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Home Articles posted by Dapo Akande

Provisional Measures and Joinder of Cases at the International Court of Justice – The Answers

Published on January 18, 2016        Author: 

Earlier this month I asked four trivia questions about the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) practice on provisional measures and joinder of cases. The questions were prompted by the ICJ’s recent Judgment in the joined cases concerning Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica). I also stated that the first person to provide the most correct answers would win a year’s free subscription to the European Journal of International Law prize. Within minutes of my piece being posted, Niccolò Ridi (right, who is doctoral candidate at the Dickson Poon School of Law,  King’s College London and Research Assistant at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva) had provided comprehensive answers to all four questions. His quickness off the mark hardly gave anybody else a chance! He later added to his answers with subsequent comments, and is very deserving of the prize!

My first question was “1) In what other case has the Court made a finding in the dispositif of a judgment that a party has breached a provisional measures order made by the Court?” Niccolò is absolutely right to note that the use of the singular – ‘case’ – in my formulation is incorrect. The Court has made such a finding in the dispositif of a judgment in a few cases. The first case in which the Court did so was the La Grand case (Germany v the US) 2001. That was the first case in which the Court held that provisional measures orders were legally binding, and it is only since that judgment that the Court has included declarations of non-compliance with provisional measures in the dispositifs of judgments. Massimo Lando and Niccolò are also right that the Request for Interpretation of the Avena Judgment (Mexico v US); the Armed Activities case (DRC v Uganda); and the Bosnia Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) case are other cases where the Court has found non-compliance with provisional measures. Indeed, it seems to be the case that, since LaGrand, in the majority of judgments dealing with cases where the Court has ordered provisional measures, it has subsequently made findings of violations of its interim orders. Two cases where the ICJ has not, in that time period since LaGrand, made such findings are the Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v Nigeria) case (2002) and the Request for Interpretation of the Judgment in the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) case (2013). By my count that makes it 5 cases of findings of non-compliance with 2 cases of no such finding. These are not encouraging statistics regarding compliance with provisional measures!

Which Cases have been Joined?

Question 2 asked “In which proceedings have cases before the International Court been joined?” Niccolò was correct in referring to the South West Africa cases (Liberia & Ethiopia v South Africa) and the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands). Those were indeed the two cases where the ICJ has formally joined proceedings (I later realized that I had made a gaffe in my earlier post in referring to this press release as the answer to the question was made plain there).  Read the rest of this entry…

 

Trivia Competition: Provisional Measures and Joinder of Cases at the International Court of Justice

Published on January 8, 2016        Author: 

A few years ago I began the practice of asking on this blog – every now and again – trivia question relating to international law, with the questions focusing mainly on the practice of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals. Unfortunately, I have not done this in quite a while. You can find previous questions (and answers) here or by viewing the EJIL:Trivia category in the list of categories on the right hand column of the blog. Last month, the International Court of Justice delivered its Judgment in the joined cases concerning Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica). This judgment and the cases provide me with an opportunity to ask a set of trivia questions relating to the ICJ.

On this occasion, we will offer a prize to one respondent. The person who provides the most correct answers will win a free subscription to the European Journal of International Law for 2016. In the case of a tie, the first person to provide their answers will be the winner.

In the Costa Rica v. Nicaragua case, the Court found that “Nicaragua has breached the obligations incumbent upon it under the Order indicating provisional measures issued by the Court on 8 March 2011”. This is a relatively rare finding by the Court that a party has breached a provisional measures Order indicated by the Court earlier in that case. This finding was not merely made in passing but was recorded in the dispositif of the judgment. My first question is a perhaps an easy one:

1) In what other case has the Court made a finding in the dispositif of a judgment that a party has breached a provisional measures order made by the Court?

The rest of my questions relate to joinder of cases at the ICJ. The Costa Rica v Nicaragua and Nicaragua v Costa Rica cases began as separate proceedings which were joined together by the Court in 2013 (see this press release). Under Article 47 of the Rules of the ICJ,

The Court may at any time direct that the proceedings in two or more cases be joined. It may also direct that the written or oral proceedings, including the calling of witnesses, be in common;  or the Court may, without effecting any formal joinder, direct common action in any of these respects.”

There are not too many cases that have been joined by the Court and my second question is this:

2) In which proceedings have cases before the International Court been joined?

Read the rest of this entry…

 

Happy New Year & Most Read Posts of 2015

Published on December 31, 2015        Author: 

As 2015 comes to an end and we enter into 2016, I would like to wish our readers a Happy New Year! I also take the opportunity to provide you with a list of the 20 most read posts for 2015. The information used in compiling the list is from Google Analytics, which tell us which gives us information about the number of times pages on the blog are viewed. The posts listed below were not all written in 2015 but were the ones accessed most frequently in 2015. In fact, nearly half of the posts in the list below were not written in 2015. It is encouraging to see that readers come to blog not just to access current material but that pieces are regarded as having some enduring value.  We strive to cover a range of areas of international law on the blog, and the list below, contains pieces with diverse subject matter. However, it is noticeable that right at the top of this list of most read posts, there is a concentration on pieces that touch on the use of force and armed conflict. The list below is reverse order, with the top 10 posts below the fold:

20) On the Entirely Predictable Outcome of Croatia v. Serbia, Marko Milanovic

19) Kadi Showdown: Substantive Review of (UN) Sanctions by the ECJ, Antonios Tzanakopoulos (2013)

18) Permanent Imminence of Armed Attacks: Resolution 2249 (2015) and the Right to Self Defence Against Designated Terrorist Groups, Marc Weller

17) European Hypocrisy: TTIP and ISDS, Joseph Weiler

16) Double Duty at the ICC, Daphné Richemond-Barak

15) The Grand Chamber Judgment in Hassan v UK, Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne (2014)

14) The new enemy of mankind: The Jurisdiction of the ICC over members of “Islamic State”  Kai Ambos

13) European Court Decides Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda Marko Milanovic (2011)

12) Arbitration between Croatia and Slovenia: Leaks, Wiretaps, Scandal (Part 2) Arman Sarvarian & Rudy Baker

11) Espionage & Good Faith in Treaty Negotiations: East Timor v Australia Dapo Akande & Kate Mitchell (2014) Read the rest of this entry…

Filed under: EJIL Analysis
 

A Preview of a Prequel: Roger O’Keefe’s Inaugural Lecture

Published on December 30, 2015        Author: 

Early in the New Year, we will have the pleasure of posting Roger O’Keefe’s inaugural lecture,roger-okeefe delivered earlier month, at University College London. In the lecture, “Curriculum Vitae. A Prequel“,  Roger:

 “tease[s] out some recurrent international legal problems through the story of the life and opinions of D. H. G. H.-G. Salamander, lesser highly qualified publicist and minor poet”.

animal-reptile-salamander-north-american-salamander-610x340The lecture is very much in the vein of Roger’s masterful piece: “Once upon a time there was a gap” from about 5 years ago. It is a wonderfully written piece that will have you laughing out loud. Watch out for the cameo appearances made by real life academics (departed and still living – including editors of blogs) as well as judges. The genius of the piece lies in the fact that as much as it is a humorous piece, it is also a most thoughtful piece about international law theory and methodology. It should cause readers to reflect on issues like the role and function of international law (and indeed of international lawyers). Those of you who enjoyed “Once upon A time there was a gap” will surely enjoy this new piece. I would encourage you to re-read the earlier piece to whet the appetite. Those who have not enjoyed the previous piece, well, that can only be because you have not yet read it. So you should also read that earlier piece and look out for the tale about D. H. G. H.-G. Salamander!

 

UK Parliamentary Inquiry into UK Policy on the Use of Drones for Targeted Killing

Published on December 23, 2015        Author: 

In August this year, the United Kingdom carried out a drone strike in Syria for the purpose of targeting a member of ISIS (see previous discussion on this blog here and here). At the end of October, the Joint Committee on Human Rights of the UK’s Parliament launched an inquiry into the UK government’s policy on the use of drones for targeted killing. Unlike the US, which has published a white paper setting out the legal framework for the US of lethal force against US citizens who are senior members of Al Qaeda, the UK had not previously set out its policy for the use of lethal force in areas outside of active hostilities.  The inquiry by the Joint Committee (joint because its membership is drawn both from the House of Commons and the House of Lords) is not particularly directed at the drone strikes that occurred this past summer but has a more general focus. It is intended to tease out the following issues:

  • clarification of the Government’s policy and its legal basis
  • the decision-making process that precedes the Government’s use of drones for targeted killing, including the safeguards to ensure the sufficiency of evidence
  • accountability for actions taken pursuant to the policy (what independent checks exist before and/or after a strike; should there be independent scrutiny and, if so, who should carry it out?)

The Joint Committee invited the submission of written evidence as part of its inquiry and you can find the evidence submitted to the Committee here. That evidence came from a range of sources, including academics and civil society.  Christof Heyns (the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Arbitrary and Summary Executions), Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, Thompson Chengeta and I put in a written submission which is essentially an article that we are writing on “The Right to Life and the International Law Framework Regulating the Use of Armed Drones” – but which starts with a 7 page summary of the article. That article is a much expanded version of the Report that Christof presented to the UN General Assembly on 25 October 2013, (UN Doc, A/68/30532).

UK Memo to the Committee

The UK Government submitted a 4 page memo to the Joint Committee setting out its response to the issues raised by the Committee. That memo sets out very briefly the UK’s policy on the use of lethal force. Much of what is says is very familiar and simply restates the position of the UK government on a number of important issues regarding the use of force: Read the rest of this entry…

 
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Discussion of Stefan Talmon’s “Determining Customary International Law: The ICJ’s Methodology between Induction, Deduction and Assertion”

Published on November 27, 2015        Author: 

I am delighted to announce that, over the next few days, we will be hosting a discussion of Professor Stefan Talmon’s (University of Bonn) recent article – “Determining Customary International Law: The ICJ’s Methodology between Induction, Deduction and Assertion” – which was published a few months ago in (2015) EJIL Issue no. 2 . As he explains in the abstract:

This article aims to refocus attention on the methodology used by the Court when determining the rules of customary international law that it applies, and it highlights the role played by methodology in the development of customary international law.

Commenting on the article will be Sir Michael Wood, who is the International Law Commission’s Special Rapporteur on “The Identification of Customary International Law”, writing together with Omri Sender (of the World Bank); Harlan Grant Cohen (University of Georgia); and Fernando Lusa Bordin (University of Cambridge). They have all previously written brilliantly on customary international law. We are grateful to each of them for taking part in this discussion. As usual, comments by readers are welcome. Stefan’s article is freely available on the EJIL and OUP websites so do take a look at it in advance of the discussion.

 
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China’s View of International Litigation: Is the WTO Special?

Published on November 13, 2015        Author: 

Yesterday, Geraldo Vidigal put up a really interesting post looking at recent patterns of use of the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement system. One thing that was particularly striking to me was the extent to which China has participated in the WTO dispute settlement system given its previous position on resolution of disputes by international tribunals. Geraldo’s chart of the latest 100 disputes at the WTO shows that only the United States, the EU and Japan have initiated more cases at the WTO in recent years than China (with Japan initiating just one more case than China in this period). Given that the WTO system is the most widely used inter-state dispute settlement system, it might not even be an exaggeration to say that: in terms of numbers of cases brought before international tribunals by states, China is one of the most enthusiastic state users of international tribunals! Of course, that enthusiasm is only before one particular system.

In October 2010 I posted here on EJIL:Talk a piece titled “Is China Changing its View of International Tribunals?“in which I noted that China’s view on international tribunals more broadly seemed to be changing. At the time, I noted China’s participation in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion at the ICJ, which was the first time that the People’s Republic appeared in oral hearings before the ICJ. I also pointed out China’s participation, around the same time, in the written and oral phases of International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’s (ITLOS) first advisory proceedings –  the Responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area (Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber). In 2014, China submitted a substantial written statement in the Request for an advisory opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC) though it did not take part in the oral hearings.

Of course, we have non-participation by China with respect to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Annex VII arbitration initiated by the Philippines (in respect of which the tribunal issued an award on jurisdiction a couple of weeks ago). Read the rest of this entry…

 
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Joint Series on International Law and Armed Conflict: Querying the Roles for Human Rights Bodies in the Interplay between International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law

Published on September 11, 2015        Author: 

As noted earlier this week, EJIL:Talk! together with Lawfare and InterCross are running a joint series over the next few weeks on International Law and Armed Conflict. The latest post in the series, over at Lawfare, is by Joanna Harrington, (Professor of Law at the University of Alberta). She begins her post by noting that:MG0146cropped

“Complexities remain with respect to the interaction between the fields of international human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL) in situations of armed conflict. Focusing on the human rights side of this interplay, there are questions about which human rights obligations apply, to what extent, and to whom, as well as questions about the role for international human rights monitoring bodies. Should the human rights bodies, for example, see their role as one of shaping the contours of IHL?

The words “human rights body” can easily be misread as if to treat all human rights bodies as being the same, with the same functions, and with the same effect or influence by virtue of being a “human rights body”. Included within this term are courts and commissions, committees and working groups, but from a Canada/U.S. perspective, there is interest in those human rights bodies that are not courts, since both countries cannot be subject to the European Court system, and nor have they accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

The Question of an Accountability Gap

Often these discussions begin by identifying a perceived accountability gap, drawing attention to the lack of an international adjudicative body to provide authoritative interpretations of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols. Having identified a gap, it is assumed that the gap must be filled. But there are times in international negotiations when gaps serve a purpose, perhaps when efforts to achieve agreement on a particular aspect or mechanism have failed.”

Read more at Lawfare

 

Embedded Troops and the Use of Force in Syria: International and Domestic Law Questions

Published on September 11, 2015        Author: 

Editor’s Notes: This post was written before the announcement earlier this week that the UK had conducted a drone strike against members of Islamic State in Syria in August. Commentary on that latest development will follow later.

As Rob McLaughlin noted in his post, UK military pilots, (as well as other UK military personnel), embedded with US and Canadian forces have taken part in air strikes in Syria against Islamic State (or ISIL) targets. It has also been reported that Australian pilots embedded with US forces are also due to start taking part in that campaign in Syria. In a written Ministerial Statement of 20 July, the UK Secretary of State for Defense confirmed that: “A small number of embedded UK pilots have carried out airstrikes in Syria against ISIL targets: none are currently involved in airstrikes.”

The involvement of UK military personnel in air strikes in Syria would ordinarily raise a number of international law questions: (i) Is the UK to be considered as using force in Syria, and, if so, what is the legal basis for such action?; (ii) is the UK to be regarded as a party to one or more of the armed conflicts taking place in Syria?; (iii) would the UK bear responsibility if any violations of international law, occur in the conduct of those air strikes? Although these are all important questions of international law, they have not been all that significant in this case. These questions have not been of great importance in the context of the air strikes conducted by embedded personnel largely because (in the case of the first two) they arise apart from the participation in those airstrikes, and because (in the case of the third), it has not been suggested that violations of international humanitarian law occurred in the conduct of those strikes.

In the UK, the significance of UK forces acting in Syria has arisen largely because of domestic political and legal considerations that I set out below. However, as will be seen those domestic legal considerations are intertwined with questions of international law and in particular, with the question whether the UK pilots who have acted in Syria are to be considered as part of the armed forces of the UK, or rather as part of the armed forces of the countries in whose forces they are embedded (the US or Canada). This question, which is important domestically, raises the international law question that Rob McLaughlin refers to: are the acts of those UK pilots attributable, as a matter of international law, to the UK, or attributable only to the US and Canada?

The UK and the Legality of the Use of Force in Syria

The UK has already indicated that it would be prepared to use force against Islamic State in Syria and it has been rumoured that the government would seek parliamentary approval for such a use of force this autumn, perhaps even, this month. In any case, even prior to the revelation that UK embedded personnel had acted in Syria, the UK had already engaged in acts which amount to a use of force in Syria as it is involved in training and equipping Syrian rebel forces Read the rest of this entry…

 

Transatlantic Workshop on International Law and Armed Conflict: Introduction to a Joint Blog Series

Published on September 9, 2015        Author: 

Over the next few weeks, three blog –  Lawfare, InterCross (the blog of the ICRC) and EJIL:Talk! – will host a joint blog symposium on International Law and Armed Conflict. The series will feature posts by some of the participants at the Third Transatlantic Workshop on International Law and Armed Conflict, which was held at the University of Oxford this summer. As with previous years, the Transatlantic Workshop brought together senior government officials, senior military lawyers and leading academics from the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Israel and Switzerland. The two day workshop focuses each year on a range of critical issues in the law of armed conflict. This summer, there was a particular focus at the workshop on the judicial application of international humanitarian law, with sessions dedicated to the application of the law of armed conflict by human rights tribunals; international criminal tribunals; and by national courts. In addition, the workshop also engaged in discussions on direct participation in hostilities; humanitarian access in armed conflict; and foreign intervention in non-international armed conflicts.

The first post in the series – “Direct Participation in Hostilities- What are the Issues and Where are the Controversies?” – by Marco Sassoli (University of Geneva) is now available on InterCross. In his concluding paragraph he argues that:sassoli_marco220

” . . . it is this preliminary question whether and in which circumstances someone who is not a combatant may be targeted even while not DPH [taking a direct part in hostilities] that is at the heart of the controversies surrounding the ICRC DPH Guidance, rather than the question of what conduct actually constitutes direct participation. On this latter question the Guidance has suggested a definition. Today several experts and officials criticize some aspects of this definition. Experts representing militaries are however mostly obsessed by – and object to – first, the application, by the ICRC, of the principle of military necessity to the targeting of individuals directly participating in hostilities and second, by what they refer to as the ‘revolving door’ phenomenon. That a civilian regains protection once s/he no longer directly participates, regardless of whether s/he may possibly directly participate in the future, is however, an unavoidable result of the clear wording of Article 51(3) of Protocol I and of Art. 13(3) of Protocol II. If the fact of having directly participated in hostilities once or several times had the effect of turning civilians into combatants or members of armed groups, the crucial criteria relevant to determining whether an individual is a member of an armed group – belonging, responsibility and command – would become irrelevant. From a pragmatic point of view, I wonder how a soldier confronted with a civilian not directly participating can be expected to know that the individual did previously engage in direct participation and/or is likely to do so again. To make such speculations the basis for decisions over life or death is dangerous, including for the great majority of harmless civilians.”

Read the rest of this entry…