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Women on Board: The EU Commission’s Proposal for a Directive on Improving the Gender Balance among Non-Executive Directors of Companies Listed on Stock Exchanges and Related Measures

Published on November 30, 2012        Author: 

Anne Peters is Professor of International and Constitutional Law, University of Basel,  and currently fellow at the Wissenschaftskolleg Berlin.

1. Background and core contents of the proposed Directive

On 14 November 2012, the EU Commission tabled a proposal for a Directive on a highly sensitive issue and did so without using the ‘Q-word’ (COM(2012) 614 final). The Commission bases its proposal on Art. 157(3)TFEU which empowers the EU to adopt ‘measures to ensure the application of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation’. The proposed Directive requires that

‘Member States shall ensure that listed companies in whose boards members of the under-represented sex hold less than 40 percent of the non-executive director positions make the appointments to those positions on the basis of a comparative analysis of  the qualifications of each candidate, by applying pre-established, clear, neutrally formulated and unambiguous criteria, in order to attain the said percentage at the latest by 1 January 2020 or at the latest by 1 January 2018 in case of listed companies which are public undertakings.’ (Art. 4(1)).

The Directive further holds that

‘In order to attain the objective laid down in paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that, in the selection of non-executive directors, priority shall be given to the candidate of the under-represented sex if that candidate is equally qualified as a candidate of the other sex in terms of suitability, competence and professional performance, unless an objective assessment taking account of all criteria specific to the individual candidates tilts the balance in favour of the candidate of the other sex.’ (Art. 4(3)).

The proposed Directive is equally applicable to various board structures for listed companies that exist in member states, both to dual systems (separate management and supervisory boards) and to unitary systems combining management and supervisory functions.

Measures to improve the gender balance through quotas are highly controversial both politically and in legally. Many states of the world have been experimenting with quotas for women in public employment/civil service and for political elections/party lists. Imposing by law quotas for women onto the business sector raises additional legal issues, because such legislation interferes with the business actors’ rights of property, economic freedom, and the freedom of association. Reacting to the conspicuously meagre presence of female managers, some EU member states, notably Norway and Denmark, have already introduced quotas, goals, or reserved seats in the boards of companies’ management positions. In other states such as Germany, such a policy is totally contested. This post sketches out the main legal issues hoping to trigger further debate.

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Filed under: EJIL Analysis, European Union, Prohibition of Discrimination
 

Human Rights Essay Award Competition Deadline: February 1, 2013

Published on November 29, 2012        Author: 

This annual competition sponsored by the Academy on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law at American University Washington College of Law seeks to stimulate the production of scholarly work in international human rights law.

The 2013 topic is The Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered People and International Human Rights Law. Participants have the flexibility to choose any subject related to the assigned topic. The best articles may be published in the American University International Law Review.

 The Academy will grant two Awards, one for the best article in English and one for the best article in Spanish. The Award in each case will consist of:

  • a scholarship to the Academy’s Program of Advanced Studies
  • travel expenses to Washington D.C.
  • housing at the university dorms
  • a per diem for living expenses

 For detailed guidelines about the award please visit: www.wcl.american.edu/hracademy/hraward.cfm or contact the Academy at hracademy {at} wcl.american(.)edu

Filed under: EJIL Reports
 
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Evidence Obtained by Torture: Is it Ever Admissible?

Published on November 28, 2012        Author: 

Natasha Simonsen is a graduate student in the Faculty of Law, University of Oxford

Earlier this month, the UK’s Special Immigration Appeals Commission (‘SIAC’) ordered the release from detention of controversial Jordanian-born cleric Abu Qatada. SIAC held that he could not be deported to Jordan, because there was a ‘real risk’ that evidence obtained by torture would be admitted against him in proceedings in Jordanian courts (read the judgment here). The cleric was released on highly restrictive bail conditions on Tuesday of last week, and the scale of public outrage was such that police had to intervene to protect him from protesters outside his home. The Home Secretary may appeal the decision, and there are new rumours that Abu Qatada plans to sue the government for damages for wrongful imprisonment. This post addresses the implications of SIAC’s decision for the exclusionary rule for  evidence obtained by torture.

The Strasbourg Court’s decision

To fully explain the SIAC decision we must return to the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in Abu Qatada v UK from January of this year. To the exasperation ofmany British politicians, including the Prime Minister, in that case the Strasbourg Court held that Abu Qatada could not be deported to Jordan, because the trial that he faced there would likely involve the admission of torture evidence. The two key witnesses against him had been beaten on the soles of their feet to extract confessions—a torture technique known as falanga—and the Jordanian State Security Court was unlikely to exclude such evidence [at 285 in the judgment]. This meant, in the Strasbourg Court’s view, that there was a ‘real risk’ that Abu Qatada would face a flagrantly unfair trial in breach of Article 6 of the Convention. The Court used strong language, stating that that ‘the admission of torture evidence is manifestly contrary, not just to the provisions of Article 6, but to the most basic international standards of a fair trial’ [at 267]. Elsewhere in the judgment, the Court stressed that the exclusionary rule was inextricably bound up with the rule of law [264]. Read the rest of this entry…

Filed under: European Court of Human Rights, Human Rights, Torture
 
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Drug trafficking at sea: no longer a crime of universal jurisdiction before US Courts?

Published on November 22, 2012        Author: 

Once again, a new maritime drug smuggling case raises interesting questions of international law and its implications for national prosecutions.

Back in 2010 I blogged on Medvedyev: a European Court of Human Rights case finding that an ad hoc agreement between France and Cambodia was an insufficient legal basis for France to prosecute drug smuggler. The agreement for France to board the vessel and assume jurisdiction over the offences discovered was concluded by diplomatic note and valid at international law, but it was a defective basis of jurisdiction in European human rights law because (inter alia) it lacked a required quality of “foreseeability”. (That is, the Cambodian nationals in question could not have predicted they would become subject to French law).

In more recent developments, I am grateful to Ilias Bantekas for drawing to my attention the US Court of Appeals (11th Circuit) decision in US v Bellaizac-Hurtado (6 November 2012).

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Filed under: EJIL Analysis, Law of the Sea, Piracy
 

The University of Michigan Law School is looking for an Assistant Dean for International Affairs

Published on November 20, 2012        Author: 

This opening follows the announcement that their longtime Assistant Dean, Virginia Gordan, will be retiring. The announcement is here. This is a great opportunity for someone interested in serving as an academic administrator at one the top institutions for international, comparative, and foreign law.

Filed under: EJIL Reports
 
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The Saga Continues: Argentina’s Request for Provisional Measures v Ghana before the ITLOS

Published on November 20, 2012        Author: 

On 14 November 2012 Argentina filed a Request for provisional measures before the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) based in Hamburg, Germany in accordance with Article 290(5) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), requesting Ghana to release the frigate ARA Libertad, a sailing training vessel of the Argentine Navy. For the background of the case relating to Argentina’s default on its external debt in 2001 see my previous EJIL:Talk! post. This brief post will touch upon certain jurisdictional and substantive issues of the case, with particular emphasis on the jurisdictional framework established by the UNCLOS, the question of jurisdiction, and the scope of Argentina’s waiver with regard to enforcement immunity of warships.

Some Jurisdictional Aspects of the Case: The Forum

Although the case relates to the seizure of a vessel, it should be stressed that the case in question is a provisional measures case and not a prompt release case (Article 292 UNCLOS) which constitute the majority of the cases decided by the ITLOS so far. Where there is no agreement regarding which court or tribunal should decide on the prescription of provisional measures, the ITLOS will decide on the matter, provided that proceedings are already initiated before an arbitral tribunal  (Article 290 UNCLOS). Read the rest of this entry…

Filed under: EJIL Analysis, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Law of the Sea, State Immunity
 

Immunity of Warships: Argentina Initiates Proceedings Against Ghana under UNCLOS

Published on November 20, 2012        Author: 

Another chapter has begun in the saga of NML Capital Ltd’s attempts to collect on its holdings of Argentinean bonds (see here for earlier reporting on EJIL:Talk!) with the initiation of inter-State proceedings by Argentina against Ghana under the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea.

It will be recalled that on 2 October 2012, whilst on an official visit, the Argentinean naval training vessel the ARA Libertad was arrested in the Ghanaian port of Tema.  Its arrest was ordered by Justice Richard Adjei Frimpong, sitting in the Commercial Division of the Accra High Court, on an application by NML to enforce a judgment against Argentina obtained in the US courts.   The judge considered that the waiver of immunity contained in Argentina’s bond documents (which are at the heart of the dispute with NML) operated to lift the vessel’s immunity from execution. That waiver provides that:

To the extent the Republic [of Argentina] or any of its revenues, assets or properties shall be entitled … to any immunity from suit, … from attachment prior to judgment, … from execution of a judgment or from any other legal or judicial process or remedy, … the Republic has irrevocably agreed not to claim and has irrevocably waived such immunity to the fullest extent permitted by the laws of such jurisdiction (and consents generally for the purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to the giving of any relief or the issue of any process in connection with any Related Proceeding or Related Judgment).

Argentina has strongly resisted this assertion of jurisdiction, claiming that it violates the immunity enjoyed by public vessels, which cannot be impliedly waived.  It appears that the vessel remains under the control of a skeleton crew, who have prevented any efforts by the Ghanaian authorities to move the vessel, whilst being preventing themselves from leaving port.

Both States being parties to UNCLOS, on 29 October 2012 Argentina instituted arbitration proceedings against Ghana under Annex VII UNCLOS (Ghana not having made a declaration under Article 287 UNCLOS: see Article 287(3)).  On 14 November 2012 Argentina applied to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for the prescription of provisional measures prior to the constitution of the Annex VII arbitration tribunal (ITLOS press release here). Argentina may well have the law on its side as regards State immunity for warships.  It may be, however, that ITLOS and an UNCLOS Annex VII arbitral tribunal are not the right fora for the settlement of its dispute with Ghana.

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Filed under: EJIL Analysis, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Law of the Sea, State Immunity
 

The Gotovina Omnishambles

Published on November 18, 2012        Author: 

Friday’s judgment in Gotovina and Markac by the ICTY Appeals Chamber (summary; judgment), in which it by 3 votes to 2 reversed a unanimous Trial Chamber and acquitted the defendants, is a disaster at almost every level. I say this not as an aggrieved Serb lamenting the selectiveness of international justice and its failure to punish crimes against his own people – I have long since developed antibodies to all forms of nationalism, including the very virulent type thriving on self-victimization, and I have no personal axe to grind here. I say this rather as an international (human rights) lawyer who has always thought of the ICTY as an indispensable, if imperfect, instrument of justice for the atrocities of the Yugoslav conflicts. That said, how and why then is the Gotovina appeals judgment so bad? To my mind, the problem is not with the acquittal as such – even though as far as public opinion in the former Yugoslavia is concerned the bottom line is all that mattered. Rather, the problem is with the process, the reasoning, the appearances, and the broader repercussions that all these will have.

First, with regard to process: as the dissents by Judges Agius and Pocar correctly point out, the majority make a complete mess of the appellate standards for review. Readers will recall that in the common law-inspired procedure of the ICTY the main task of the Appeals Chamber is to correct errors of law made by the Trial Chamber. The Trial Chamber is owed deference with regards to its findings of fact, which are not to be disturbed lightly on appeal, but only if no reasonable trier of fact could have made the relevant finding on the strength of the record. In short, unlike in most continental systems, the appellate process should not amount a retrial, a de novo examination of the entire case. This ensures both procedural economy and the integrity of the exhaustive fact-finding process in the trial court.

While the majority endorses these standards as they are set out in the ICTY’s long-established jurisprudence, it does not actually follow them – to the extent that its approach to standards of review is actually even discernible, as I will now explain. The whole case ultimately turned around the Trial Chamber’s unfortunate finding that in assessing the shelling by the Croatian artillery of the four Serb towns in the separatist Serb entity in Croatia, chief of them Knin, any shell that fell further than 200 meters from a legitimate military target in the towns should be presumptively considered as evidence of an unlawful indiscriminate attack. The Appeals Chamber was actually unanimous that this rigid standard was not supported by the evidence in the trial record and was not given adequate reasons for by the Trial Chamber.

So far so good. But what the majority then does with this finding turns appellate review on its head. The majority does not explain whether the Trial Chamber’s error with regard to the 200 meter standard itself was an error of law or an error of fact. If it was the former, the majority would have had to articulate a new, proper legal standard for testing the facts established in the record, upon whose application we could know whether the shelling of Knin and the other towns was indiscriminate or not. If it was the latter, the majority would have had to pay due deference to the totality of the factual findings made by the Trial Chamber and should only have disturbed them if no reasonable trier of fact could have found that the shelling was indiscriminate on the basis of all of the evidence in the record.

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Filed under: EJIL Analysis, International Criminal Law, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
 
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