7 % of the debt were levied. Yukos’s requests to extend the very short deadline for payment were unsuccessful. In the next six months there followed further tax re-assessments for each subsequent year to 2003, including in particular huge assessments to VAT as well as profits taxes, penalties and interest, ultimately totalling some € 24billion. The enforcement of these liabilities was immediate and in the absence of immediate payment in full incurred further surcharges.

Yukos were unable to obtain sufficient liquid funds to meet the liability. In December 2004 the majority of the shares in its largest and most profitable subsidiary, Yuganskneftegaz, (“YNG”), were auctioned to meet its tax liability, rendering insolvency inevitable. Yukos was declared insolvent in August 2006.

The treatment of Yukos by the Russian Federation has resulted in considerable litigation at the international level. Read the rest of this entry…

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The Territorial Reach of the EU’s “Right To Be Forgotten”: Think Locally, but Act Globally?

Published on August 14, 2014        Author: 

Brendan Van Alsenoy is a legal researcher at the Interdisciplinary Centre for Law & ICT (ICRI), KU Leuven – iMinds. Marieke Koekkoek is a research fellow at the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies (GGS), KU Leuven.

800px-Google_SignIn May of this year, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decided that individuals can – under certain conditions – ask Google (photo credit) to stop referring to certain information about them. The CJEU’s recognition of this so-called “right to be forgotten” has kicked up quite a storm. Now that the dust is beginning to settle, it’s time to direct our attention to questions of practical implementation. One set of questions is about territorial reach. How far should the right to be forgotten extend, geographically speaking? Should Google, upon finding that an individual’s request is justified, modify its search results globally? Or should it only modify search results shown within the EU?

According to press reports, Google’s current approach is to limit its modification of results to the “European versions” of the search engine. Search results of people using google.com remain unaltered, while people using google.es or google.be may no longer be seeing the full picture. However, Google still allows its EU users to switch to the .com version, simply by clicking a button at the bottom of the page. EU users can also freely navigate to other country-specific versions of the search engine, whose search results may not be filtered in the same way. By not taking further measures to limit access to “forgotten” search results, it seems as if the search engine is needlessly provoking the wrath of European data protection authorities. So what should the search engine be doing?

Realistically speaking, only two approaches seem viable. The first option would be to “keep it local”, by filtering the search results for queries originating from EU territory – regardless of which country version of Google is being used. The second option would be to “go global”, which would involve modification of search results worldwide. (To be clear, either approach would only kick in once Google has decided to grant a specific request and would only affect results following a name search).

It is true that nothing in the CJEU ruling suggests that Google would be justified in limiting itself to specific websites, countries or regions. But, as even the Chairwoman of the Article 29 Working Party has acknowledged, the matter may not be so clear-cut. Read the rest of this entry…

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The Security Council and Humanitarian Relief in Opposition-Held Territories

Published on August 12, 2014        Author: 

TilmanTilman Rodenhäuser (pictured left) is a researcher at the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, and a PhD candidate at the Graduate Institute in Geneva. Jonathan Somer (pictured right) is the founderJonathan Somer of Persona Grata Consulting, advising on international law and policy in fragile states. Until recently he was Legal Adviser for Geneva Call and has previously worked with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Over the past year, the Security Council has repeatedly demanded all parties to the armed conflict in Syria, particularly the Syrian authorities, to allow and facilitate humanitarian relief operations across conflict lines and across borders (see resolution 2139 and a presidential statement) – but with little success. In its latest resolution the UN Security Council decided – for a period of 180 days – “that the United Nations humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners are authorized to use routes across conflict lines and [specific] border crossings … in order to ensure that humanitarian assistance” reaches people in need in Syria. The Security Council also decided to establish a monitoring mechanism in neighbouring countries in order to confirm the humanitarian nature of the relief consignments.

Resolution 2165 was adopted as international humanitarian law experts continue to debate whether aid may be lawfully delivered cross-border to opposition-held territories without the consent of the host state. While some (here and here) contend that the issue is clear-cut – with consent being required – the only thing that does seem clear-cut is the lack of consensus. Others, including one of the present authors, argue a case exists for cross-border assistance without consent under certain conditions. This latter view has been supported by the former President of the International Humanitarian Fact Finding Commission and co-author of an authoritative commentary on the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, Professor Bothe, in an unpublished study provided to the UN. A group of prominent legal experts have made even bolder claims in a recently published open letter. So while international lawyers continue to sharpen their pencils, resolution 2165 supplements IHL by invoking the authority of the Security Council to fill in the gaps left by IHL’s uncertainties on cross-border aid in non-international armed conflict.
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Article 12(2)(a) Rome Statute: The Missing Piece of the Jurisdictional Puzzle

Published on August 7, 2014        Author: 

2014.08.05.Jean Baptiste photoJean-Baptiste Maillart is a PhD Candidate at the University of Geneva and a Teaching Assistant at the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights.

Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute provides that the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction over a crime if the “State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred” is a party to the Statute or has accepted the Court’s jurisdiction by a declaration. It has become commonplace to paraphrase that provision as stating that the Court may exercise its territorial jurisdiction over a crime that has been committed within the territory of a State Party. For instance, the late Judge Hans-Peter Kaul wrote [p. 607] “if a core crime is committed by an individual in the territory of a State Party to the Statute, the ICC will have jurisdiction” (see also the commentaries of Schabas [p. 285], Bourgon [p. 564] and Haupais [p. 582]). The Court itself uses the exact same wording: “[…] under article 12(2) of the Statute one of the two alternative criteria must be met: (a) the relevant crime was committed in the territory of a State Party or […] (b) the relevant crime was committed by a national of a State Party […]” (ICC-01/04-01/07-262 [§. 14]); see also for instance ICC-02/11-14 [§. 187] or ICC-01/09-19-Corr [§. 175]).

However, a careful and literal reading of Article 12(2)(a) leads to a different conclusion. The Court has jurisdiction over a crime when “the conduct”of this crime occurred on the territory of a State party, not when the crime was committed there. Some scholars addressing Article 12 (e.g., Wagner [p. 485] and Vagias [p. 53]) have pointed out the exact terminology used, but none have considered whether it could have any practical effect. This post considers, on the basis of the traditional interpretation of the term “conduct”, a possible challenge to the ICC’s jurisdiction over certain cross-border crimes where, if Article 12(2)(a) said “commission”, it would undoubtedly have jurisdiction. In other words, it could be argued that it is incorrect to read “conduct occur[ing]” on certain territory as equivalent to “commission of a crime” on that territory.  The post also proposes a counter-argument in favor of jurisdiction. Read the rest of this entry…

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Towards a New Global Treaty on Crimes Against Humanity

Published on August 5, 2014        Author: 

Sadatl4Leila Nadya Sadat is the Henry H. Oberschelp Professor of Law and Israel Treiman Faculty Fellow at Washington University School of Law and has been the Director of the Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute since 2007.

Douglas J. Pivnichny, JD, is the Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute Fellow at Washington University School of DPivnichny photoLaw in St. Louis, Missouri, and a masters candidate in International Law at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva.

The Crimes Against Humanity Initiative and Recent Developments at the ILC

On Thursday, July 17, the International Law Commission moved the topic of crimes against humanity from its long-term to its active agenda and appointed Professor Sean D. Murphy as Special Rapporteur. The Rapporteur’s charge is to prepare a First Report, which will begin the process of proposing Draft Articles to the Commission for its approval. The expectation is that, in due course, the Commission will send a complete set of Draft Articles for use as a convention to the United Nations General Assembly. This was a crucial step in filling a normative gap that has persisted despite the development of international criminal law during the past decades:  the absence of a comprehensive global treaty on crimes against humanity.

The Commission’s interest in this topic was sparked by the work of the Crimes Against Humanity Initiative, launched by Professor Leila Sadat of Washington University School of Law in 2008.  The Initiativeset out to study the current state of the law and sociological reality regarding the commission of crimes against humanity and to address the gap in the current international legal framework by drafting a global, comprehensive model convention on crimes against humanity. Ambitious in scope and conceptual design, the Initiative has been directed by a distinguished Steering Committee and consulted more than 300 experts in the course of elaborating and discussing the Proposed International Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity (Proposed Convention), published by Cambridge University Press in English, French and Spanish in Forging a Convention for Crimes Against Humanity (1st  ed., 2011; 2nd ed., 2013). Arabic, Chinese, German and Russian translations are also available. Read the rest of this entry…

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Consent and Customary International Law

Published on August 4, 2014        Author: 

I am pleased to see Professor Guzman and Jerome Hsiang being among those authors who admit that one cannot construct a plausible and coherent CIL theory without a thorough conceptual clarification. In their short article in EJIL Vol. 25:2 (2014), they are focusing on consent and CIL, particularly on the tension between the principle of consent prevailing in international law and non-consensual law-making in the field of CIL. They do not perform an analysis on the concept “consent”, but try to answer the question of why rationally self-interested states should accept the existence of non-consensual customary rules in international relations. I am willing to accept some of their claims or conclusions, as follows. (i) There exist some weak, limited forms of non-consensual rule-making in contemporary international law. (ii) Customary rules are the output of such rule-making. (iii) A non-consensual customary rule, by its content and nature, usually provides great benefits to most of the states or the whole international order and relatively small costs to one or some states.

Of course, all this is the rejection of the so-called consent theories of CIL. It is no surprise. In his excellent, seminal article of 2005 (Saving Customary International Law), Guzman has outlined the basis of a modern, non-objectivist, belief-based CIL theory within the framework of his rational choice doctrine. A belief-based CIL theory is not compatible with consent theories. I also have doubts about that a consent theory could adequately explain how CIL really works. However, three caveats are in order here.

First, consent theories of CIL put up a stout resistance. They are supported by the requirement of “acceptance” in the text of Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, although they encounter difficulties with adjusting acceptance to opinio juris. For example, Olufemi Elias and Chin Lim, who worked out a modern, refined and flexible version of CIL consent theories (The Paradox of Consensualism in International Law), simply conflate the two concepts, which is problematic from the theoretical angle. Read the rest of this entry…

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Use of Grad Rockets in Populated Areas: What Lessons from Gotovina?

Published on July 30, 2014        Author: 

Maya Brehm PhotoMaya Brehm is a researcher in weapons law at the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (ADH) and a consultant with Article 36 and PAX. Her recent work focuses on the humanitarian impact of explosive weapon use in populated areas and on framing the policy debate on autonomous weapons systems.

In a recently published report, Human Rights Watch (HRW) documents harm to civilians from the use of 122mm Grad rockets apparently fired by Ukrainian government forces and pro-government militias into Donetsk and its suburbs. In four attacks investigated by HRW at least 16 civilians were killed and many more wounded. According to HRW insurgent forces also recently used Grad rockets. The image below from HRW shows attacks in and around Donetsk (click to enlarge). The organization has also posted a video online presenting its findings.

 The problem with Grad rocketsGrad rockets

Grad rockets are unguided rockets fired from a multiple-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) that can deliver up to 40 rockets within a very short time to a range of 20 kilometers. Like other unguided, indirect fire  weapons, Grad rockets are considered ‘area weapons’, suited for attacks against targets of significant dimensions, because due to ballistic and other factors, the area over which the rockets can spread out is relatively wide.

The dimension of the area affected by a rocket attack (the area of potential impact of the rockets combined with the blast/fragmentation zones of the individual rockets) is a function of many variables, including fuzing, ballistic and firing technique-related factors. As that area can be very wide, the use of Grad rockets in populated areas carries a high risk of harm to civilians. Read the rest of this entry…

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The ECtHR Finds the US Guilty of Torture – As an Indispensable Third Party?

Published on July 28, 2014        Author: 

The recent rulings by the European Court of Human Rights in two cases concerning secret detention in Poland are remarkable, not the least because their bold approach in respect of human rights violations committed by a third party, in this case the United States of America. Of course, the US is not a party to the European Convention on Human Rights and was not a participant in the proceedings. In both cases Poland was found to have violated a number of ECHR provisions, including articles 3 and 5, by hosting a CIA black site and by otherwise participating in the US programme of secret detention and extraordinary renditions.

In paragraph 516 of Al Nashiri v. Poland (Application no. 28761/11, Chamber Judgment of 24 July 2014), the Court concludes:

In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the treatment to which the applicant was subjected by the CIA during his detention in Poland at the relevant time amounted to torture within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention (…).

The same conclusion appears in paragraph 511 of Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland (Application no. 7511/13, Chamber Judgment of 24 July 2014). Immediately after the finding on torture by the US, the Court makes its finding in respect of Poland (Al Nashiri para. 517).:

Accordingly, the Polish State, on account of its “acquiescence and connivance” in the HVD Programme must be regarded as responsible for the violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 3 of the Convention committed on its territory …

One may ask whether the ECtHR through its formulations in paras. 516-517 created a situation where the US was an indispensable third party, to the effect that the finding in respect of the lawfulness of conduct by the US was a prerequisite for a conclusion in relation to Poland, even if the Court obviously did not consider the US participation in the proceedings (or consent to its jurisdiction) to be indispensable.

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The ECtHR and the Regulation of Transnational Surrogacy Agreements

Published on July 25, 2014        Author: 

ivana6-1Ivana Isailović is a post-doctoral researcher at the Perelman Center for Legal Philosophy (Université libre de Bruxelles) and is affiliated with the IAP, Human Rights Integration Project.

In a number of recent cases, French courts refused to give effect to US court decisions that recognized French intending parents as legal parents of children born through surrogacy agreements and to inscribe the foreign filiation into the French civil status registry. In the decisions in Mennesson v. France and Labassee v. France, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that those refusals violated children’s right to private and family life, protected by article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It dismissed claims based on the breach of parent’s right to private and family life and on violations of article 14 (non-discrimination), article 6-1 (right to a fair trial) and article 12 (right to marry).

This is the first time the ECtHR has considered the question of transnational surrogacy. The decisions tackle some of the vexing issues related to the regulation of the booming global surrogacy market. These issues include ethical and political concerns related to the commodification of the body. Also in question are the definitions of citizenship and parenthood in a context in which the differences between domestic regimes illustrate a variety of cultural and political understandings of filiation and parenthood. This post focuses on the latter set of issues and the legal uncertainties they create.

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The Downing of MH17 and the Potential Involvement of International Courts

Published on July 22, 2014        Author: 

I do not at all want to trivialize the human tragedy that is the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 over Ukraine last week, nor for that matter the parallel unfolding tragedies on the ground in Ukraine and in Israel and Gaza, by engaging in some premature lawyerly analysis. But, in reading on the unfolding story of the aircraft’s demise, I nonetheless couldn’t help but think how that story is very likely to find its epilogue in an international courtroom. The facts of MH17′s destruction are obviously far from clear, and are not going to become much clearer in the near future, but the number of possible scenarios is limited – the aircraft was (most likely) destroyed by Ukrainian rebels with Russian-supplied weapons, or (less likely) by either Ukranian or Russian state agents (who may have acted ultra vires). And not only did the downing of MH17 deepen a major existing international crisis, but it directly affected a number of states other than Ukraine and Russia, such as Malaysia and the Netherlands, not to mention the families of the victims themselves. This raises both the incentives and the opportunities for international litigation, in addition to whatever proceedings may ensue before domestic courts or international fact-finding missions.

Consider, first, the possibility that a case or cases regarding MH17 might end up before the European Court of Human Rights. Both Russia and Ukraine are of course parties to the ECHR, and readers will recall that one of the first acts of the new government in Kiev in response to the Crimea crisis was to lodge an inter-state application against Russia in Strasbourg, on which the Court ordered provisional measures. It is perfectly possible for the downing of MH17 to be an issue in the existing or a new inter-state case, or indeed one brought by a third state, such as the Netherlands, since the majority of the victims had Dutch nationality. And obviously the families of the victims may also bring individual applications against either Russia or Ukraine.

In addition to whatever direct involvement these states may have had in the destruction of the aircraft, they could also be held liable for other internationally wrongful acts. For example, Ukraine could be responsible for failing to secure the right to life of the victims and failing to comply with its substantive positive obligations under Article 2 ECHR by deciding not to close the relevant airspace for civilian traffic. Russia could be held responsible for providing the rebels with anti-aircraft weaponry without sufficient safeguards (e.g. appropriate training of the missile crews), thus creating the risk that this weaponry could be used against civilian targets. Both states could be held responsible for failing to secure an effective investigation into the incident. Obviously the facts could yet develop and some very complex preliminary issues could arise (e.g. the extent of Russia’s control over the Ukrainian rebels and the question of the ECHR’s extraterritorial application), but all these points seem arguable.

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